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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the effects of state initiated smart 
growth legislation on various aspects of the phenomenon known as urban sprawl. Sprawl 
is associated with a number of undesirable conditions including depletion of natural 
resources, increased traffic congestion, and loss of residents and businesses in inner city 
areas. 
In an attempt to alleviate and prevent these conditions, some states have 
implemented smart growth legislative programs. These programs vary in form from 
comprehensive in nature, or extending to all land use activities; to pertaining only to 
special areas, such as coastlines. In addition, state legislation varies according to the 
balance employed by the state between coercion and incentives used to obtain local 
government compliance. Utilizing a combination of existing classification systems for 
state smart growth legislation, I developed a model that incorporates the two elements 
described above. Based on the "proposed model", I selected three cities in three states to 
evaluate. I selected Baltimore, MD to represent low-coercion/comprehensive general; 
Atlanta, GA to represent medium-coercion/comprehensive general; and Orlando, FL to 
represent high-coercion/comprehensive general. My rationale was that change could best 
be observed at the city level. 
I selected variables for testing within these cities based on the five primary 
objectives of smart growth. In each city, I evaluated whether or not there was a change in 
certain variables (air quality, for example) after implementation of the respective state 
program. I determined which city showed the most improvement in terms of the 
dependent variables, and then I extrapolated my findings to the state level. 
I reached a preliminary conclusion that the more coercive a state's smart growth 
legislative program is, the more likely it will be effective at the local level. I based this 
on data results for the city of Orlando, FL, which were generally more in line with smart 
growth goals than those of Baltimore and Atlanta. In fact, Orlando was more successful 
with controlling population density, maintaining air quality, and minimizing roadway 
congestion. It is also important to note that Atlanta, the test city with the next highest 
level of coercion, scored second best. These findings are of particular interest given that 
the trend for the last ten to 15 years has been for states to implement less coercive smart 
growth programs. 
V 
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. CHAPTERI 
THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN SPRAWL IN THE UNITED STATES 
Introduction 
One of the perennial challenges for local governments is how to encourage 
responsible growth while minimizing problems that often accompany growth (Burby and 
May 1998; Freilich 1999; Garreau 1991; Popper 1981; Stein 1993; Weitz 1999). A 
growing population and economy are desirable for cities because of the subsequent 
benefits (Briechle 1999, Hudnutt 1998). Those may include an increased tax base, 
creation of jobs, and economic stimulation of local retail and entertainment venues. 
However, economic growth may also be accompanied by rapid expansion in the land area 
of a community, depletion of natural resources, increased traffic congestion, and loss of 
residents and businesses in the inner city area. These undesirable conditions are all 
associated with "urban sprawl", perhaps the most widely cited problem related to rapid or 
uncontrolled urban growth (Anderson and Tregoning 1998). 
Consequences of Urban Sprawl 
Urban sprawl refer.s to a variety of possible conditions that may arise when 
growth is not managed in a way that utilizes existing infrastructure, or that talces into 
account the natural features that make a community one-of-a-kind. Sprawl is associated 
with low-density development outside of an established urban core. Development of this 
kind may engulf neighboring communities, destroy natural resources, and reinforce the 
1 
reliance on personal automobiles for transportation (Beaumont, ed. 1999, Briechle 1999, 
Mitchell 2001 ). 
Atlanta, Georgia is an example of a city that has experienced sprawl and its 
associated challenges. According to U.S. Census data, Atlanta has spread outward so that 
it now occupies a total of 701. 7 square miles. In addition, per capita land consumption in 
Atlanta is .337 acre (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). This means that it talces over one­
third of an acre to provide the average resident of Atlanta with space for housing, work, 
recreation, and other needs ("Per Capita" 2000). 
When communities sprawl, existing infrastructures are underutilized, often while 
new systems are built simultaneously elsewhere. The most common situation is that 
water and electrical systems in older urban centers fall into disuse while whole new 
systems are built in rapidly expanding suburbs. This is an expensive problem, because 
the city must raise money to pay for the new infrastructure (Mitchell 2001). 
Environmental degradation is another negative aspect of unmanaged growth. 
The migration of residents to newly built developments in urban fringe areas has the 
consequence of shrinking the supply of open space and valuable farmland, and may 
threaten wetlands or alter environmentally sensitive areas (Bullard 2000). Increased 
runoff caused by more pavement, roadways, and roofs increases the volume of storm 
water and contributes to non-point source pollution of streams, rivers, and lakes. 
Development in areas away from urban infrastructures results in placement of septic 
systems in areas that could pose problems for aquifers and groundwater resources 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998). Pollutants from expanding local governments may also 
include oil leaked from cars and lawn care chemicals. Contamination of natural water 
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sources, soil erosion, flash flooding, and increased air pollution are all possible 
consequences of rapid, unplanned urban development (Sierra Club 2001, Sorensen et al. 
1997). 
Transportation and traffic problems also are associated with unplanned growth. 
First, as suburbs creep further and further from the original urban center of a city, citizens 
are often forced to drive long distances to get to work. Baldassare (1986) argues that as 
suburbs have continued to expand, this situation has evolved into another problem. His 
concern is that workers who commute between suburbs utilize roadways that were not 
designed to handle high volume traffic. According to Baldassare, the resulting traffic 
congestion in suburbs is different than that in cities. The lack of a central geographic 
focus in the suburbs makes no massive rush hour jams, but has less predictable and more 
widely diffused congestion. 
Another aspect of urban sprawl with consequences for transportation is the design 
of these new suburbs. The typical arrangement within suburbs today is a "separation of 
uses". This means that shopping, recreation, and residences are all in separate locations. 
The result is that people have to drive more to accomplish daily tasks. Not only is 
increased traffic congestion a serious problem, but increased gasoline usage results as 
well (Giuliano and Wachs 1993). 
Aesthetic and social consequences are also associated with sprawling 
communities. One serious problem is that the unique features of an area that first 
attracted residents may be changed as a result of the growth. What was once "one of a 
kind" may become indistinguishable from development elsewhere. Outward expansion 
also often leaves a community with no town center. Some concerned scholars (Mitchell 
3 
2001, "Problems'' 2000) argue that as the heart of a community, or the town center dies, 
civic values also decline. They believe that when there are no longer common meeting 
places, people become isolated and anti-social (Mitchell 2001, "Problems" 2000). 
Origins of Sprawl 
Some scholars argue that policies instituted by the federal government had the 
effect of encouraging sprawl. The federal government began giving land grants to 
railroad companies in the mid-1800s. This had the effect of slowly expanding America's 
inhabited regions to include those previously unreachable and inhospitable areas (Freilich 
1999, Hill 1910). The Housing Act of 1934 also encouraged sprawl. The act was 
ostensibly created to improve housing conditions throughout the country. Loans were 
made readily available to homebuyers anxious to achieve the "American dream", and 
small home construction was used as a means of creating jobs for unskilled laborers. 
The result, however, was to move the middle class out of cities and into the suburbs. In 
1956 the national government continued to encourage sprawl by passing the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act, which created the interstate system. President Eisenhower observed that: 
"More than any single action by the government since the end of the war, this one would 
change the face of America" ("The Roots" 2001 quoted p. 1 ). The effect of interstate 
highways was to make undeveloped areas more accessible. This in turn encouraged 
residential and commercial development in rural areas (Giuliano and Wachs 1993, 
Popper 1981, "The Roots" 2001). 
State governments indirectly contributed to sprawl by enacting enabling 
legislation that gave local governments the authority to manage growth themselves 
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through zoning, ordinances, subdivision regulations, annexations, and other_ means 
(Freilich 1999). In fact, local government has historically been the level where most land 
use policies have been formulated. In spite of this, for much of the twentieth century, 
many communities were unable or unwilling to address or resolve the issue of promoting 
growth while minimizing its potentially deleterious consequences. In many cases, urban 
growth occurred without a deliberate planning effort and without regard to possible 
negative consequences (Cullingworth 1997). 
Critics have charged that many local governments made at least two critical 
mistakes that led to some of the consequences of urban sprawl. One criticism is that 
zoning, one of the most widely used tools to regulate growth, was used in a reactive 
manner rather than in a proactive way to implement a growth plan. Unlike a 
comprehensive land use plan, zoning results in many individual and unrelated decisions 
regarding lots. The results of decades of zoning decisions often are widespread, 
haphazard development patterns, inefficiency of services, and waste of resources (Burby 
and May 1997, Porter 1997). 
The second problem is that local governments often make plans and decisions 
without consulting or cooperating with neighboring local governments. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, when communities were small and distant from one another, 
unilateral planning was a necessity. Contemporaneous issues like traffic flow, pollution 
control, and environmental conservation are not contained within boundaries, however, 
and therefore require cooperation between neighboring communities (Briechle 1999, 
Smith 1993, Stein 1993). 
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Introduction of State Control 
Beginning in the early 1970s, as a result of the perceived inadequacies of 
traditional growth control tools, some states began to regulate urban growth at the local 
level (Liou and Dicker 1994). In fact, prior to that time, the only real land management 
function exercised by most states was the operation of state parks and recreation areas 
(Platt 199 1  ). This change from exclusive control by local authorities to some degree of 
control being exercised by some states is referred to as the "quiet revolution" in land use 
planning. A primacy reason for this renewed interest among state leaders concerned the 
growing awareness and lobbying efforts of citizens and interest groups regarding the 
results of poorly planned growth (Porter 1998, Morandi 2000, Weitz 1999). 
The policies being adopted by the states were eventually labeled "smart growth" 
because they had the dual intentions of encouraging healthy economic growth while 
discouraging environmental damage (Leo et al. 1998). There is considerable confusion 
as to who first developed the term smart growth. A review of the literature indicates at 
least three possibilities. Various sources claim that Roy Romer, former governor of 
Colorado first coined the term ("Colorado'' 1999, Casini 1999). Parris Glendening, 
former governor ofMacyland may have created the term (Smith 2000, Jellema 2000). 
Still other sources cite the state of Massachusetts as the birthplace of the term smart 
growth (Flint 2001 ,  "Government" 2004 ). 
Understanding _Smart Growth 
Differentiating smart growth from previous attempts at growth management is not 
easy. There is no single, widely accepted definition of smart growth. Rather, a review of 
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the literature indicates various "definitions" of this approach, which read more like 
descriptions. The Environmental Protection Agency defines smart growth as "high 
density, mixed use, transit oriented development" (Staley 2000). According to Bierbaum 
(2001 ), some characteristics of smart growth policies are control of outward migration of 
residents, urban area revitalization, design innovation, land and natural resources 
preservation, transportation reorientation, and equitable access to affordable housing. 
According to the Urban Land Institute ( 1998), smart growth policies enhance the sense of 
community, protect the investment in existing neighborhoods, protect environmental 
quality and conserve open space, decrease traffic congestion by providing alternative 
forms of transportation, and make efficient use of public money. 
While dozens of different descriptions of smart growth may be found in the 
literature, there are certain points that are agreed upon (Staley 2000). One is that smart 
growth is meant to counteract urban sprawl. Proponents seek to promote economic 
growth while also protecting environmental resources and open spaces. In all cases, 
smart growth attempts to make the link between a beneficial kind of development and 
improved quality of life (Godschalk 1992, Innes 1993, Merriam 2003). Affordable 
housing for people at all income levels is also important because it keeps populations 
from segregating or being forced to move (Danielson and Lang 1998). Smart growth also 
generally requires some sort of centralized plan, either at the state, regional, or local 
level. It is clearly important for communities dedicated to smart growth to stick to a 
preconceived growth plan rather than being swayed by developers or other interests to 
enact zoning changes. Lastly, smart growth is a collaborative effort. Local governments 
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must work together in their planning so that issues like traffic flow and pollution can be 
managed at a regional level (Briechle 1999, Hudnutt 1998). 
Smart growth legislation takes various forms. In Tennessee, growth boundaries 
are used. All counties and municipalities in the state are required to develop 
recommended growth plans for areas that will be designated as urban growth areas, 
planned growth areas, and rural areas (English and Hoffman 2001 ). Oregon utilizes 
growth boundaries similar to those developed in Tennessee and it also uses 
intergovernmental coordination techniques. Cities in Oregon are required to coordinate 
plans with their respective counties, special districts, state agencies, and the Oregon state 
plan. California, on the other hand, has an issue-based approach to smart growth. The 
state does require local governments to develop plans, but the contents of the plans are 
specific and reflect the state's concern with environmental protection as well as with 
population controls. Local governments in California must address land use, housing, 
conservation, and safety (Freilich 1999). 
As of July 2004, sixteen states have instituted some kind of smart growth 
legislation. These include Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and Washington (Bolen et al. 200 1,  Cobb 1999, Freilich 1999, Innes 1993, 
Johnson 2002). At least another four are considering similar legislation. These states are 
New Hampshire, New York, Utah, and Wisconsin ("State Incentive" 2004). 
Much of the recent growth literature details the benefits of this type of state 
intervention (Bolen et al. 2001 ,  Cobb 1999, Johnson 2002, Smith 1993). Despite the high 
level of support for the theoretical justification of state intervention, the limited number 
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of studies that have been conducted to evaluate the success of these initiatives have had 
mixed results. At this point research in this area is inconclusive as to whether state smart 
growth legislation has been successful at controUing or reversing some of the conditions 
associated with urban sprawl described above (Burby and May 1997; Porter 1998). 
Purpose of Research and Methodology 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the effects of state initiated smart 
growth legislation. To this end, I have four primary objectives. The first is to develop a 
working definition of "smart growth". I will begin by providing a brief historical review 
of growth control and land use policy enacted at each of the three levels of government. 
In developing the definition, I will explore what kinds of policies states have adopted to 
promote smart growth. 
The second objective is to identify the major types of state smart growth 
legislation. Based on the definition of smart growth developed, I will establish certain 
criteria in order to determine what laws include smart growth components. I will group 
state laws in terms of similar characteristics so that a model for classifying legislation can 
be developed. The "new" typology will be based on improvements to existing models. 
The third objective is to assess the impacts of the primary types of smart growth 
legislation identified by the model on promoting smart growth at the local level. A 
detailed discussion of methodology employed is provided in Chapter IV. Based on the 
classification system, one city in each of three representative states will be selected for 
the study. Numerous dependent variables will be tested as indicators of smart growth, the 
independent variable. For example, I will examine the trend in traffic congestion, a y  
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variable, both before and after state smart growth, the x variable, was adopted. I will 
determine whether changes are seen for each dependent variable after the state law was 
implemented, and whether those changes may be attributed to state legislation. 
The final objective is to determine which category of smart growth legislation 
appears to be most effective based on the test of cities. These conclusions will be 
preliminary, based on the evidence collected. Limitations will be further discussed in 
Chapters N and V. 
Potential Contributions to the Literature 
The primary contribution of this research will be to define, classify, and study the 
effects of smart growth legislation passed by the states. Numerous definitions or 
descriptions of smart growth exist in the literature. I will compile and synthesize the most 
useful ones into a single definition. In addition, the proposed typology will be a more 
comprehensive classification than what is currently available in the literature because it 
will combine various dichotomous classifications. Lastly, I will use the data analysis to 
extrapolate which type of state legislation appears to be most effective in achieving the 
goals of smart growth. While the results will be preliminary, they may be added to the 
developing body of scholarship on this topic. This is important, because currently, 
research on the effectiveness of state smart growth policies is inconclusive (Burby and 
May 1997, Leo et al. 1998). Most of the literature on this topic consists of case studies or 
polemics that tout the merits of more centralized policy making to regulate growth and 
minimize urban sprawl (Bierbaum 200 1 ,  Nelson and Moore 1996). Little unbiased, 
systematic investigation of smart growth legislation has been conducted. This may be 
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because state smart growth legislation is not an easy subject to study. One reason for this 
is because most smart growth legislation only ten or fifteen years old. The types of 
outcomes that the laws should produce are slow and evolutionary in nature. Real changes 
resulting from the laws are only just now beginning to be seen in many places (Burby and 
May 1997). 
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CHAPTER II 
CLASSIFICATION OF STATE INITIATED SMART GROWTH LEGISLATION 
A Definition of Smart Growth 
In order to examine smart growth at the state level, an operational definition must 
be developed for the term. As stated in the previous chapter, this is no simple task 
because existing definitions are vague and vary widely from one another (Bierbaum 
2001, Mitchell 2001, Nolon 2001 ). Popper ( 1981) argues that within the legislative 
arena, an understanding of smart growth must be kept vague in order to garner necessary 
support for the measures from both Democrats and Republicans. Outside the legislative 
arena, even land use and planning experts do not agree on exactly what constitutes smart 
growth (Bierbaum 2001 ). 
The Roots of Smart Growth: Growth Management 
Examining the roots of smart growth enhances an understanding of this concept 
that is difficult to define. A number of authors agree that smart growth stems from the 
growth management movement that began in the 1960s (Merriam 2003 ). An explanation 
of growth management is somewhat easier to provide than an explanation of smart 
growth, because authors largely agree on what constitutes that concept ( Cullingworth 
1997, Freilich 1999, Godschalk 1992, Innes 1993, Merriam 2003, Porter 1997, Steel and 
Lovrich 2000). According to Stein (1993), "Growth management planning, in all its 
varied forms, basically involves using government regulatory powers in a comprehensive, 
rational, coordinated manner to meet public objectives for balancing economic growth 
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with the protection and preservation of our natural and manmade systems" ( quoted p. vii). 
DeGrove and Metzger ( 1993) state that growth management "is a comprehensive 
concept, concerned not only with the physical impacts of growth but with the economic 
and social impacts as well" (quoted p. 1 ). 
Growth management is a governmental process that involves many interrelated 
aspects of land use. According to Godschalk ( 1992, quoted p. 423), "the hallmark of 
growth management is its balance among competing objectives". It is not restricted only 
to channeling urban growth in beneficial directions. Growth management includes a 
prohibitive element- in other words; farmland and other fragile environments must be 
protected against some or all types of development. At the same time, growth 
management plans promote development in other areas, such as housing and 
transportation (Cullingworth 1997). Above all, a growth management plan must take a 
variety of issues into account so that no single area, such as affordable housing or natural 
resource management, is neglected or harmed (Weitz 1999). 
In the next few sections, the smart growth movement will be examined in terms of 
the values associated with it, the variety of strategies employed to achieve it, and the 
individual goals that these strategies are meant to achieve. What must be concluded from 
this discussion is that the smart growth movement is "something less than a bold new 
horizon" (Bierbaum 2001 ). It is not a radically new and different concept, nor has it 
revolutionized the planning profession. Rather, the objectives and goals associated with 
smart growth have been in existence since at least the start of the growth management 
movement that began in the 1960s. (Jeffords 2000) In short, the growth management 
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plans of earlier decades have been conveniently repackaged and sold to scholars, 
politicians, environmentalists, and concerned citizens as smart growth. 
Values Associated with Smart Growth 
The basic elements of growth management became incorporated into the smart 
growth movement (Godschalk 1992, Innes 1993, Merriam 2003). The two concepts 
share a focus on economic development as well as environmental protection. Both may 
also include attention to a wide variety of planning issues- from transportation 
management to revitalization of inner cities. Neither of these approaches is restricted to 
land use management alone (Briechle 1999, Burby and May 1997). 
While smart growth is more difficult to define, a review of the literature suggests 
that a number of values are associated with it. Most scholars agree that smart growth is 
beneficial to the economy, the community, and the environment (Anderson and 
Tregoning 1998, Audubon 2001, Beaumont 1999, Briechle 1999). Allusion to a 
construction project as "smart" means that it is beneficial in all three of these ways- to the 
economy, the community, and the environment. Smart growth should not be confused 
with "no growth" agendas (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Beaumont 1999, McMahon 
1997). Indeed, smart growth activists recognize the critical role that development plays 
in maintaining and improving communities (Audubon 2001 ). 
What apparently distinguishes smart growth from other growth initiatives is the 
linkage between quality of life and development patterns and practices (Audubon 2001 ). 
Merriam (2003) asserts that the bedrock principle of the movement is that "good planning 
and appropriate regulation are essential to protecting the public's health, safety, and 
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general welfare" ( quoted p. 2). Smart growth initiatives incorporate these aspects in a 
variety of ways. For example, smart growth plans often contain a transportation element. 
Providing citizens with alternative modes of transportation may lessen traffic congestion 
caused by reliance on cars. Such action might also have the "smart" effects of decreasing 
air pollution and making the community more inviting to pedestrians. A smart growth 
plan might seek to maintain a small town's character and charm while accommodating 
new residents and a prospering economy. Another common element of a smart growth 
plan is to channel new commercial growth into the partially abandoned urban core of a 
city rather than building and financing new infrastructure elsewhere ( Anderson and 
Tregoning 1998). 
Variation in Smart Growth Strategies 
While the values associated with smart growth are generally agreed upon, there is 
no large-scale uniformity as to how these values may be implemented ("Around" 2001 ,  
Jeffords 2000, Porter 1997). In states that have adopted smart growth legislation, 
programs are unique in part due to the extent of some particular perceived environmental 
crisis (or lack thereof) (Cullingworth 1997, Popper 1981). For example, degradation of 
wetlands in Florida might stimulate different action than would air pollution in 
Tennessee's Smoky Mountains. 
Another factor that produces variation in smart growth initiatives is the political 
climate of the state. Smart growth programs involve a larger role for government in the 
development process. As a result, Democrats are often more likely to be supportive of 
these efforts than are Republicans, who generally wish to limit government intervention 
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in economic affairs (Hylton 2001 ,  Schneider "The New" 200 I ,  Schneider "White" 200 1 ). 
A state that is progressive in terms of environmental protections and planning, such as 
Oregon, might produce different smart growth programs than would a less progressive 
state, like Georgia, for example (Beaumont 1999, Cullingworth 1997, Popper 1981). In 
addition, DeGrove (1990) has shown that usually, in order for smart growth legislation to 
"have teeth", it needs gubernatorial support. Governor Parris Glendening ( 1999) of 
Maryland was especially supportive of smart growth measures in his state, which 
certainly helped Maryland to become a "model" smart growth state, according to 
advocates (Bierbaum 200 1 ). 
Finally, the social culture of a state is an important determinant of the form that 
smart growth might take in the legislature (Innes 1993, Porter 1997). States that include 
large rural areas often perceive government regulation of land and development as 
unwanted, unjustified interference, or, even "communist" in nature (McMahon 1997). 
Another pertinent social factor is the extent of citizen interest and activism in a state 
(Jeffords 2000). This has particularly affected legislation in California, which has a 
vocal, pro-active citizenry (Cullingworth 1997, Steel and Lovrich 2000). 
The Goals of Smart Growth Strategies 
A review of the literature reveals a wide diversity of strategies for achieving the 
goals of smart growth policy. These strategies may be organized under five primary 
goals, or objectives. These objectives are to: ( 1)  revitalize central cities, (2) control 
development, (3) create and improve transportation options, (4) protect natural resources, 
and ( 5) create equitable, desirable neighborhoods. Each one of these may be 
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accomplished through the incorporation of numerous initiatives by local governments 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Audubon 200 1 ,  Merriam 2003, Sierra "Sprawl" 2001). 
A sampling of the most common types of initiatives is provided below. The goals are 
italicized, while examples of means of achieving them are lettered. 
The Goals and Elements of Smart Growth 
1. Revitalize central cities 
A. Encourage investment/reinvestment in central cities and older suburbs 
B. Encourage location of major new regional attractions in central cities 
C. Encourage infill development 
D. Revitalize areas by reducing poverty and crime and improving-schools 
2. Control development 
E. Develop new communities in areas that can be efficiently serviced 
F. Establish growth boundaries for metropolitan areas 
G. Encourage/Require local governments to prepare comprehensive growth 
management plans 
H. Reverse government programs/true policies that create sprawl 
I. Increase population density to prevent sprawl 
J. Prevent new development in disaster prone areas 
3. Create and improve transportation options 
K. Direct transportation funds to existing communities 
L. Create higher density development around transit 
M. Reduce overall highway traffic congestion 
N. Make available transportation options such as walking, biking, public 
transportation 
4. Protect natural resources 
0. Preserve open space, forests, and scenic areas 
P. Conserve environmentally sensitive areas 
Q. Conserve farmland 
R. Enforce clean air and water standards 
5. Create equitable, desirable neighborhoods 
S. Create affordable housing options 
T. Incorporate New Urbanism planning guidelines 
U. Encourage mixed-use development 
V. Maintain local community character and identity 
In the following sections, I will discuss each of these goals and the means of achieving 
them, in detail. 
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Revitalize Central Cities 
A common goal of smart growth legislation is to revitalize central cities, or the 
urban cores of communities (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Beaumont 1999, Jeffords 
2000, "Sprawl Guide" 2000). When there is reinvestment and redevelopment in an 
existing community, the local government saves money by not having to finance new 
infrastructures (Audubon 2001). In addition, some amount of sprawl is prevented ·and the 
once vital downtown does not become an abandoned ghost town. Governments at 
various levels can encourage investment and reinvestment in central cities and older 
suburbs by offering incentives to businesses and residents willing to locate there 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998). A related strategy is for local governments to_ 
encourage "infill development". This is development that fills in vacant or underused 
land in existing cities with new development that blends in with its surroundings 
(Beaumont 1999, Audubon 2001 ). Another smart strategy is to plan the location of major 
new regional attractions in central cities (Anderson and Tregoning 1998). Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, for example, was able to create a once again vibrant downtown area in part by 
locating an aquarium in the area. Governments can also make older suburbs and urban 
areas more inviting to residents and businesses alike by concentrating on reducing crime 
and improving schools in those areas (Sierra "Sprawl" 2001 ). 
Control Development 
Regulating development is another critical facet of smart growth policy. A by­
default city or county planning policy consisting of an amalgam of zoning decisions is 
not acceptable to advocates of smart growth (Cullingworth 1997, "Planning" 2001). 
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Instead, advocates (Audubon 2001 ,  Beaumont 1999) argue that a number of strategies 
can be used to pro-actively encourage economic growth while accommodating the needs 
of both citizens and the environment. One strategy is to ·disallow new development in 
disaster prone areas, such as floodplains and coastal areas. Tremendous financial losses 
can be avoided altogether by not building houses in floodplains, for example (Sierra 
"Sprawl" 2001 ). Another strategy is to develop new communities in areas that can be 
efficiently serviced. With "leapfrog" development, or new housing developments that 
spring-up in rural areas made newly accessible by interstates, often new roads, water 
systems, and schools have to be created to service the new residents. Another smart 
growth strategy is to have developers themselves pay impact fees when new roads, 
schools, etc. must be constructed (Cullingworth 1997, Sierra "Sprawl" 2001). 
An increasingly popular method used by states to regulate and restrict 
development is requiring, or, at least encouraging, local governments to prepare 
comprehensive growth management plans. Often the establishment of growth boundaries 
for metropolitan areas is a part of these plans (Audubon 2001 ,  Sierra "Sprawl" 2001). 
Finally, smart growth advocates recommend that governments reverse programs 
. and tax policies that have historically encouraged sprawl (Sierra "Sprawl" 2001 ). For 
example, some communities require residential roads to be wider than other kinds of 
roads. A smart growth strategy is to narrow residential streets, in order to slow traffic 
and make neighborhoods more inviting to pedestrians (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, 
"Sprawl" 2001). 
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Create and Improve Transportation Options 
A third important goal of smart growth is to create smarter transportation options. 
A large part of this involves trying to reduce individuals' reliance on automobiles 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Audubon 200 1 ,  Beaumont 1999, Jeffords 2000). Smart 
growth advocates argue that doing so reduces pollution from car emissions, alleviates 
some degree of traffic congestion, and makes a community more pedestrian friendly, 
which in tum attracts some new residents by creating a small-town atmosphere ("Sprawl 
Guide" 2000). One strategy for accomplishing this is to create higher density 
development near transit- such as subways, bus lines, etc (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, 
Sierra "Sprawl" 2001 ). The logic of this strategy is that if public transit is convenient to 
individuals, they will be more likely to take advantage of it. Another strategy is to plan 
communities so that residents have a variety of transportation options available to them. 
Possibilities include walking, biking, and public transportation (Audubon 2001 ,  
Beaumont 1999). Walking or biking from home to the grocery store, or from home to 
work is not a realistic option in most suburban communities today. Rather, the strict 
separation of uses and heavy traffic usually helps to reinforce a reliance on cars for even 
basic errands ("Sprawl Guide" 2000). 
Advocates of smart growth (Audubon 200 1 ,  Jeffords 2000, Sierra "Sprawl" 2001 )  
also recommend leveraging state and federal transportation funds to encourage the kinds 
of changes described above. Transportation funds available to local governments can be 
restricted for use in existing communities. This strategy has the dual effects of causing 
local governments to reinvest in existing suburban and urban areas, and reducing sprawl 
by not creating new highways (Anderson and Tregoning 1998). Research has shown that 
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in many instances, construction of new roads in order to alleviate congestion on existing 
roads does not work. In fact, it usually encourages more traffic and more development in 
areas made accessible by the new roads (Sierra "Sprawl" 2001 ). 
Protect Natural Resources 
Protection of natural resources is an important part of smart growth. Activists 
seek to preserve air and water quality, open spaces, forests, and scenic areas (Anderson 
and Tregoning 1998, Audubon 2001 ,  Beaumont 1999, Jeffords 2000). Initiatives of this 
type are important for environmental reasons, such as protecting nesting birds in 
woodlands, and they are important for retaining the unique character and appeal of an 
area to its residents (Beaumont 1999, "Sprawl Guide" 2000). Smart growth activists also 
often attempt to conserve environmentally sensitive areas, such as coastlines and · 
wetlands (Audubon 2001 ,  Beaumont 1999). Areas such as wetlands perform unique 
functions, like filtering impurities from the water supply and acting as a sponge to absorb 
excess precipitation. Developing wetland areas may contaminate groundwater supplies 
and contribute to flooding (Reagin 2002). Another smart growth strategy is to conserve 
farmland by planning for and encouraging development in other areas (Anderson and 
Tregoning 1998, Beaumont 1999). Experts state that after farmland has been developed, 
it can eventually be return�d to a natural state, but it can never regain the rich crop 
producing potential it once had (Cullingworth 1997). 
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Create Equitable, Desirable Neighborhoods 
A fifth primary objective of the smart growth movement is to make 
neighborhoods themselves "smarter". A basic part of this goal lies in developing 
neighborhoods that residents can live, play, work, and shop within (Beaumont 1999). 
This is the concept of "mixed-use" development (Audubon 200 1 ). Conventional 
suburban development employs a strict separation of uses. In other words, grocery stores 
and other shopping venues are located away from residential areas. Individuals in 
conventional suburbs must often drive to widely dispersed locations in order to get to 
their jobs, places of recreation, and churches. The legal separation and isolation of land 
uses originated as a means of protecting citizens. Dangerous, foul smelling, and 
unsightly practices, such as tar boiling and fat rendering, were restricted to locations 
away from residences. Children were also protected from commercial and industrial 
traffic (Nolon 2001). Planners assert that this well-intentioned practice eventually served 
to reinforce suburban sprawl in the US ( Gerckens 1994 ). According to smart growth 
advocates {Audubon 200 1,  Beaumont 1999), mixed-use neighborhoods would decrease 
dependence on cars and increase the quality of life for residents by making their daily 
experiences less stressful or aggravating. 
A second smart growth strategy for making smarter neighborhoods is maintaining 
local community character and identity within the development process (Anderson and 
Tregoning 1998, Beaumont 1999). Smart growth advocates argue that one of the 
unfortunate consequences of sprawl is that over time, areas that were once unique 
become indistinguishable from other places. This is largely because the absence of a 
calculated· growth plan by local governments allows for the flourishing of conventional 
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"cookie cutter" suburban neighborhoods. One of the methods recommended for 
. maintaining local community character is the adoption of New Urbanist planning 
guidelines (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, "Smarf' 200 1 ). New Urbanism is the area of 
planning most closely associated with smart growth. Aspects of New Urbanism design 
include developing a town square, or other central meeting point in a community, 
locating playgrounds within ¼ mile of any home, and situating houses near the street with 
the garage in back of the house accessible by an alley (Steuteville 2000, Schneider 2001 ). 
Proponents argue that incorporating these features into a neighborhood enhances a 
healthy sense of community. 
Smart growth advocates also argue that to improve neighborhoods, housing must 
be made available to residents of every income level (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, 
Audubon 200 1). This means that there must be a mix of housing options in an.area, 
including single-family homes, apartments, and duplexes, for example. One of the goals 
of this recommendation is to remedy the type of housing segregation that exists in many 
communities and is associated with sprawl. Often lower income families are forced to 
live in inner cities where rents are cheaper, while wealthy and middle-class families move 
further and further into the suburbs (Katz and Bradley 1999). Besides the implications 
for individual civil rights, such segregation has secondary effects (Rusk 1993 ). There 
may eventually develop a mismatch between available workforce and potential jobs. 
When a community sprawls, new growth emerges further and further away from what 
was once the urban core. Supermarkets, specialty shops, professional practices, and 
entertainment venues all may open new sites in the outer ring suburbs, and close sites in 
the city. These establishments require low wageworkers that live primarily in the older 
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urban areas. Businesses eventually suffer from not having enough low line employees. 
Meanwhile, those potential workers forced to remain in the old city areas have trouble 
finding jobs (Rusk 1993). Middle class and wealthy suburbanites, on the other hand, are 
often forced to drive from suburbs back into the city, where their higher paying positions 
are located (Walljasper 2001). 
Criticisms of Smart Growth Techniques 
While smart growth is a popular approach in many communities today, a review 
of the literature also reveals substantial criticism toward the concept. Some critics 
challenge the assumptions underlying the need for smart growth policies, while others 
challenge the methods associated with achieving smart growth. Still others are critical of 
the results achieved by smart growth legislation. 
A number of scholars (Bishop and Tilley 2002, Gordon and Richardson 1998, 
Staley 2001) who are critical of smart growth argue that the environmental crises that 
generally precede such legislation are usually misunderstood, exaggerated, or 
nonexistent. Staley (200 1 ), for example, challenges popular notions that development in 
the U.S. is systematically reducing valuable farmland. He argues that only 6% of the 
total U.S. land area is actually developed Furthermore, he argues that three quarters of 
the American population live on less than 4% of the total land area. He believes that the 
consequence of these conditions is that most citizens have a skewed understanding of 
how much land is actually developed, and how much remains undeveloped. Farmland, 
he concludes, is not being lost to development. Rather, increasing agricultural 
productivity and technology result in fewer farming acres being needed in the U.S. each 
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year (Staley 2001 ). Skeptics of the statistics s_upporting the need for smart growth, such 
as Staley, have referred to the alleged loss of prime farmland as "the most conclusively 
discredited environmental-political fraud of recent times" (Gordon and Richardson 1998, 
quote by Julian Simon p. 23). 
In addition to challenging the statistics that are used to support smart growth 
initiatives, other critics challenge the methods of achieving smart growth. The greatest 
challenge comes from individuals who argue that the market could correct for all or most 
of these problems if it was given the chance (Bishop and Tilley 2002, Gordon and 
Richardson 1998, Staley 2001 ). Smart growth generally requires government 
intervention. Some people argue that government interference in areas such as land 
management and transportation management not only truncates the market economy's 
ability to respond to the problems, but it also creates new problems. Markets, it is 
argued, are much more effective at registering the preferences of individuals, than is 
centralized planning by government (Bishop and Tilley 2002, Gordon and Richardson 
1998, Staley 2001). 
One scholar (Green 2001) argues that smart growth initiatives that force 
developments of higher densities have the effect of worsening pollution problems. This 
view asserts that before government intervention of this sort, when market preferences 
alone determined densities·of developments, it gradually became clear that individuals 
preferred single family homes on moderate sized suburban lots. Under smart growth 
initiatives, it is argued, not only are individuals forced to live in denser communities than 
they prefer, but the environment is also put at greater risk. One alleged consequence is 
that denser development reduces the ability of the natural environment to absorb 
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pollutants. For example, in dense communities, storm water that includes pollutants from 
roadways may not be adequately absorbed into the ground, but may instead cause some 
localized flooding (Green 2001 ). 
Another major criticism of smart growth initiatives is related to the rational choice 
planning components included in these programs. Some opponents of smart growth 
legislation, drawi�g on research from Herbert Simon (1946) and Charles Lindblom 
(1959), argue that planners "muddle through" decision-making processes with incomplete 
information, and then adopt plans only after they have already acted. These critics charge 
that the limited rationality of planners and other government officials renders their 
resulting plans to nothing more than a conglomeration of convenient, opportunistic, and 
haphazard decisions. Furthermore, some critics charge that the plans of local 
governments are largely ignored (Burby and May 1997). 
An Operational Definition of Smart Growth 
A working definition of smart growth is a prerequisite to the study of smart 
growth legislation initiated by the states. The literature provides no single useful 
( operational) definition of the term. Existing definitions are vague and descriptive in 
nature because smart growth is a fairly new term, even experts do not agree on a 
definition, and because initiatives vary widely in different communities (Bierbaum 2001, 
Briechle 1999, Nolon 200 1). Another complication is that the term smart growth may be 
used in different ways. A single initiative may be considered smart growth, or the term 
may refer to the intended effects of a collection of pieces of legislation. For example, a 
law requiring that necessary infrastructure is in place before new development may be 
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built may be considered smart growth because it satisfies the three-pronged test discussed 
earlier- it is beneficial the economy, the environment, and the community. On the other 
hand, in the case of California, for example, reference to the state's smart growth 
program may include dozens of individual pieces of legislation. 
I believe that smart growth should not be so difficult to define because it is 
essentially growth management updated. The concept of growth management, with all of 
its interrelated parts (including land use management, natural resource conservation, 
transportation and housing issues), gradually transformed into the smart growth 
movement beginning in the early 1990s (Godschalk 1992, Innes 1993, Merriam 2003). 
This happened for a number of reasons. One reason was that the movement gained 
advocates who had not previously been overtly supportive of the measures. Businesses 
and religious groups, for example, began to rally for changes as sprawl was purported to 
harm not only the physical landscape of communities, but also the individuals within the 
communities ( Godschalk 1992 ). 
The transition from growth management to smart growth was also undertaken 
because advocates realized that new "packaging" was necessary to sell the concept. 
People were no longer highly motivated by the packaging of growth management. Smart 
growth initiatives, on the other hand, were designed to appeal to every individual in a 
personal way (Anderson and Tregoning 1998). For example, under the old banner of 
growth management, traffic congestion was a problem because it contributed to the 
pollution of the air. Revamped by smart growth advocates, however, traffic congestion 
was a problem because it caused individuals to waste time and gas money idling in heavy 
traffic. Improving air quality remained a primary goal, but it became cleverly disguised. 
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I will now establish a working definition of smart growth based on the literature 
review I have presented thus far in Chapter IT. A smart growth program meets each of 
the following criteria: ( 1 )  it is focused on reducing urban sprawl and the pathologies 
associated with sprawl; (2) it addresses multiple issues, which may include affordable 
housing, resource conservation, mixed-use development, and revitalization of urban 
areas; (3) it is beneficial to the environment, the community, and the economy; and, 
finally, ( 4) aspects of the program are designed to improve quality of life for individuals. 
Based on this definition, I will now examine what smart growth laws are in effect at the 
state level, and how those laws are both similar to and different from one another. This 
information will be useful in eventually testing the effectiveness of various types of smart 
growth programs. 
Classifying Smart Growth Legislation 
For nearly thirty years, the growth management trend in this country has been for 
an increasing number of states to assume some level of responsibility for local land use 
planning. As previously mentioned, in most states at least some singular aspect of 
growth management is controlled by the state (protection of coastal areas, for example) 
(DeGrove and Metzger 1993). Classifying state smart growth legislation is important 
because doing so facilitates evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs. It is 
important for researchers to determine whether these programs are having the intended 
effects because theoretical support for these programs has helped them become 
fashionable with many planners, government officials, citizens, and academics (Burby 
and May 1997). 
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Differentiating growth management legislation in the states is also important for 
developing and refining theory in this field. Much of the literature regarding growth 
planning focuses on the use of a single growth management tool, or a single jurisdiction's 
experience with managing growth. While these case studies contribute to the general 
body of knowledge on this subject, researchers find it difficult to draw broad lessons 
from them (Bollens 1993, Burby and May 1997). 
Inadequacy of the Existing Literature 
Most classification systems identified in the literature focus on land use or 
growth management. Land use systems alone do not include the diversity found in smart 
growth programs. For example, growth boundaries may be included, but not along with 
transportation issues and affordable housing. The closest, or most similar studies are 
those that classify states by how they approach growth management. The relevant 
literature from this similar field will be reviewed in order to establish some existing 
theory. 
Review of the Literature 
A search of the literature reveals a variety of models for classifying state growth 
management legislation. In the following sections I will survey and critique seven of 
these classification systems. From the planning literature, I will detail the frameworks 
created by Gale (1992) and Bollens ( 1992). Following those systems I will review work 
by Ndubisi and Dyer (1992); Durant, Thomas, and Haynes ( 1993); Burby and May 
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( 1997); Bollens and Caves ( 1994); and DeGrove and Stroud ( 1987); all of which 
originate in the policy analysis literature. 
None of these models is fully adequate for the task of meaningfully differentiating 
between the systems of growth legislation so possible relationships among variables can 
be tested. Some of the models reviewed here are so complicated that they are difficult to 
reproduce independently. Others are too simplistic, and classify legislation by_only one 
dimension. This research attempts to constructs a model of classification that remedies 
these shortcomings, in turn making it possible to investigate the effects of the different 
types. 
The Gale Model 
Gale ( 1992) developed a system for classifying state growth management 
programs based on the intergovernmental frameworks created by the legislation. The 
result is that qualifying states fit into one of four categories that primarily emphasize the 
level of coercion exerted by the state within the planning system. 
To develop his framework, Gale examined each state's growth management 
legislation according to three principle criteria. The first criterion involved determining 
what each state required for plan submittal and review. He was interested in whether 
each state mandated planning for local governments, or whether such activity was 
optional. For this first criterion, Gale also considered how local plans were reviewed. If 
a state required local plans to be reviewed at the regional or state level, he determined 
whether the reviewing body had the authority to approve or disapprove the plans, or 
whether the review was solely a forum for comments and suggestions. Additionally, 
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Gale examined how the state resolved disagreements between municipalities, counties or 
regional councils, and the plan review entity. 
The second criterion that Gale evaluated in examining state level growth 
management programs was what kind of"consistency" and "compatibility" requirements 
were in place between the various levels of government. For example, Gale looked at 
whether the state required consistency between local and county, or regional plans; local 
and state level plans; and regional and state level land management plans. He was also 
interested in determining whether the plans of local governments were required by the 
state to be compatible and nonconflicting with those of their neighbors, or "proximate 
jurisdictions". Lastly, Gale was interested in "local internal consistency", or whether 
local governments required by the state to ensure that local zoning ordinances and local 
capital improvements programs be consistent with their own comprehensive plans (Gale 
1992). 
Gale' s  third and final criterion for classifying growth management legislation 
involved looking at the systems of incentives and/or disincentives states provided to local 
governments in the planning process. He determined whether each state made technical 
and/or financial assistance available to local or regional governments. He also looked at 
whether states imposed sanctions on local governments for nonparticipation or 
noncompliance with program requirements, such as ineligibility to apply for state grants 
(Gale 1992). 
Based on the information he collected while examining state planning legislation 
in light of these three criteria, Gale developed four unique categories to describe growth 
management as it was being instituted by the states. These were the categories "state 
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dominant", "regional-local cooperative", "state-local negotiated", and "fusion" (All tables 
and figures have been placed in the Appendix. Please see Figure A-1 for The Gale 
Model). 
States grouped in the "state dominant" category included Oregon (1973), Florida 
(1986), Maine (1988), and Rhode Island (1988). The programs in these states imposed 
mandatory local or local and regional plan preparation. Each of these also gave the states 
the power to impose serious sanctions on planning bodies that did not submit a plan, or 
failed to meet the state standards. These state programs established strict standards of 
interjurisdictional consistency. Maine was the exception. That program did not require 
state or regional level plans, so consistency was treated differently in that case (Gale 
1992). 
The second category Gale developed was "regional-local cooperative". Two 
states were included in this category- Vennont (1988) and Georgia (1989). In both of 
these instances, state governments have an obviously less decisive role in growth 
management than did the governments of the state dominant category. Plan preparation 
is voluntary for all communities in this second type of system, and the reviewing body is 
limited to only making comments and suggestions. In addition, consistency standards are 
much less exacting for these two states. The effect, as Gale notes, is that resulting 
regional and state plans in Georgia and Vermont may be primarily "an amalgam of 
policies" by either state's local governments (Gale 1992). 
Gale's third category, "state-local negotiated", was unique to only the state of 
New Jersey (1986). In this case, while state government has a central role in the 
planning process (as in the state dominant approach), plan preparation is voluntary at the 
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regional and local levels (as in the regional-local cooperative approach). Local 
governments in New Jersey can negotiate with the State Planning Commission over terms 
and conditions of the state plan that both agree to accommodate. This is a process unique 
to New Jersey known as ''cross-acceptance". County governments .also have a role in this 
process, as they are supposed to act as liaisons between local governments and the state 
commission to facilitate negotiation. It is important to note here that because neither the 
regional-local cooperative or the state-local negotiated category has stringent sanctions in 
place for noncompliance with the state plan, states in both must rely on some other 
mechanism to entice local government cooperation. Gale suggests that the passage of 
time will reveal whether factors such as interjurisdictional peer pressure, critical media 
publicity, citizen and interest group mobilization, and systems of state incentives and 
disincentives can effectively bring about effective land use planning within these states 
(Gale 1992). 
The fourth and final approach in Gale's  system is called "fusion". Washington 
(1990) is the only state Gale assigned to this hybrid category. Washington, like the state 
dominant cases, mandates local and county plan preparation, but only for rapidly growing 
areas. Those areas in Washington with less substantial growth may decide not to 
participate. Jurisdictions that choose not to participate then become ineligible for certain 
types of state grants. On the other hand, the legislation in Washington also exhibits 
characteristics of the regional-local category in that responsibility is somewhat 
decentralized. The role of the state in this instance is limited solely to review and 
comment on county and local plans (Gale 1992). 
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Gale made an important contribution to the study of growth management as it is 
legislated by the states, because he was one of the first researchers to devise a 
classification system of this type. As Weitz concluded, Gale deserves at least an 
"honorable mention" for pioneering a template for this type of research (Weitz 1999, 
quoted p 275). In fact, Gale's framework is of limited use because while the resulting 
model appears to be intuitive, his method for arriving at such conclusions is complex and 
difficult to replicate. One problem is that the three broad criteria that he bases his 
analysis on- state requirements for plan submittal and review; consistency and 
compatibility requirements; and incentives/disincentives; must be translated into the four 
various models. This leaves a lot of discretion to the researcher attempting to translate 
the information. 
Weitz (1999) provides an example of this methodological inconsistency by 
challenging Gale's description of Florida as state-dominant and Georgia as regional-local 
cooperative. According to Gale's classification, state-dominant programs do not allow 
much "discretionary judgment" by regional or local governments in comparison with the 
other models. Weitz argues that it is, in fact, Florida's program that contains an informal 
procedure allowing local governments to negotiate with the state regarding compliance 
with state statutes. At the same time, while Georgia's legislation does allow local 
governments certain variances to the minimum planning standards, in reality these are 
rarely granted. Weitz means to point out that based on Gale's classification system, 
different researchers may arrive at different conclusions. 
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The Bollens Model 
Bollens ( 1992) has also developed a growth management classification system 
that considers the intergovernmental structures created by state legislation. A central 
theme underlying Bollens' work is that when the legislation was enacted has a lot to do 
with what roles state, regional, and local governments are given within the program. 
Bollens shows that state growth policies have evolved over time, from their beginnings as 
preemptive, regulatory, environmentally oriented interventions during the "first wave", to 
more cooperative, incentive based state and local planning efforts with growth 
accommodating economic policies. Accordingly, he develops three categories to 
describe state growth management legislation that correspond with the increasingly 
cooperative nature of the efforts (see Figure A-2) (Bollens 1992). 
Bollens' first category is "preemptive/regulatory". State programs included here 
are characterized by direct state land-use regulatory power and a focus on protecting the 
environment. In these cases, when projects of a predetermined size or within 
environmentally sensitive areas are proposed, the state, or in some cases regional 
governments, can override or preempt local action. Bollens describes Vermont's 
Environmental Control Act of 1970 as the "purest example" of preemptive/regulatory 
state growth management legislation. Under the act, regional boards reviewed projects 
proposed by local governments that could have had regional area externalities, such as 
water and air pollution, traffic congestion, and soil erosion. As described above, most of 
the pieces of legislation Bollens classified as preemptive/regulatory were passed in the 
1970s, during the "quiet revolution", or "first wave", in land use management (Bollens 
1992) .  
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The second category created by Bollens was termed "conjoint/planning". Most of 
the pieces of legislation categorized here are representative of the popular planning 
notions prevalent during the "second wave'' of land use reform, and were enacted 
beginning in the mid-1980s. Conjoint/planning legislation is different from the 
preemptive/regulatory classification described above in that there is a lesser degree of 
coercion by the state. Rather than automatic preemption of local authority, states and 
regions that employ a conjoint/planning framework mandate that local governments 
develop and implement plans consistent with state ( or regional) goals. Some penalties 
that may be imposed by the state ( or region) for failure to comply with goals and 
standards include withdrawal of state discretionary funding and seizure of plan-making 
responsibility by the superseding level of government. The other major difference 
between conjoint/planning legislation and those pieces of legislation falling under the 
previous category is that the more recent plans of the second category have a more 
balanced emphasis on protecting the environment from damage, but also on promoting 
responsible economic development and improved quality of life for citizens. Oregon's 
Land Conservation and Development Act of 1973 is an example of this type of legislation 
(Bollens 1992). 
Bollens' third and final classification, "cooperative/planning", also consists of 
second-wave land management legislation. While much of this legislation shares the 
same environmental/economic focus of conjoint/planning legislation, in this third 
category, local government compliance is largely voluntary. Penalties are not imposed. 
Rather, these cooperative strategies use incentive systems. In order to stimulate local 
plans consistent with state growth goals, states may offer funding, technical assistance, or 
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increased local discretionary powers. Bollens considers Vermont 's 1988 Growth 
Management Act to be an example of cooperative/planning legislation (Bollens 1992). 
This classification system developed by Bollens . is of limited use to researchers 
who wish to evaluate the effectiveness of smart growth legislation. The categorization of 
legislation based in part on when it was enacted serves primarily as a heuristic for 
understanding how growth management legislation has evolved during the last several 
decades. Newer, more progressive programs have superseded much of the legislation 
examined and classified by Bollens. In other words, states are not enacting 
preemptive/regulatory programs today. Most of the existing and newly enacted growth 
management legislation is classified by Bollens as cooperative/planning. Because his 
system does not distinguish between current programs, it is of limited use to growth 
management scholars. Weitz (1999) also argues that Bollens made a serious error by 
failing to include the role of regional planning bodies in the system. 
The Ndubisi and Dyer Model 
Ndubisi and Dyer (1992) have an entirely different approach to understanding 
growth management than do both Gale and Bollens. Ndubisi and Dyer classify state 
policies based on the degree of responsibility given to regional planning bodies. While 
these researchers admit that their work is exploratory, they argue that the greater the role 
of the regional entities within a state, the more effective the growth management plan 
will be. They support regional involvement in planning decisions because many 
decisions made by local governments have regional consequences. In addition, they 
suggest authority asserted at the regional level may ease tensions between state and local 
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governments. Furthermore, Ndubisi and Dyer argue that, "With a regional approach, 
efficiency and coordination of land-use issues among local governments are enhanced, 
and costs and benefits are more fairly distributed" (Ndubisi and Dyer 1992, quoted p 
118). 
The system developed by Ndubisi and Dyer is a five-part typology describing 
regional authority in local growth management ranging from mandated and highly 
authoritative to voluntary and nonbinding. To develop a foundation for this model, the 
authors explain three possible categories that may describe which areas the state is most 
concerned with managing. First, states may have control only over certain geographic 
areas, such as those considered to be "critical" or unzoned. A second possibility is that 
state involvement may be limited to regulation of development activities only, such as 
developments of regional impact or benefit. Or, the third alternative is that a state may 
exercise control over both specific geographic areas and development activities (Ndubisi 
and Dyer 1992). 
Ndubisi and Dyer argue that it is important to understand these differences in 
scope of state intervention, because each of these three types produces unique outcomes. 
According to the authors, state land use management that is limited to control of certain 
geographic areas may be ineffectual in managing growth throughout the state as a whole. 
For example, the state may restrict undesirable development of a protected geographic 
area, with the result that the development simply occurs in some other area of the state 
that is not regulated. The authors argue that states focused instead on managing 
development activity provide at least greater uniformity in regulation (Ndubisi and Dyer 
1992). 
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The typology developed by Ndubisi and Dyer ranges from Type 1 regional 
participation, which is the strongest, to Type 5- the weakest (see Figure A-3). Each level 
of successively greater regional participation may include all of those elements exhibited 
in the levels below it. (Ndubisi and Dyer 1 992). 
Type 1 is distinguished by mandatory involvement of regional councils in state 
growth policy formulation. Possible duties of regional entities in states of this type 
include designating areas of regional significance, developing criteria and issuing permits 
for developments of regional impact, and reviewing local comprehensive plans for 
compliance with state and regional policy. The authors cite California (1972) as an 
example of a Type 1 regional system (Ndubisi and Dyer 1992). 
Type 2 systems are the next most complex regional systems. In these cases, the 
state may regulate all development activity and/or all geographic areas of environmental 
concern. The role for regional councils in these systems is diminished, however, because 
they are merely enforcement agents for the state rather than participants in statewide 
policy making. Type 2 regional councils formulate regional land-use policy. They also 
may review local comprehensive plans for compliance with regional concerns. Vermont 
( 1970) is cited as a Type 2 program. 
Type 3 systems are similar to Type 2 except that only certain activities or 
geographic areas fall under state control. Type 3 regional systems, such as those enacted 
in Florida in 1985, are charged with enforcing the will of the state in those selected 
instances (Ndubisi and Dyer 1992). 
The next level of regional council involvement, Type 4, provides much less 
authority to councils. In this case, regional councils do not act as enforcing bodies for 
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state policy. Further, what regional land management policy is developed is the result of 
voluntary collaboration by local governments. It is interesting to note here, however, that 
local governments may decide to delegate certain planning responsibilities to their 
regional councils. If they should choose to do so, the state will provide funds for the 
regional council to carry out the responsibility. Duties of type 4 councils typically 
include providing technical assistance to local governments, collecting data and 
information for use by. the state, and giving advice to state and local policymakers. 
Oregon (1973) is an example of a Type 4 regional system (Ndubisi and Dyer 1992). 
Type 5 regional council systems represent the weakest category in Ndubisi and 
Dyer's scale. In these systems, state legislation gives regional councils no specific 
planning responsibilities. Local governments, however, may elect to form regional 
· entities to address planning concerns. Unlike type 4 systems, in this case the local 
governments must provide the funding to support such initiatives. The state will not 
contribute funds. The authors conclude that these circumstances generally exist in states 
that do not have formal growth management plans. These systems, by default, presume 
that local governments are able and willing to address the problems of land and growth 
management. California's 1976 Coastal Act is an example of this type of regional system 
(Ndubisi and Dyer 1992). 
The authors stress that these distinct classifications are for heuristic purposes 
only. In reality they suggest, most states employ a mix of these types. Therefore, 
because the states are not purely a single type, Ndubisi and Dyer talk about "degree of 
fit" between each state's system and each type (Ndubisi and Dyer 1992). Each of the 
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examples cited in this section were rated by the authors as a "high" degree of fit for that 
category. 
There are a couple of obvious problems with the classification system created by 
Ndubisi and Dyer. One problem is that the focus on regional authority is only one piece 
of the smart growth puzzle. These authors have neglected many other important aspects 
of these programs, such as the requirements established for local governments, possible 
penalties for noncompliance, and review standards set by the state. Regional government 
involvement is clearly important, but to estimate a state's success with this legislation 
based on this factor alone is wrongheaded. Instead, regional involvement should be 
included as one aspect of a more comprehensive classification system. 
The second problem with the scale created by Ndubisi and Dyer is that it is fairly 
complicated to use. This might be improved if there were fewer categories on the scale. 
Instead, states must be forced into one of these five categories, and even then they can 
only be described according to "goodness of fit". This model does not reveal much 
useful information about the legislation, and what it does reveal is not clearly understood. 
The Durant, Thomas, and Haynes Model 
Durant, Thomas, and Haynes ( 1993) have also produced a classification system 
for understanding state growth management policy. Their typology consists of four 
"ideal types" that provide some understanding of the politics behind growth management 
legislation. These authors noticed that while urban sprawl and its related effects are 
found throughout the country, legislative efforts in the states vary from comprehensive, 
meaningful reforms, to diluted, ineffective statutes. Their research interest lay in 
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understanding what accounts for these differences. While many variables contribute to 
mold a state's growth management plan, these authors focused on a political 
understanding. 
Durant, Thomas, and Haynes developed a four-part typology based in part on the 
work by Ndubisi and Dyer described above (see Figure A-4). They focused on two 
attributes of growth management reform for classification purposes. They called these 
''mode" and "tempo" (based on the use of these terms in the field of evolutionary 
biology). Policy mode refers to the character of the reform, which can be qualitatively 
different from existing policy or simply a repackaging of familiar policy. In other words, 
mode may range from a high degree of change, for example an entirely new idea or 
proposal, to a low degree of change, such as a mere extension of an existing policy. The 
authors' definition of mode is based on the five-part scale developed by Ndubisi and 
Dyer, which is discussed above. Accordingly, a Type 5 system is the weakest in terms of 
regional authority and Type 1 is the strongest. For Durant, Thomas, and Haynes, it is the 
intended leap from one level to another that constitutes mode. Legislation that would 
produce a change from, say a Type 5 system to a Type 1 system would be a 
nonincremental, or drastic change. On the other hand, proposed legislation that would 
change a Type 2 system to a Type 1 system would be considered incremental. Within the 
political arena, producing a nonincremental change would be more challenging than 
securing an incremental change (Durant et al 1993 ). 
The second component of these authors' typology is called policy tempo. This 
attribute is based on Kingdon's (1984) theory that policy alternatives must be "softened 
up" over a period of time before they may be successfully passed into law. I believe the 
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tenn "softened up" is misleading as it is used in this instance, however. It does not mean 
watered down. Rather, it refers to the gestation, or incubation period of the policy 
proposal. Kingdon's idea was that policy entrepreneurs (those seeking to have certain 
legislation enacted) should keep their agenda fresh in the minds of citizens, interest 
groups, and government agencies, so that over a period of time, the agenda would be 
perceived as part of mainstream debate. Growth management refonns are placed on the 
tempo continuum in a similar manner to the mode continuum. A classification of low 
softening means that the policy moved quickly from idea conception to a prominent 
position on the legislative agenda. High softening refers to refonn that has been 
considered, debated, and discussed for many years. The implication with tempo is that 
policy that has been highly softened will be easier to pass into law (Durant et al. 1993). 
As described above, the factors mode and tempo interact to form four categories. 
The classifications are considered to be ideal, or theoretical, because while complex in 
reality, both mode and tempo ratings are restricted to only two possibilities on the scale­
low or high. In addition, the authors note that a policy may change categories during 
legislative deliberation- if significant portions of the policy were changed, for example 
(Durant et al. 1993 ). 
According to Durant, Thomas, and Haynes, quantum reform is a major change 
from the policy status quo that is developed and implemented quickly. In terms of the 
typology, quantum reform is nonincremental (high mode) and unsoftened (low tempo). 
Legislation of this type is usually associated with a perceived crisis in a state or a change 
in a state's political climate. This could be initiated by political elites in a top·down 
centralized effort, or it might be a powerful grassroots campaign. Intense conflict may 
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occur in these instances. The authors note that proposed quantum reform packages are 
more likely to become law if they are somewhat ambiguously worded. Maryland's 
Growth and Chesapeake Bay Protection Act of 1991, for example, was specific in terms 
of implementation procedures, and it failed to become law (Durant et al. 1993 ). 
California's Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 is an example of quantum 
type reform. First, the policy was a tremendous shift from local to state control (Type 5 
to Type 2 on the mode scale). Second, a crisis atmosphere developed in the wake of the 
Santa Barbara oil spill. This had the effect of urgently rushing the issue into the political 
arena. In addition, the policy was a grassroots initiative that culminated in referendum. 
Finally, conflict was considerable. Ronald Reagan, governor at the time, was 
unsupportive of the policy, as were many legislators. Despite the challenging conditions 
associated with quantum reform, concerned citizens were able to secure the legislation 
(Durant et al. 1993 ). 
The emergent category includes reforms that are high policy change, or mode, and 
high policy softening, or tempo. According to the authors, in these cases the policy 
emerges well softened from a professional-bureaucratic complex within government, the 
Department of Natural Resources, for example. It is likely not softened outside of those 
government offices, however. As a result, potential supporters outside of the agency may 
be skeptical, defensive, and concerned about hidden benefits the policy advocates may 
collect if they are successful. The nonincremental, real policy change being considered 
must be sold to concerned citizens and legislators. If the reform is to be successful, 
advocates must build coalitions of support (Durant et al. 1993). 
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North Carolina's Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 is an example of 
emergent reform. It was a fairly drastic policy change ( moving from a Type 4 to a Type 
2 system). In addition, the softening that did occur was within the scientific community, 
among natural scientists who were concerned about development along the coastline. 
After much debate and negotiation, a modified version of the act did become legislation. 
In order to secure enough votes to pass. the law, however, supporters finally agreed to a 
change to a Type 3 system, with fewer boundaries and state regulatory roles (Durant et al. 
1993). 
Convergent reform is the third type in the mode/tempo classification system. 
These initiatives have low softening and low policy change. The authors called this 
category convergent because these issues are suddenly spotlighted and considered by the 
legislature when the right circumstances converge. Because of the unpredictable policy 
window of opportunity, previous public debate and discussion have not occurred to 
soften the issue. In the rush to have the policy enacted, key legislators may not be 
consulted regarding the substance of the reform. Instead, proponents may try to win the 
support of lawmakers and citizens alike by advertising the policy as morally sound, or in 
the public's best interest. One last aspect of convergent reform is that in order to have the 
policy successfully enacted, proponents must allow adversaries to "save face". This 
typically results in a more ambiguously worded statute (Durant et al. 1993). 
The authors cite New Jersey's experience with the State Development and 
Redevelopment Plan in 1986 as an example of convergent type reform. In this instance, a 
policy window was suddenly opened when the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in the 
Mount Laurel decisions that the court itself would maintain control over all local zoning 
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and planning decisions until legislators could enact a planning statute that fairly 
addressed the state's housing needs. Proponents of the State Development and 
Redevelopment Plan seized the opportunity to gather support for the comprehensive 
growth management policy. Opponents of the proposed legislation (primarily local 
governments) "saved face" by securing wide powers for themselves. The net result was a 
"comprehensive" planning statute that functioned more like a system of checks and 
balances. The cross-acceptance process ensured negotiation between state and local 
governments over the final plans. Moreover, the state did not have the power to force 
local compliance with the plans (Durant et al. 1993 ). 
The final category of reform developed by Durant, Thomas, and Hayes is the 
gradualist type. According to the authors, gradualist types of growth management 
reforms are the most common type in the United States. As the name implies, these 
policies develop gradually over time. They are highly softened yet incremental changes. 
Bargaining within the legislature is amicable. Specialists in the relevant agencies work 
out details of the policy. Contributing to the attitude of cooperation is the expectation by 
all stakeholders that the resulting policy, low in mode, will require only minimal changes 
in existing budgets, staffing levels, and enforcement structures (Durant et al. 1993 ). 
Maryland's Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act of 1992 is 
an example of gradualist policy. The authors describe the legislation as ''quantum­
sounding growth management reforms that are really only well-softened, incremental 
shifts from the pre-existing regulatory regime" ( quoted p. 46). In this instance, local 
governments in Maryland were to retain almost all land use decision-making powers. In 
addition, the goals devised in the policy were intentionally ambiguous- to protect 
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environmentally sensitive areas, for example. One final example of the weakness, or 
extreme incremental nature of the legislation was that compliance by local governments 
was required only to the extent that they could afford to do so (Durant et al. 1 993). 
The model created by Durant, Thomas, and Haynes is of limited use to 
researchers who wish to evaluate the effectiveness of state initiated growth legislation 
because it does not yield substantive information. It does not help with distinguishing 
legislation so that independent variables can be established. The placement of legislation 
(or, attempted legislation in some cases) into categories only reveals how significant the 
change in the legislation was from what existed previously. Furthermore, since the 
authors have used Ndubisi and Dyer's regional authority scale, the information is focused 
on the varying role of regional bodies. While a model of this type might be useful in 
conjunction with other measurement devises, for these purpo�es it is insufficient. 
The Burby and May Model 
Burby and May ( 1997) developed a more useful state growth management 
legislation classification system (see Figure A-5). They focused on two aspects of state 
intervention. The first they called degree of"prescription". For this, the authors 
examined three different types of consistency requirements found in state growth 
management legislation. First, they determined what level of vertical consistency each 
state required.- Vertical consistency refers to the extent that local plans must be consistent 
with state planning goals. Second, Burby and May addressed requirements for horizontal 
consistency. This refers to what degree local government plans must be coordinated with 
neighboring local governments. The requirements of both vertical and horizontal 
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consistency are designed so that local governments must consider the plans of neighbors 
in conjunction with their own. The intent is to make local governments less parochial 
and more responsible in addressing externalities such as pollution and traffic congestion. 
Lastly, what these authors termed local internal consistency was examined. In states that 
require local internal consistency, activities of local governments must be consistent with 
their own comprehensive plans. Concu"ency requirements may be an important part of a 
state' s  local internal consistency requirements. Concurrency means that capital 
infrastructure, such as water lines and roads, must be in place and able to support private 
development in order for that development to occur (Burby and May 1997). 
The second aspect of Burby' s and May's classification matrix evaluates state 
"persuasion" tactics. The authors examined to what degree each of the state programs 
used both coercion and/or incentives in order to secure program compliance from local 
governments. When using either of these tactics, the goal of state planning authorities is 
to lessen the costs of local government compliance with state legislation. In programs 
that are coercive in nature, the state will impose sanctions, such as fines, on local 
governments, making the cost of not complying greater than the costs of cooperating with 
state legislative guidelines. In areas where an incentive structure is employed, states seek 
to help local governments to comply with planning requirements by providing financial 
and technical support, which in turn lowers compliance cost for the local government 
(Burby and May 1997). 
The primary challenge with using the matrix developed by Burby and May is that 
the factors described above must be translated into the ordinal categories of the system. 
In other words, after examining a state's vertical, horizontal, and local internal 
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consistency requirements, the state must be classified as having a low, moderate, or high 
degree of prescription. Obviously, the state may vary its requirements for each kind of 
consistency. The result is that the findings of this model are difficult to replicate because 
of the discretion required in categorizing the states. The same type of translation is 
needed for placing states on the persuasion scale (Burby and May 1997). 
The Bollens and Caves Model 
Scott A. Bollens, who developed one of the intergovernmental frameworks for 
understanding state growth management legislation described above, published another 
classification system two years later, with co-author Roger W. Caves ( 1994). In this 
system, the authors group legislation based on the role of counties within the process. 
They classify legislation according to two major categories, the subordinated-county 
model and the empowered-county model (see Figure A-6). 
States with subordinated-county, or "top-down" growth management plans 
minimize the autonomy of counties by limiting them to implementation of state goals, 
rather than giving them a participatory function in the design of those goals. In these 
systems, counties and cities prepare local comprehensive plans that must be consistent 
with state goals. According to Bollens and Caves, Oregon (1973) and Florida ( 1985) are 
two prime examples of this type of system. In both cases local governments may face 
penalties if their individual plans are not consistent with state goals. As an additional 
note, the authors describe the similar backgrounds of these two states. The states both 
faced tremendous growth pressures, which included threats to environmental and 
agricultural resources. And in both cases it was determined that local governments were 
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either unwilling or unable to protect the natural systems without interference by the state 
(Bollens and Caves 1994 ). 
Bollens' and Caves' alternative category is the empowered-county, or "bottom-­
up" model. Empowered counties are key participants in multijurisdictional growth 
management strategies. They are regional leaders in designing and implementing growth 
management strategies. In these instances, a state mandate is not responsible for the 
planning responsibilities taken on by counties. Rather, the county may have acquired the 
leadership position through state enabling legislation, or through grassroots citizen 
activism expressed at the ballot box (Bollens and Caves 1994 ). 
The authors cite New Jersey as an example of county empowerment through 
enabling legislation. In New Jersey, the counties function as important intermediaries 
between the state planning goals and the municipal growth goals. In a unique "cross­
acceptance" process ( described above in the Gale Model), both the state and local 
governments make revisions to their plans until consistency is achieved. The counties 
hold public meetings and document the negotiations between the state and local 
governments. The state then uses the reports compiled by the counties to revise state 
planning goals (Bollens and Caves 1994 ). 
Barnstable County, (or, Cape Cod) Massachusetts, on the other hand, is an 
example of a county that has gained importance in the growth management process 
through citizen initiative. The county has become a unique regional land use regulatory 
and planning commission for the county's fifteen towns. The authors conducted a case 
study on the planning reforms in Cape Cod. They concluded that a combination of 
"bottom-up" cooperation and "top-down" encouragement from the state would perhaps 
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be the most effective arrangement. Based on their research, the authors suggest that state 
governments should set regional growth goals in order to stimulate inter-local 
governmental cooperation. After that, however, the governments and citizens of each 
region should be able to develop plans and a governance structure based on local needs. 
In short, these authors recommend a subordinated-county/empowered-county hybrid 
arrangement for effectiveness (Bollens and Caves 1994 ). 
While the model provided by Bollens and Caves is easier to use than the model by 
Ndubisi and Dyer, they both have the same fault- concentration on one aspect of growth 
management to the exclusion of others. Regional authority, or in this case county 
authority, probably is an important part of successful growth management in conjunction 
with other factors rather than by itself. Unlike the system of Ndubisi and Dyer, however, 
Bollens' and Caves' model may be too simplistic, since it separates states into only two 
categories. Indeed, there is enough variation among the states that a useful classification 
model would certainly have more than two categories. 
The DeGrove and Stroud Model 
John M. DeGrove and Nancy E. Stroud ( 1987) developed a four-part 
classification system for state growth management programs (see Figure A-7). Their 
model classifies state growth management legislation according to the scope of the 
program created. Their first category is called "comprehensive/selective". States with a 
comprehensive/selective approach may apply their program throughout the state, but they 
are restricted to particular types of development or geographic areas. In Florida, for 
example, the Land and Water Management Act of 1972 established a critical-area 
5 1  
program so that a particular geographic area of concern could be selected for special 
management attention from the state. According to the act, the governor and Cabinet 
may review the local land use plans of such critical areas, and if they are unsatisfactory, 
the governor and Cabinet may supercede local authority and impose state plans and 
regulations on the area (DeGrove and Stroud 1987). 
The second variety of state land regulation developed by these authors is called 
''comprehensive/general". These programs are described as statewide in scope and 
applicable to all land use activities. Hawaii's 1961 land use legislation provides an 
example of comprehensive/general state regulation. The Hawaiian Land Use 
Commission divides the entire state into one of four land use districts, thereby 
determining what type of development may occur in all locations. The Commission may 
also approve changes in the boundaries and issue special permits or zoning variances in 
all but "conservation" districts (DeGrove and Stroud 1987). 
DeGrove' s and Stroud' s remaining categories pertain to states that have special 
geographic areas to plan and regulate. The third category is the "coastal" approach. 
Coastal planning is given its own category by these authors because it is so highly 
developed. The 1974 North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act is one example. 
According to this legislation, each coastal county in the state is required to adopt a coastal 
plan. While local governments monitor minor development in areas of environmental 
concern along the shoreline, ''major" developments in these areas may only proceed after 
a state permit is acquired (DeGrove and Stroud 1987). 
The final category of land use planning developed by DeGrove and Stroud is 
termed the "selective" approach. It includes all areas of special concern, except coastal 
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areas, which have their own category above. The New Jersey Pinelands are an example 
of the selective planning approach. The Pinelands Commission has the responsibility of 
developing a comprehensive plan for the area. The Commission then insures that county 
and municipal plans within the area conform to the special criteria developed (DeGrove 
and Stroud 1987). 
The model developed by DeGrove and Stroud is intuitively appealing. It is also 
amenable to replication by other researchers because of the straightforward instructions 
provided by DeGrove and Stroud. However, it is too simplistic to employ as the only 
means for a growth management legislation evaluation measure. As with several of the 
other models detailed, this one may be useful if used in conjunction with another model. 
Another criticism of the DeGrove and Stroud model is that the areas of special 
concern category no longer needs to be divided so that coastal areas are in an exclusive 
category apart from other areas of special concern, such as wetlands. In the mid 1980s, 
when DeGrove and Stroud were researching their model, coastal land management 
legislation was more highly developed than legislation regarding other areas. The 
differences are no longer great enough to warrant this separation however (Weitz 1999). 
The Proposed Model 
I will develop a revised growth management classification model by combining 
selected attributes of the DeGrove and Stroud (1987) model with those of the Gale ( 1992) 
model. The result is shown in Figure A-8. The new model classifies state growth 
legislation on two dimensions: scope of coverage and level of coercive power exerted by 
the state. In order to place a piece of legislation within one of the nine newly resulting 
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categories, it must first be determined whether the legislation is comprehensive, or 
statewide, in scope, or whether it pertains only to an area of special concern, as DeGrove 
· and Stroud established. The law may be placed into one of three categories­
comprehensive general, comprehensive selective, or areas of special concern. {These 
terms, borrowed from DeGrove and Stroud, are explained in detail in the previous section 
and matched with exemplary laws.) 
Legislation that is comprehensive-general in nature is applicable to all land use 
activities throughout the state. Comprehensive-selective legislation is also statewide in 
application; however, it is restricted to particular types of development or to certain 
geographic areas. At this point a difference should be noted between the DeGrove and 
Stroud model and the proposed model. DeGrove and Stroud presented four possible 
categories, whereas the newly proposed classification system has three categories. This 
difference is accounted for by the fact that those authors separated legislation applying to 
areas of special concern into two subcategories- coastal areas, and all other special areas. 
In the newly proposed model, these classifications have been collapsed so that coastal 
areas and all other special areas (such as Pinelands) are considered together, in the final 
category called special areas only. 
Once a piece of legislation has been labeled as comprehensive-general, 
comprehensive-selective, or restricted to areas of special concern, the level of coercive 
power reserved for the respective state government must be determined. While 
categorizing state legislation by scope, as described above, is straightforward, placing 
states within the model based on the coercion component is more difficult. To describe 
the continuum of degree of coercion by the state, an ordinal scale consisting of three 
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categories is used. The categories are labeled low, medium, and high coercion. Even 
within a single category such as "high coercion", however, variation may exist between 
state programs. 
States utilizing a high degree of coercion generally have mandatory planning 
programs. The level of jurisdiction that is mandated to plan may vary by state. For 
example, regional and local planning may be mandated, or, city and county governments 
may be mandated to plan. In states with highly coercive programs, penalties for 
noncompliance are stringent. These may include ineligibility to qualify for state 
sponsored grants and loan programs, or, in some cases the state may intercede and plan 
for a noncompliant jurisdiction. 
At the other extreme of the coercion scale lays state programs that have low levels 
of coercion. Within this category, compliance with state programs is voluntary, at least 
in part. States that do not mandate planning, for example, attempt to gain compliance by 
offering incentives to regional or local governments, or to both. Incentives may include 
_ grants for local projects or free technical assistance with developing plans. At the same 
time, the state may also use sanctions against local governments who do not voluntarily 
participate. 
In between the two extremes of high coercion and low coercion is the middle 
category. It is challenging to draw generalizations about these types of programs. They 
may employ a mix of incentives and disincentives. Policies may be mandatory, but 
perhaps only for jurisdictions of a certain population, or a certain location. There could 
also be an unusual amount of cooperation, or a partnership of sorts, between state and 
local governments with medium-coercion programs. 
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The addition of this second attribute, level of state coercion, results in nine final 
possible categories, as shown in Figure A-8. These are low, medium, and high coercion 
comprehensive-general; low, medium, and high coercion comprehensive-selective; and 
low, medium, and high coercion areas of special concern. The interest of this project is 
with the categories represented by the three boxes in the top row of the diagram- low 
coercion/comprehensive-general, medium coercion/comprehensive-general, and high 
coercion/comprehensive-general. State smart growth programs are classified within these 
three categories. Based on the definition of smart growth I proposed earlier in Chapter II, 
I will restrict the study to these three categories because I am interested in the highly 
comprehensive nature of those laws. As I wrote in the definition, smart growth programs 
must address multiple issues related to urban sprawl, and must provide benefits to the 
community, economy, and environment. 
Improvements over Existing Models 
The proposed model is an improvement over existing models for several reasons. 
First, it incorporates more than merely a single piece of information, as many of the 
existing models rely on. Bollens and Caves ( 1994 ), for example, sought to understand 
growth management legislation in light of the amount of authority granted to counties. 
While a single explanatory variable may yield some useful infonnation, this approach 
clearly leaves much unexplained. In this improved proposed model, the scope of 
legislation and the coercive power of the legislation are both included. 
A second benefit to using this model is that researchers may replicate the work of 
others who may use it. Many of the existing systems are complicated and require the 
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researcher to exercise a level of discretion that may lead different individuals to different 
conclusions. 
Another improvement of the proposed model is incorporated into the coercion 
category. In some previously published models, researchers considered the degree of 
possible sanctions used by state governments as a separate measure from possible 
incentives used by states to encourage local action that was not mandatory. While this 
differentiation may have been appropriate to employ when examining legislation 
employed during the quiet revolution, or "first wave" of land use reform, such a 
differentiation is not necessary today. As described previously, first wave legislation 
focused primarily on protecting the environment, and it was largely imposed upon local 
governments as a mandatory program (DeGrove 1990). Recent legislation employs a 
cooperative framework, however. Often there is negotiation between levels of 
government. In addition, legislation no longer fits neatly into the designation of 
sanctions only or incentives only (Bolen et al. 2001 ,  Johnson 2002). Instead, in almost 
all cases, both are used. Typically, local governments may be punished or disadvantaged 
in some manner by the state for failure to comply with the law. At the same time, 
however, most states employ systems of incentives to help lower the costs of compliance 
for local governments. In the proposed model, the coercion measure encompasses both 
sanctions and incentives at the same time. 
Using the Proposed Model to Select States for Study 
Classification of state smart growth efforts is important to an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of such legislation. In other words, the type of smart growth program in 
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place is important because different types might produce difference degrees of 
effectiveness. Previous research (Burby and May 1998) has suggested that mandatory 
planning laws produce not only higher degrees of compliance from local governments, 
but also higher quality plans. Based on these findings, I might expect more coercive 
smart growth programs to be more effective. 
Because the existing models for classifying growth legislation are inadequate for 
determining effectiveness, a proposed model has been developed and detailed above. 
Based on the new classification system, three states will be chosen for examination, each 
representative of a different type of smart growth program- low coercion/comprehensive­
general (Maryland), medium coercion/comprehensive-general (Georgia), and high 
coercion/comprehensive-general (Florida). Although I will present further details in 
Chapters ill and IV, I will state at this point that I selected these states in particular in 
order to provide some degree of control for geographic region and political culture. 
The smart growth program in Maryland is representative of the low coercion/ 
comprehensive-general category for a number of reasons. First, almost all of the 
initiatives are incentive based ("Smart Growth" 2003). Local governments do not 
necessarily have to participate in the Rural Legacy program, or the Brownfields 
Revitalization program, for example, but the state does make financial and other types of 
incentives available to those local governments that do participate. Secondly, there is 
little in the legislation to stop local governments from engaging in poor planning 
practices that contribute to sprawl (Cohen 2002). The incentive structure in place 
essentially requires that if local governments want to develop greenspaces rather than 
revitalize inner cities, they may legally do so, but the state will not contribute to the cost 
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of new infrastructure. A third reason Maryland is in this category is because while 
legislation from 1992 requires local governments to plan, there is no formal approval 
process for those plans. In short, a local government can develop and implement a plan 
contrary to smart growth goals because it is not dependent on regional or state approval 
(Bierbaum 2001, Knaap "Talking" 2002). 
Georgia's smart growth program is representative of the medium coercion/ 
comprehensive-general category established by the proposed model. Local governments 
in Georgia are not mandated to plan, but if they do not, the plans of the next highest 
jurisdiction are imposed on them (Bolen et al . 2001). For example, if a city created no 
land use plan, it would be required to follow the plan developed at the county level. 
Regional governments, on the other hand are required to plan. In addition, all plans 
developed, even those by local governments, must be approved by the state. Jurisdictions 
whose plans do not meet the minimum review criteria for a broad range of issues 
(regarding land use, use and protection of natural resources, and affordable housing, for 
example) are disqualified from receiving state funds and other incentives. Another 
reason for classifying Georgia as medium coercion/comprehensive-general is that both 
the state and local governments are powerful in different manners (Cobb 1999). One of 
the greatest powers of the state is in establishing a plethora of minimum requirements 
concerning every aspect of smart growth, which all plans must meet, in order to be 
approved. Local governments are powerful at the same time, however, because of the 
"bottom-up" structure of planning in Georgia, as I will discuss in Chapter III (Johnson 
2002). According to the legislative process, local governments prepare their plans first, 
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then regional bodies, and lastly the state, with both of the latter basing their plans on local 
plans (Weitz 1999). 
Lastly, Florida's smart growth program is high coercion/comprehensive-general 
in nature. The state plan is the guiding document for the program, establishing policy for 
26 areas of growth management. Local governments are mandated to prepare plans that 
must address each of the 26 areas outlined by the state (Bolen et al. 2001 ). Furthennore, 
those plans must be approved by the state. Regional level plans are also required. The 
State of Florida also mandates both "consistency" and "concurrency". Consistency 
requires that plans from local governments be in accord with the plans of not only the 
region and the state, but also of neighboring governments. Concurrency requires that 
infrastructure and basic services both be in place before development may occur in an 
area (Catlin 1997, DeGrove 1 990). 
In the following chapter, the smart growth programs of these three states will be 
examined so that the differences between them can be more fully illuminated. This, in 
tum, will allow for a b�sic evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs in Chapters 
IV and V, ultimately allowing for a tentative conclusion as to which category of smart 
growth legislation is most effective. 
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CHAPTER ID 
SMART GROWTH PROGRAMS IN MARYLAND, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss state smart growth legislation in Maryland, 
representative of the low-coercion/comprehensive approach; Georgia, representative of 
the medium-coercion/comprehensive approach; and Florida, representative of the high­
coercion/comprehensive approach. For each of these states, I will detail the history and 
impetus behind the legislation, the gradual development of the legislation, and, finally, 
implementation of the legislation. Following examination of the state programs, I will 
discuss the logical connection between state smart growth legislation and smart growth 
initiatives adopted by local governments, cities in particular. I will then select one city 
from each state for analysis in Chapter IV. 
Maryland 
Smart growth in Maryland is often described as innovative because of the unique 
incentive structure at the heart of the programs (Freilich 1999). Richard Moe called it 
"the most important set of new ideas for growth management . . .  in the last twenty years" 
(Beaumont 1999, quoted p. 64 ). In this section I will detail the history and structure of 
Maryland's program. 
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Impetus For Smart Growth: Response to an Environmental Crisis 
As has often been the case in other states, the story of land use management in 
Maryland was predicated by a widespread perceived environmental crisis. In 1983, the 
Environmental Protection Agency released the results of a study of the Chesapeake Bay, 
one of Maryland's most beloved natural resources. Findings from the report indicated the 
deterioration of the bay, prompting both state and federal initiatives aimed at reducing the 
amount of pollutants causing the damage (Cohen 2002, Freilich 1999, Knaap "An 
Inquiry" 2002). 
Five years later, a panel of experts called The 2020 Commission released another 
significant report. These experts had been charged with advising what measures were 
necessary to protect the bay, while still allowing for the projected population growth in 
the area through the year 2020. In their final report, commissioners detailed the alarming 
trend of sprawl in the bay region, as well as the overall lack of growth management 
planning at both the state and regional level (Bolen et al. 2001 ). The report 
recommended that policy makers be guided by six "visions" for stewardship and growth 
accommodation of the bay region (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). These 
"visions" would later become some of the core elements of the state's smart growth 
initiative. These were: 
1 .  Concentrate development in suitable areas 
2. Protect sensitive areas 
3. In rural areas, direct growth to existing population centers and protect natural 
resource areas 
4. Make stewardship of the land and the Chesapeake Bay a universal ethic 
5. Conserve and reduce the use of resources 
6. Institute funding mechanisms to achieve these visions (Cohen 2002, Knaap 
"An Inquiry" 2002) 
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The release of The 2020 Commission's report in 1988 spurred an unsuccessful 
attempt at a statewide smart growth law (Weitz 1999). Supporters of the failed 1990 bill 
· sought to significantly increase the state's regulation and oversight of local land use 
planning. The law would have required local governments to classify land into four 
categories based on useage. While the bill was popular with environmentalists, it failed 
to gain necessary votes in the legislature for two primary reasons, according to Cohen 
(2002). These were that too much power would have been usurped from local 
governments by the state, and that the bill failed to recognize the state's regional and 
geographic diversity ( Cohen 2002 ). 
Development and Character of Smart Growth Legislation 
In 1992, Maryland lawmakers succeeded in enacting legislation that became the 
foundation for the state's smart growth program. The Economic Growth, Resource 
Protection, and Planning Act of 1992 is known as a "comprehensive planning act" 
because it mandates that all cities and counties develop comprehensive land use plans 
(Bierbaum 2001, Freilich 1999). Further, those plans were required to address seven 
visions identified by the state, and to include certain elements, such as transportation, 
community facilities, mineral resources, and sensitive areas (Bolens et al. 2001, Knaap 
"An Inquiry" 2002). For example, plans were required to incorporate four sensitive areas 
elements. These included steep slopes, streams and buffers, 100-year floodplains, and 
habitats of endangered species. This portion of the legislation was intended to ensure that 
each city and county preserve and protect these types of fragile areas. Policy analysts 
quickly concluded that would not likely be the outcome because the legislation allowed 
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each jurisdiction to define the "elements" and determine the suitable level of protection 
for each (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
The 1992 planning act became law because competing interests were satisfied 
during political maneuverings within the state assembly. In addition to being vaguely 
worded, the final product assigned only a small role to the state, and allowed local 
governments great discretion in designing their plans (Freilich 1999). The state's 
Department of Planning was charged with reviewing local plans and providing advice, 
but the local governments were never required to follow those recommendations in their 
final plan (Bolen et al. 2001 ). The state of Maryland also tried to assist cities and 
counties with planning requirements by providing publications and other useful materials. 
While political negotiation and compromise did succeed in enactment of the law, little 
time passed before shortcomings of the law were revealed (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An 
Inquiry" 2002). 
Contributions of Governor Glendening 
When Governor Glendening took office in 1 995, he made growth management for 
Maryland one of his administration's top priorities (Bierbaum 2001, "Smart Growth" 
2003). Not only was Glendening concerned about the future livability of the state, but he 
was also a skilled politician who researched what measures were necessary to convince 
Marylanders that his vision of smart growth for the state was sound (Schneider "The 
New" 2001 ). Governor Glendening spent his first two years in office collecting 
information regarding how citizens felt about their state and the legislation that was 
currently in place. He held over 400 public meetings throughout the state. He also 
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worked clos�ly with both state and local level agencies as his legislative agenda began to 
take shape (Bierbaum 2001 ). 
In 1997, Governor Glendening' s efforts finally were realized in the form of the 
Smart Growth Areas Act ("Smart Growth" 2003). He had been able to learn from the 
unsuccessful policy initiatives of preceding years in order to craft a program and an 
implementation style that would be accepted by the legislature, citizens, and other · 
stakeholders (Bierbaum 200 I ). Glendening reasoned that in order for his smart growth 
plan to be embraced, that it would have to meet certain criteria. First, the program 
needed to be incentive based rather than based in regulation. That way the programs 
would not intrude on local land use authority- a particularly important point since 
previous legislative efforts had failed largely because of ignorance of its importance. 
Second, his plans had to be designed so they could be implemented immediately and 
without the creation of any new bureaucracy. Lastly, the Governor insisted on 
reprioritizing existing government budgets rather than requiring new spending 
(Beaumont 1999, Bolen et al. 2001 ,  Cohen _2002). 
Glendening also took a unique approach in order to "sell" his plans to the public 
by making a link between economics and social policy goals (Bierbaum 2001 ) .  He 
focused his message on government efficiency, a topic that he believed citizens and 
lawmakers would find it hard to argue against. With efficiency as the emphasis, the 
Governor announced three major objectives for his smart growth program. These were to 
save natural resources, to support existing communities and neighborhoods by supporting 
areas where infrastructure was already in place, and to save money by not building new 
infrastructure (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
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The 1997 Smart Growth Areas Act 
The smart growth program instituted by Glendening in Maryland consists of five 
primary initiatives (Bierbaum 2001, Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002, "Smart 
Growth" 2003 ). The centerpiece of these is the 1997 Smart Growth Areas Act. These 
initiatives, together with Maryland's 1992 legislation, make-up the state's smart growth 
program. This program discourages low-density development by directing state spending 
on infrastructure and public services into existing communities and areas that are targeted 
for growth. The areas that are eligible for state funds are called priority funding areas, or 
PFAs. PFAs include the traditional urban areas of Maryland- the City of Baltimore and 
areas inside the Baltimore and Washington beltways. They also include neighborhoods 
that have been designated by the state's Department of Housing and Community 
Development for revitalization, such as Enterprise Zones and Heritage areas (Knaap 
2002). Counties may designate additional PF As that meet certain criteria established by 
the state. In order to qualify, proposed PF As must: 
1. Have a permitted density of at least 3.5 units per acre 
2. Have existing or planned water and sewer systems 
3. Be consistent with county growth projections and a long term policy 
promoting orderly expansion of development and efficient use of land and 
public services (Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002, "Smart Growth" 2003) 
Despite these restrictions, an exemption process does exist that allows the state to 
provide funds for public services or infrastructure outside of PF As under certain 
circumstances (Johnson 2002). Decisions regarding exemptions are made by the State 
Board of Public Works- a three-person committee including the Governor, State 
Comptroller, and the Treasurer. Other exceptions to the policy that do not require review 
by the board include commercial or industrial development that must be located away 
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from other development, such as a railroad facility or a major highway interchange. 
(Cohen 2002) 
It is important to note here that the law does not prohibit development outside of 
priority funding areas; rather, it simply restricts the state from subsidizing such 
development. Growth outside of PF As may still occur if infrastructure costs are absorbed 
by either local governments or private sources. Another strategy that the state employs to 
prevent such growth is in offering expertise to citizen groups or communities that are 
opposed to development outside PFAs. For example, the state cannot prohibit a Wal­
Mart from opening in a rural area, but it can make the process complicated for the retailer 
and its supporters by providing planning, design, and legal advice to those groups who 
oppose it (Bolen et al. 200 1 ,  Johnson 2002). 
Potential Problems with Priority Funding Areas 
The effectiveness of priority funding areas on producing desired growth patterns 
is largely undetermined due to the newness of the program as well as its uniqueness to the 
state of Maryland. Knaap (''An Inquiry" 2002) has made predictions about PFAs based 
on other states' experiences with the use of urban growth boundaries, which have some 
similarities. 
One foreseeable problem is the potential political struggle that may erupt between 
local and state governments. According to program guidelines, the state must approve 
PFA designations produced by local governments. Knaap's  prediction for conflict is 
based on the simple observation that the larger the area of a PF A, the greater the amount 
of stat_e funding a local government has access to. From a purely financial standpoint, 
67 
local governments might want larger PF As while the state might want smaller ones. 
Further, the procedure for expanding the boundaries of a PF A after it has already been 
approved by the state has yet to be determined. Knaap argues that whatever process is 
eventually adopted will be a convoluted set of rules and regulations that is more 
representative of political compromise than the logic of land use planning (Knaap "An 
Inquiry" 2002). 
A second prediction Knaap made regarding PF As is that local governments will 
intentionally allow growth to occur outside of those designated areas in a process referred 
to as "income and substitution effect". According to Knaap, cities and counties might 
reallocate money that they otherwise would have used to finance urban services inside 
the designated growth areas to finance infrastructure and service demands outside the 
PF A This action would maximize the potential dollars a local government has available 
to it for subsidizing growth, while negating the "smart" intent inherent in the policy 
(Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
Another dire prediction by Knaap is that sprawl will continue to occur, and 
perhaps be encouraged to occur, inside PF As. Again, the state government eagerly 
providing money for infrastructure and public services inside PF As may result in 
wasteful land use practices. Knaap suggests that local governments must ensure strong 
anti-sprawl regulation within the boundaries in order to prevent or minimize this outcome 
(Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
The fourth observation Knaap made is that priority funding areas may cause 
controversy to develop over the effect they have on land and housing prices. As is the 
case with urban growth boundaries, some individuals may argue that because PF As 
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restrict urban land supply, the cost of housing may increase. This controversy may be 
compounded by the fact that Maryland does not require local governments to include an 
affordable housing element in their comprehensive plans. Rather, the state recommends 
that they do so (Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
While smart growth legislation in the State of Maryland may be too newly 
implemented to support or disprove Knaap's predictions, examining those predictions as I 
have done here enhances understanding of the intricacies of the laws. I will now review 
the remainder of Maryland's smart growth legislative program. 
The 1997 Rural Legacy Act 
A second major �omponent of Maryland's smart growth program is the 1997 
Rural Legacy Act ("Smart Growth" 2003). This initiative provides funds to local 
governments and land trusts to buy forests, open space land, and farms in designated 
"rural legacy" areas, so that the land may remain undeveloped. Policymakers attempted 
to accomplish numerous goals through preservation of these areas. Goals included 
preserving wildlife habitat; reducing pollution runoff into streams and the Chesapeake 
Bay; protecting farming, forestry, outdoor recreation, and tourism from the effects of 
sprawl; and preserving a "sense of place" in the countryside (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An 
Inquiry" 2002, "Smart Growth" 2003). 
Participants in the Rural Legacy program are selected through a competitive 
process. Special criteria are used in the state's review in order to compare the 
significance of each property in terms of agriculture, forestry, and natural resources. 
These criteria include the degree to which the purchase will protect contiguous blocks of 
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land; the degree to which the resources and character of an area are threatened by 
development; and the significance of any historic sites on the property. Local 
governments and land trusts chosen to receive grants must sign a contract with the Rural 
Legacy Board that outlines recommendations for furthering rural land conservation . . 
Program participants are also required to submit annual reports to the board detailing 
their efforts and any improvements to their land preservation program (Bolen et al. 2001, 
Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
An amendment to the act in 2000 allows development rights that have been 
purchased from landowners in these areas to be resold to developers, a legal procedure 
known as "transfer of development rights", or TDR. Developers, however, may only use 
the rights in priority funding areas. In addition, the local government that sold the rights 
is required to use fifty percent of the profit on capital projects. The other half of the 
proceeds must be given to the Rural Legacy Program, where the amendment mandates 
that the funds will be used for conservation in the county where the TDR occurred 
(Cohen 2002). 
The Brownflelds Voluntary Cleanup and Revitalization Incentives Program 
The Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and Revitalization Incentives Program is a 
third smart growth program that is intended to stimulate reuse of contaminated property 
(Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002, "Smart Growth" 2003). As defined in a 
previous chapter, brownfields are abandoned properties in cities or inner ring suburbs that 
continue to remain unused because of contamination due to some previous industrial use 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998). Communities benefit in several ways from the 
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rehabilitation of these properties. In addition to the obvious public health benefit of 
decontaminating an area, local governments save money when these sites are restored 
because they usually have infrastructure such as water and sewer systems already in 
place. The use of existing infrastructure saves taxpayer dollars that would otherwise be 
spent on the construction of new roads, utilities, etc. In addition, urban sprawl may be 
avoided and valuable green space may be saved when industrial sites are rehabilitated. 
Finally, reuse of these properties contributes to the revitalization of cities by helping to 
bring commerce back to an abandoned area (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Briechle 
1999, Silberstein and Maser 2000). 
The greatest obstacle to rehabilitating brownfields that has had to be overcome in 
Maryland is the issue of who is ultimately liable for environmental, public health, or 
other damages caused by contaminated property (Cohen 2002). In 1980, federal 
legislation (The Comprehensive Environmental Response Liability and Compensation 
Act, or CERCLA) was created establishing the "Superfund" program, which sought to 
identify and target the most severely polluted brownfields in the country. This legislation 
placed responsibility for cleanup expenses on current owners of such properties whether 
they were involved in originally disc�arging the pollutants or not. The effect of the 
policy was to discourage businesses from purchasing sites that were contaminated, or 
possibly contaminated (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
The brownfields revitalization program in place in Maryland is a two-pronged 
approach to alleviating those concerns of potential participants described above. First, 
the Voluntary Cleanup program eliminates, or at least reduces, liability concerns of new 
resident businesses. Qualifying participants submit a proposed cleanup plan to the 
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Maryland Department of the Environment, which administers the program. After 
approved cleanup plans are executed to the satisfaction of the state, the new tenants are 
legally released from further liability (Bolen et al. 2001, Cohen 2002). 
The second part of the state's effort is the Brownfield Revitalization Incentive 
Program, which offers financial incentives in the form of grants or low interest loans to 
commercial enterprises willing to participate (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002, 
"Smart Growth" 2003) . The available funds can be used in the environmental assessment 
and plan development phase, or for the property cleanup itself. In addition, this program 
allows property tax abatements for site owners who have completed their cleanup 
programs, provided the property is located in a participating taxing jurisdiction. Property 
tax credits equal to fifty percent of the property tax attributable to the increase in value of 
the site since the last pre-cleanup assessment are available for five years after the site 
rehabilitation is complete (Bolen et al. 2001, Cohen 2002). 
The Job Creation Tax Credit Program 
The fourth major part ofGlendening's 1997 Smart Growth initiative was the Job 
Creation Tax Credit Program, which was originally passed in 1996, then significantly 
altered in 1997 so that a greater number of businesses could qualify. The program is 
intended to encourage businesses to expand within Maryland or to relocate to Maryland. 
The changes made to the law in 1997 also encourage midsize and smaller businesses to 
invest in priority funding areas (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002, "Smart Growth" 
2003) .  
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Qualified employers may receive a basic credit of $1,500 per employee. Only 
specified industries are eligible for the tax credit. These industries include 
manufacturing, biotechnology, computer programming, transportation, and 
communications. Some exceptions are allowed, but with more stringent conditions that 
must be satisfied. For example, entertainment, recreation, and tourism types of 
businesses are eligible for the tax credits only if they will generate a minimum of 1000 
new full time jobs in a two-year period (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
To qualify for this tax credit, a business must create a minimum of twenty-five 
new, full-time jobs, with a salary 1.5 times the federal minimum wage, and located within 
a priority funding area. Each position must be newly created, and not a transferred job 
from another part of the state. Each job must also provide at least thirty-five hours a 
week of work to an individual employee. Further, each position must remain in existence 
for three years after the credit is claimed, otherwise the state may reclaim it ( Cohen 2002, 
Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
It should be noted that while in order for a company to qualify for this program 
jobs must be created, but the law includes no residency requirements. Qualified 
employees may not necessarily live in the PF A that the industry is located in. In other 
words, the firm's location may not necessarily correlate with increased job opportunities 
for residents of those same areas (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
The Live Near Your Work Program 
The fifth major part of the 1997 smart growth initiative in Maryland was the Live 
Near Your Work {LNYW) program. This program provides financial incentives for 
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employees to buy homes near their workplaces. One objective for LNYW was urban 
revitalization, which was expected to result from an increased number of homeowners 
downtown, as well as the increased commerce associated with those occupants. So called 
social benefits were also goals of the program. According to proponents, reduced 
commuting times and decreased automobile traffic were factors that might both improve 
the quality of life for employees in urban areas. A third objective was environmental. 
Decreased commute distances for participants was expected to lessen pollutants from car 
emissions (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry'' 2002, "Smart Growth" 2003). 
Employees who qualify for the Live Near Your Work program can receive a 
minimum of $2,000 toward down payment and closing cost on the purchase of a home. 
There is no income restriction for employee eligibility (Bolen et al. 2001 ). In other 
words, both wealthy employees and low-income employees may apply. Program homes 
are located in mixed-use neighborhoods that local governments have designated as in 
need of revitalization. Participating employers determine eligibility requirements; 
including the maximum distance homes may be located from the employment location. 
Both the employing business and the local government contribute $1 ,000 to approved 
homebuyers. The homebuyer must also contribute $ 1 ,000. The Maryland Department of 
Housing and Community Development provides technical assistance and grant money to 
local governments participating in the program (Cohen 2002, Knaap "An Inquiry" 2002). 
Cohen's Conditions for Success 
According to Cohen (2002), who has researched smart growth programs in 
Maryland, the future success of these programs is dependent on at least four factors. 
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First, the state and local governments must continue to provide adequate funding for the 
infrastructure and public services required for growth within priority funding areas. If 
they fail to do so he argues, more residential development could occur outside PF As 
because private developers are willing to subsidize infrastructure costs in those areas. 
Another potential outcome is that local governments might use "fiscal zoning" to 
compensate for the lack of government funding. Fiscal zoning is usually counter to smart 
growth because it reduces affordable housing options. Regulations of this type allow 
only structures that are taxed at a high rate, such as large homes, to be constructed in an 
area in order to produce sufficient funds for services and infrastructure (Cohen 2002) . 
Second, the smart growth programs must provide sufficient financial incentives 
to induce citizens and business people to make personal decisions that are consistent with 
the goals of the programs. Cohen states that because the programs are incentive based 
rather than mandatory, many individuals may not be aware of the opportunities available 
to them. Hence, the state and local governments must publicize the various programs to 
ensure an informed citizenry. Furthermore, Cohen predicts that additional incentives 
may be required in order for some programs to be successful. For example, he argues 
that middle-class families and those with children may need greater incentives to relocate 
to cities or inner-ring suburbs. "Unless great improvements are made in school quality 
and public safety . . .  only certain types of individuals and households will be attracted to 
the city (e.g. single young adults, empty-nesters)" (Cohen 2002, quoted p. 20) . 
Third, support for smart growth initiatives must be maintained within the state 
and local governments, as well as with the public if the programs are to be successful. 
Support from the governor and other high-ranking state officials is critical for smart 
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growth in Maryland. As described above in the section "The 1 997 Smart Growth Areas 
Act", the governor, state comptroller, and treasurer comprise the State Board of Public 
Works, which can give approval to state funding for development outside of PF As, in 
effect negating the policy (Cohen 2002). 
In addition to the need for state and local government support, Cohen (2002) also 
argues that if citizens lose confidence in or become disenchanted with the programs, they 
might pressure local governments to enact regulations that undermine the state's smart 
growth efforts. Local government officials are likely to comply because they are 
interested in satisfying constituents and being reelected (Cohen 2002). 
Finally, Cohen (2002) argues that benchmarks and other indicators of success 
must be created and utilized so that citizens, business professionals, state employees, and 
local governments themselves can monitor effects of the programs. According to Cohen, 
it is important to the long-term success of smart growth initiatives that stakeholders "see" 
the policies producing desired results. He cautions, however, that while benchmarking is 
an important factor, it will be a number of years before meaningful comparisons can be 
made utilizing such measures due to the relative newness of the programs (Cohen 2002). 
As with Knaap's cautionary predictions regarding Maryland's priority funding 
areas, Cohen's observations and predictions are useful in providing a richer 
understanding of the legislation, even if it is premature to judge their accuracy or validity. 
I will now provide background information for the smart growth program implemented in 
Georgia. 
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Georgia 
Smart growth legislation in-Georgia is entirely unique. Local governments are 
merely "encouraged" to plan. The state plan is later created from local plans ( Georgia 
2000, Starnes 199 1  ). In this section I will detail how Georgia's program may be 
classified as medium coercion/comprehensive-general. 
Impetus for Smart Growth: Environmental Problems, Interjurisdictional Conflicts 
In Georgia, there was no single environmental crisis that provoked smart growth 
legislation as there was in Maryland with the Chesapeake Bay crisis. Georgia, rather, had 
a number of problems throughout the state that were primarily of two types­
environmental issues and interjurisdictional conflicts (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Starnes 
1993 ). One of the most serious environmental concerns was regarding the state's water 
supply. A mismatch existed between supply and demand. In north central Georgia, 
including Atlanta, where the population was growing, water was in short supply. In the 
coastal plains of the state, however, where population growth was much slower, both 
groundwater and surface water supplies were abundant. Georgia was also experiencing 
the usual problems associated with sprawl, most dramatically in and around Atlanta. In 
the 1980s Atlanta's population boom overwhelmed the area's existing infrastructure. 
Traffic congestion and sewer moratoria were two results (DeGrove and Miness 1992, 
Starnes 1993). 
Interjurisdictional conflict was another reality in Georgia. Every city and county 
in the state had the authority to provide basic public services and to regulate land use 
through planning and zoning powers. Local governments typically carried out these 
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duties in isolation, without consulting neighboring communities. According to DeGrove 
and Miness ( 1992), uncoordinated transportation planning between jurisdictions resulted 
in major highways changing from two to four lanes, and then back again, as they crossed 
jurisdictional boundaries. The poor communication between local governments became a 
greater concern when the federal government issued new mandates regarding clean air, 
clean water, and wetlands protection. Government officials at both the state and local 
level acknowledged that greater cooperation was necessary between jurisdictions in order 
to meet the requirements of the new mandates, as well as to effectively plan for growth in 
the state (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Starnes 1993). 
Development and Character of Smart Growth Legislation 
The eventual adoption of smart growth legislation in Georgia was surprising to 
many observers outside the state because of Georgia's history as a place where home rule 
and private property rights are cherished (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Starnes 1993 ). In 
fact, in 1976, the state constitution was amended so that local governments gained the 
power to establish zoning regulations. The amendment stated that the state legislature 
could not "in any manner, regulate, restrict, or limit the power of any county, 
municipality or combination thereof, to plan and zone" (DeGrove and Miness 1992, 
quoted p.101 ). -This restriction on the state would prove to be short-lived, however. 
In 1981, on the heels of the environmental and interjurisdictional problems described 
above, the entire state constitution was rewritten. The new constitution included an 
amendment that gave the state authority to govern the planning and zoning powers of 
local governments (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Starnes 1993). 
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Contributions of Governor Harris 
Georgia's smart growth effort was seriously begun under the direction of 
Governor Joe Frank Harris in the second half of the 1980s (Weitz 1 999). Late in Harris' 
first term as governor, Leonard Ledbetter, the commissioner of the State Department of 
Natural Resources, convened a meeting in order to discuss what could feasibly be done to 
manage growth in Georgia. The group he assembled represented all major stakeholders 
in the process of land use planning. Participants included state, county, and city officials, 
businesspeople, developers, and environmentalists. It became clear that support for 
change was widespread. The group concluded that in order to maintain a high quality of 
life for residents while embracing continued economic growth, an improved system for. 
coordinated planning at the state, regional, and local levels was needed. Ledbetter 
presented his findings to Governor Harris, who was eager to engineer the changes 
(DeGrove and Miness 1992, Starnes 1993). 
Harris personally took up the cause during his second term in office, and in fact 
made it the major public policy initiative of his second term. His first action was to 
appoint a thirty-five member Growth Strategies Commission that was given eighteen 
months to create a state growth strategy. The commission operated in an open and 
inclusive manner in order to build a consensus throughout the state. Information and 
insight was solicited from stakeholders, public meetings were held, and members of the 
state legislature were briefed on their progress. The commission eventually produced 
three documents whose recommendations were incorporated without major changes into 
the Georgia Planning Act of 1989 (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Starnes 1993 ). 
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The Georgia Planning Act of 1989 
The Georgia Planning Act of 1989 established the "quality growth partnership" 
prescribed by the Growth Strategies Commission. The system created by the legislation 
is described as both "bottom-up" and three-tiered in nature. The "bottom-up" designation 
refers to the fact that local governments develop their plans first, followed by regional 
bodies, and then by the state (the three tiers) (Bolen et al. 2001). Within this framework, 
local governments retain zoning powers and discretion regarding development that has 
"solely a local impact". Further, local governments are not required to plan, as regional 
governments and the state are (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Johnson 2002, Starnes 1993). 
The law consists of five main parts. First is the establishment of the Governor's 
Development Council. Membership of the GDC includes the governor, who serves as 
chairman; the commissioners of every cabinet level department, including agriculture, 
community affairs, natural resources, and transportation; the state school superintendent; 
the director of the Office of Planning and Budget; the director of�e State Soil and Water 
Conservation Commission; and the director of the Georgia Forestry Commission. The 
planning act charges council members with tremendous responsibility. Their duties 
include coordinating, supervising, and reviewing plans of state agencies. In particular, 
the council is to monitor the planning and construction of public facilities in order to 
insure they are situated in accordance with local, regional, and state plans (DeGrove and 
Miness 1992, Johnson 2002, Starnes 1993). 
The second part of the 1989 Planning Act describes the state's role in the 
comprehensive planning process. Most of the responsibilities are given to the 
Department of Community Affairs, or DCA. The legislation describes this department as 
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"the state's principal department for developing, promoting, maintaining, and 
encouraging coordinated and comprehensive planning". DCA duties include: 
1 .  Establishing standards and procedures for regional, county, and municipal 
plans 
2. Helping regional and local governments to prepare and implement plans 
3 .  Determining the boundaries of regional governments, subject to 
legislative approval 
4. Certifying regional and local governments as "qualified" in accordance 
with the legislation 
5. Gathering information from other state agencies as well as regional and 
local governments in order to construct a statewide database and 
information network 
6. Reviewing and reporting to the governor the plans of state agencies, 
regional, and local governments 
7. And, establishing procedures for conflict resolution 
Clearly, the Department of Community Affairs exercises much power and authority 
within Georgia's growth management system (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Johnson 2002, 
Starnes 1993 ). 
The third part of the planning law establishes the role of regional governments, or 
Regional Development Centers (RDCs ), as they are termed. RDCs are critical to the 
planning framework implemented in Georgia. Not only do they prepare regional plans 
based on local plans, but they also perform important checks on local governments. Each 
city and county in the state must join an RDC and pay membership dues. It is the 
responsibility ofRDCs to review the plans of their component local governments in order 
to determine if state instituted standards are being met and procedures are being followed. 
This is a critical issue because based on the RDCs evaluation and recommendation to the 
State Department of Community Affairs, local governments are determined to be either 
eligible or ineligible for grants and other types of assistance. RDCs also provide 
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technical assistance to local governments and resolve conflicts that arise between them 
(DeGrove and Miness 1992, Johnson 2002, Starnes 1993). 
The fourth part of Georgia's planning act describes the role of local governments. 
Cities and counties are encouraged, but not required, to prepare and implement 
comprehensive growth management plans (Georgia 2000). If a city creates no plan, the 
county plan applies. If neither a city nor its corresponding county prepares a plan, they 
are both subject to the regional plan once it is prepared. Cities and counties are also 
authorized, but not required, to prepare land use regulations and capital improvements 
plans consistent with their comprehensive plans. The law also states that local plans must 
be submitted for review by the appropriate Regional Development Council. As described 
above, the regional body reviews plans for consistency with the minimum planning and 
environmental standards established by the state (DeGrove and Miness 1992, Johnson 
2002, Starnes 1993). It is interesting to note that in Georgia, local governments do not 
have to plan, but if they do, those plans must be submitted for review. Local 
governments that do not prepare plans, or whose plans fail to meet state standards, lose 
their "qualified local government" status, which means that they are not eligible for state 
grants or loan programs (Georgia 2000). 
The fifth and final part of Georgia's planning legislation outlines the role of the 
state's Department of Natural Resources. The DNR is charged with developing 
minimum standards for protecting watersheds, wetlands, and aquifer recharge areas. 
These standards are subject to legislative approval. Plans prepared by state agencies, 
regional councils, counties, and cities must meet the threshold requirements established 
by DNR (DeGrove and Miness 1992). 
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The Minimum Planning Standards and Procedures 
As explained above, smart growth legisla�ion in Georgia establishes that local 
governments are not absolutely required to plan, but they are somewhat coerced to do so. 
Failure to adopt an acceptable local plan results in loss of "qualified local government" 
status, making a local government ineligible for certain state funds (Georgia 2000). The 
state's criteria regarding what constitutes an acceptable local plan were solidified when 
the Georgia legislature adopted The Minimum Planning Standards and Procedures in 
1990. According to the guidelines, local plans must include a description and assessment 
of existing conditions, a statement of goals and needs, and an implementation strategy. 
In addition, six elements must be addressed. These are population, economic 
development, natural and historic resources, community facilities, housing, and land use 
(DeGrove and Miness 1992). 
A number of scholars have expressed surprise at the level of compliance achieved 
by local governments in Georgia (Bolen et al. 2001, Freilich 1999, Johnson 2002, Weitz 
1999). According to a report released in 2002 by the American Planning Association, 
99% of local governments have achieved compliance (Johnson 2002). Starnes (1993) 
suggests that this is because the "bottom-up" nature of the law recognizes the state' s  
traditional culture of home rule. In Chapter IV, I will examine whether or not the high 
degree of compliance exhibited has been translated into the achievement of smart growth 
in a selected city in the state. Now I will tum my attention to the evolution of smart 
growth legislation in Florida. 
83 
Florida 
The history of growth management in Florida is unique because the state has 
initiated two distinct waves of reforms- one in the mid- 1970s and one in the mid-1980s 
(DeGrove 1990, Weitz 1999). This long history of state policy directed toward healthy 
growth eventually helped to mold Florida's 1985 legislative program as one of the most 
coercive (Johnson 2002, Pelham 1993). 
Impetus for Smart Growth: Environmental Crises and Grassroots Activism 
The state of Florida experienced massive population growth beginning in the 
1950s. This growth put a strain on the state's natural resources as well as critical 
infrastructure, such as roads and potable water systems. Citizen groups concerned with 
perceived degradation of the environment became active in the 1960s. Issues of concern 
included destruction of wetlands, beaches, and dune systems; the threat of salt-water 
intrusion into the fresh water drinking supply; rampant fires in the Everglades; and 
contamination of waterways by inadequate sewage treatment (Burby and May 1997, 
Catlin 1997). 
While the environmental movement continued to gain strength in Florida in the 
1960s, several issues emerged that propelled the environmental agenda into the state's 
mainstream policy arena. These were the proposal by the Corps of Engineers to build a 
barge canal across the state; the Dade County Port Authority proposal to locate a regional 
airport in the Big Cypress Swamp west of Miami; and a severe drought-in the 
southeastern part of the state due primarily to drainage of much of the Everglades for 
agriculture. By the mid-1970s, residents, lawmakers, environmentalists, members of the 
84 
planning community, and other concerned parties were clamoring for change in an 
atmosphere of desperation ( Catlin 1997). 
Development and Character of Smart Growth Legislation 
Florida is unique in that two different governors played significant roles in the 
development of smart growth legislation (DeGrove 1990, Pelham 1993). In this section I 
will discuss the evolution of Florida's program in terms of roles played by these activist 
governors. 
Contributions of Governor Askew 
The first steps in the long history of growth management in Florida were initiated 
by Governor Reuben Askew. Askew convened a conference in 1971 to study the effects 
of Florida's booming population on the environment, and to recommend ways to reverse 
the state's water shortage (Weitz 1999). He told members of the conference "a failure to 
find appropriate solutions to the effective management of growth would be disastrous .. .  " 
(Catlin 1997, quoted p. 53). Based on the findings and recommendations of the 
conference, several pieces of legislation were subsequently adopted by the legislature, 
establishing Florida's first effort at statewide land use management (DeGrove 1990). 
These pieces of legislation were: ( 1) the Environmental Land and Water 
Management Act (1972), which provided for the preservation of sensitive and 
endangered areas such as wetlands and sand dune systems; (2) the Water Resources Act 
(1972), which established five regional water management districts throughout the state; 
(3) the Florida Comprehensive Planning Act (1972), which required the state to develop a 
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master plan intended to guide policy decisions regarding growth and management of 
critical areas; (4) the Land Conservation Act (1972), which allowed for the purchase of 
environmentally sensitive areas; and (5) the Local Government Comprehensive Planning 
Act (1975), which required that all cities, towns, and counties adopt a local plan that 
included numerous elements such as future land use, utilities, and conservation (Catlin 
1997). 
While Florida's growth management legislation was ahead of its time in 
comparison with efforts in other states, Floridians became frustrated once again in the 
early 19 80s, as it became clear that the initiatives of the previous decade had fallen short 
of expectations (Burby and May 1997, DeGrove 1990). In addition to ongoing 
environmental concerns, quality of life issues had become critical. Citizens complained 
about traffic congestion, poor storm water management, and inefficiency of solid waste 
services. Public sentiment eventually encouraged a reevaluation of the growth 
management laws and proposals for major changes. Those concerns would be addressed 
for the second time by Gov. Bob Graham (Burby and May 1997, Pelham 1993). 
Contributions of Govemor Graham 
In 1982, Governor Bob Graham appointed a committee to study the inadequacies 
of the existing legislation and recommend improvements. When the final report was 
submitted in 1984, it contained a long list of factors that were found to have contributed 
to the failure of the programs. One major factor was that the state did not provide enough 
funding for successful implementation of the programs. Although substantial financial 
assistance was initially provided for the development of regional plans, local government 
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plans suffered from inadequate funding. The $50 million in assistance that was supposed 
to have been distributed by the state according to the terms of the legislation was never 
realized. Without aid from the state, many small communities simply did not have the 
financial resources to fully comply with the legislation (DeGrove 1992). 
A second reason for failure of the legislation was that it was not followed by a 
diligent implementation effort. DeGrove (1990) argues that the crisis mentality that 
helped secure passage of the laws subsided once the legislation was enacted. Two 
additional reasons the committee established for the legislation's shortcomings concerned 
the requirements of local government plans. According to the program, local 
governments' plans were not subject to an approval process, rather, they were only 
reviewed. Because the procedure lacked "teeth", local governments were not subject to 
punishment for failure to incorporate recommendations by the state (Burby and May 
1997). Also, state requirements for local plans were primarily process oriented. There 
was no guidance or oversight in regard to substance or quality of those plans (Weitz 
1999). 
Smart Growth Laws of 1984 and 1985 
Based on the findings of Governor Graham's study commission, two pieces of 
legislation were enacted in 1984 and 1985 that comprised the bulk of Florida's second 
attempt at effective land use management (Johnson 2002). These were the State 
Comprehensive Planning Act and the Omnibus Growth Management Act. The laws had 
two primary components. First, mandatory planning and plan implementation were 
established at the state, regional, and local levels. Second, new substantive requirements 
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regarding the quality of plans and implementation strategies were instituted (Pelham 
1993, Weitz 1999). 
In accordance with the laws, the order in which plans are developed in Florida is 
the opposite of the system that was eventually adopted in Georgia ( and described above). 
While Georgia's local governments plan first ("bottom--up''), in Florida, the state plan is 
developed first ("top-down") (Starnes 1993). This is known as the consistency doctrine 
in Florida, which is basically an assertion of the supremacy of the state plan, requiring 
that sub-governments and agencies develop plans that are consistent with those 
developed by the state (DeGrove 1990 ). 
The state's comprehensive plan that was eventually adopted established the goals 
and policies that would become the guidelines for the development of all subsequent 
plans. Twenty-seven policy areas were included, in effect planning for the state's 
economic, physical, and social growth (Bolen et al. 2001 ). The second step in the 
process was for state agencies to produce agency functional plans, or AFPs. These plans 
describe how an individual agency will accomplish the portion of the state plan it is 
responsible for. The third step in the prescribed process is the development of regional 
plans by each of the eleven regional planning councils in Florida. The consistency 
doctrine requires that regional planning be essentially the translation of the state plan into 
the various regional plans, in effect accounting for the significant differences across the 
state. The final stage of the process requires local governments to prepare plans that must 
be consistent with both the state and respective regional plans. The Department of 
Community Affairs, a state agency, reviews the local plans for consistency (Weitz 1999). 
Within one year after a local government submits its plan to the state, it must adopt an 
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implementation strategy describing how the plan will be achieved. Counties and large 
cities are required to update their plans every seven years. Smaller jurisdictions must 
update every fourteen years (Bolen et al. 2001 ). 
Consistency Requirements 
The consistency doctrine in place in Florida includes both vertical consistency 
and horizontal consistency. In both cases the concern is for consistency with the state 
plan, which is the authoritative document in the Florida system. The procedure outlined 
above incorporates the requirement known as vertical consistency. This designation 
refers to the "vertical" flow of the planning method established by the law. Plans made at 
the local level must be consistent with plans made at the regional level, which is next 
highest level of government. Local and regional plans must all be made consistent with 
the state plan, which is at the apex of the hierarchy (DeGrove 1990, Pelham 1993, Starnes 
1993). 
Horizontal consistency, on the other hand, is the requirement that local plans be 
compatible with one another. This element forces local governments to consult with each 
other during the planning process. For example, the establishment and maintenance of 
hurricane evacuation routes in Florida requires cooperation between local governments 
because the routes necessarily cross jurisdictions. If neighboring communities have a 
discrepancy, the regional council can provide conflict resolution services (Burby and 
May 1997). The same is true with developments of regional impact, or DRis. If a 
conflict arises over a large-scale development project that will potentially affect 
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numerous jurisdictions, such as a landfill, the regional council may intercede to settle 
disputes (Weitz 1999). 
Additional Restrictions 
Florida's 1 985 growth management legislation contains two main foci. One of 
these is restriction of coastal development. The laws establish a number of policies 
intended to stop development of barrier islands and other areas susceptible to hurricanes 
and other severe tropical weather phenomena. One method instituted was the 
requirement for the development of a ''thirty-year erosion line boundary". This boundary 
is an estimation of where the shoreline will be thirty years in the future, after erosion has 
caused more of the land surface to be underwater. The law states that no development 
may take pl�ce within this boundary (DeGrove 1990). 
The second major focus of the legislation is to reduce the effects of urban sprawl 
by encouraging compact, high-density urban development. One of the basic strategies for 
accomplishing this is known as the concurrency requirement. The goal of this policy is 
to stop the long-term trend of local governments allowing development in previously 
undeveloped areas without requiring that necessary infrastructure be constructed 
beforehand. As a result of the trend, in many instances facilities and services, including 
new roads, solid waste disposal systems, and recreation areas, were never constructed 
(Burby and May 1 997, DeGrove and Miness 1992, Pelham 1 993). Often, local 
governments were eventually forced to borrow the money to provide these, a practice 
called deficit financing (Connors et al. 1 992). 
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The concurrency requirement reverses this trend by establishing a "pay as you 
grow" system. In accordance with the legislation, after a local comprehensive plan is 
approved an implementation plan is developed, as described above. This second plan 
establishes the local land development regulations and the corresponding levels of service 
the local government intends to provide. Once these plans are in place, a local 
government is prohibited from issuing a building permit for any area where it cannot be 
guaranteed that infrastructure will be in place to support the growth when the impact of 
the growth occurs (Johnson 2002). It should be noted that new development is not 
necessarily halted by the concurrency requirement. Funding for infrastructure may 
legally be provided by a variety of sources- from developers, from residents of the new 
development in the form of impact fees, or from the local government (Connors et al. 
1992, DeGrove 1990). 
While the 1985 growth management legislation continues to provide the 
framework for smart growth in Florida, in 1993, additional legislation was adopted in 
order to fine-tune the existing laws (Freilich 1999). The Growth Management Act of 
1993 established a number of important changes. One significant change required that 
the state plan be reviewed and revised every two years. This was a particularly radical 
adjustment because the original state plan had not been reviewed since its inception in 
1985. A second difference in the 1993 legislation was that the planning and coordination 
roles of Regional Planning Councils were more clearly specified. One other significant 
change in the law dealt with developments of regional impact, or DRis. Some 
responsibility for reviewing large-scale developments was shifted from RPCs to the local 
level. The new object was for local governments to strengthen their intergovernmental 
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coordination efforts. With these additions to the 1985 legislation, Florida's core smart 
growth program was complete (Freilich 1999, Weitz 1999). 
Now that I have illuminated the history and character of smart growth legislation 
in Maryland, Georgia, and Florida, I will turn my attention to the city level analysis. 
Smart Growth Programs at the City Level 
In Chapter II, I devised an improved state growth management legislation 
classification system based on the two most useful existing systems. Based on the new 
typology, I selected three categories of legislation for study and comparison. These 
categories are: (1) low-coercion/comprehensive, exemplified by Maryland, (2) medium 
coercion/comprehensive, exemplified by Georgia, and (3) high-coercion/comprehensive, 
exemplified by Florida. Within Chapter ill, I have examined the history, 
institutionalization, and basic structure of the smart growth programs in Maryland, 
Georgia, and Florida. I have provided a detailed explanation of how each type of 
program functions as well as differs from the others. With all of the background 
information regarding the states' classifications and smart growth programs in place, I 
must now turn my attention to the local government level. 
One of the challenges with this research project has been making the theoretical 
leap between state level legislation and city level evaluation. The leap is a necessary one. 
As I discussed in Chapters I and II, in many cases over the last few decades, states have 
regained control of growth management from local governments. Some states have 
implemented incentive based programs, while other states have adopted a more heavy­
handed approach. In all cases, however, success or failure of state programs must be 
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judged by what happens at the local government level. It is the local governments that 
must implement state policies, and it is at the local level that policy outputs/outcomes are 
observed (Burby and May 1997). 
In order to bridge the theoretical gap described above, I will consider city level 
smart growth policies. {In Chapter IV, I will discuss why I have chosen to study cities as 
opposed to other units of local government.) By doing so, I develop a more logical 
connection between cause (x) and effect (y). The logical sequence of events I will 
assume is as follows: (1)  Smart growth legislation is implemented at the state level (x 1 ). 
(2) In response to the legislation, which is incentive based, mandatory, or a combination 
of both, local governments adopt complementary smart growth policies (x2). (3) The 
effects of state smart growth legislation, the primary independent variable; and locally 
adopted smart growth policy, the intervening independent variable; are both manifested at 
the local level. Therefore my goal is to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the 
effectiveness of state level smart growth legislation, taking into consideration 
manifestation of the programs at the city level. 
In the following chapter, I will detail smart growth policies adopted by three 
cities, Baltimore, :tvID, Atlanta, GA, and Orlando, FL in order to develop the logical 
sequence described above. I have selected one city from each state representing one of 
the types of smart growth legislation I identified earlier. In Chapter IV, I will present a 
detailed explanation regarding why I selected these cities in particular. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SMART GROWTH PROGRAMS 
Evaluation as Part of the Policy Process 
Evaluating the impact of a program is a crucial, and often difficult, part of the 
policy process. Public programs may be expanded, altered, or discontinued based on the 
information assembled. With increasingly tighter budgets, yet greater demands for 
services, the information collected in the evaluation phase is critical {Lindblom and 
Woodhouse 1993). This has proven to be an obstacle for policy entrepreneurs trying to 
"sell" smart growth programs at the state level. The impact of smart growth policies may 
take years, some would argue decades, to observe. Politicians are often reticent to 
champion a program that does not produce immediate results. In order to satisfy 
constituencies, the politician must produce results quickly, or at least appear to (Smith 
1991 ). This is simply not conducive to programs associated with smart growth. The 
politicians who successfully implement smart growth programs likely will not get credit 
should the programs be demonstrated as effective. Instead, the fortunate officeholder 
perhaps 15 years later might receive the praise, after desired policy results· have been 
realized (DeGrove 1990, Innes 1993, Leo et al. 1998, Pelham 1993, Popper 1981). 
Studies evaluating the results of smart growth programs have been limited largely 
because of the time required for outcomes to be manifested. It should be restated at this 
point that programs of this type at the state level have typically been in existence for ten 
or 20 years (Connors et al. 1992, Johnson 2002, Weitz 1999). In many instances, "policy 
outputs", or short-term quantifiable results, are beginning to be measured, while it will be 
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many more years before the associated "policy outcomes", or long-term qualitative 
results, are observable (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). For example, the policy 
outputs of a brownfields revitalization effort can begin to be measured months after 
implementation. One measure might be the number of businesses that have completed 
the application process and purchased property. Whether or not the desired policy 
outcomes occur would not be known for perhaps a decade. Would the areas in question 
once again be centers of activity complete with thriving industries, shops, restaurants, and 
pedestrian traffic? Would a significant amount of valuable greenspace outside the city be 
preserved? These are questions of policy outcomes, which can be evaluated only after 
programs have been in place many years. 
While it is premature to determine conclusively how well smart growth initiatives 
work, an evaluation of their effectiveness is the goal for policy analysts (Bollens 1992, 
Burby and May 1997, Gale 1992, Knaap "Talking" 2002). One method that has been 
used to gain insight into the potential outcomes of smart growth programs is forecasting 
with computer models (DeGrove 1990). Another method is estimating outputs based on 
the effects of similar programs instituted elsewhere. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Knaap ("An Inquiry" 2002) made predictions about the effectiveness of 
Maryland's  unique priority funding areas program based on his observations regarding. 
the use of urban growth boundaries in other states. 
Limited evaluative studies of smart growth policies have been conducted. Many 
have been case studies. While most social science case studies are descriptive in nature 
and designed to produce rich detail, some include an evaluative component (Campbell 
and Stanley 1963). In fact, a literature search for this subject produces dozens of case 
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studies utilizing a variety of rudimentary evaluative approaches ( Cohen 2002, Liou and 
Dicker 1994, Stein 1993). Many of them provide a detailed study of a single jurisdiction. 
For example, Catlin ( 1997) describes social, economic, and environmental conditions in 
communities in Florida before and after implementation of smart growth legislation. 
Another common approach is to compare the experiences and outcomes in two states that 
have adopted different types of smart growth programs (Bierbaum 2001 ). Carefully 
constructed case studies are an important tool for collecting detailed analysis of the 
experiences of one or more communities (Campbell and Stanley 1 963). I will employ a 
modified case study method in this research, which I will detail below. 
Methods 
In Chapter II, I developed a classification system for state smart growth 
legislation. Three basic types of smart growth programs were shown to be in place 
among less than half of all states. These are low-coercion/comprehensive programs, 
exemplified by Maryland, medium-coercion/comprehensive programs, exemplified by 
Georgia, and high-coercion/comprehensive programs, exemplified by Florida. To 
provide a deeper understanding of how those types of programs function as well as differ, 
in Chapter ill, I examined the history, institutionalization, and basic structure of the smart 
growth programs in Maryland, Georgia, and Florida. The next logical questions are: Do 
they work? If so, which of the three types works best? 
In this chapter I will present and interpret secondary data, or data that has been 
collected by other sources, to provide preliminary answers to these questions. First, one 
city must be chosen from each of the states representing the three types of smart growth 
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legislation I have identified. As stated in Chapter m, these cities are Baltimore, MD, 
Atlanta, GA, and Orlando, FL. The rationale for selecting these particular cities is 
detailed below. 
Second, I will discuss the intervening independent variables considered in this 
research. Sometimes independent variables affect dependent variables partially or fully 
through intervening variables. While intervening variables are responsible for changes in 
y, ultimately the independent variable is causal (Campbell and Stanley 1963). In this 
research, the independent variables (x 1) are state smart growth legislation; the intervening 
independent variables (x2) are local level smart growth programs; and the dependent 
variables (y) include an array of indicators, such as local air quality and local traffic 
congestion. In other words, I expect that there is a logical, causal link between the 
independent, intervening, and dependent variables, as described above. 
My third task is to develop a list of dependent variables that are reflective of the 
goals of smart growth legislation. In a following section I will detail which dependent 
variables were selected and why they were selected. I will collect time series data for the 
selected dependent variables, or indicators, as I will also refer to them. In the instances 
where appropriate historical data is available, measures for the variables will be 
compared from before and after smart growth was implemented at the state level. I will 
analyze the effectiveness of the programs based on an examination of the trends in the 
dependent variables. In each case, I will consider how the trend has evolved within the 
unique context of each city. 
Finally, in Chapter V, I will draw conclusions regarding the impacts of smart 
growth policies on the dependent variables in each city. I will make a preliminary 
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determination as to which of the cities has been most successful with achieving smart 
growth objectives based on my analysis. Based on this detenninatio� I will make 
provisional inferences as to which of the three types of state smart growth legislation is 
most effective. 
I use the word preliminary in regard to the evaluations.and conclusions of this 
research in part because legislation of this type is fairly new. As I stated in the opening 
of this chapter, if smart growth policies do produce desired results, they may not be 
entirely evident at this point in time. Even so, evaluating effectiveness is critical to the 
cyclical nature of the policy process (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993 ). The findings of 
this research may be combined with other recent evaluative studies to reach a tentative 
conclusion about the effectiveness of state initiated smart growth programs. 
Selection of Cities 
I will use Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando to represent the states of Maryland, 
Georgia, and Florida for several reasons. One reason is that all three are metropolitan 
areas with populations exceeding one million (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
According to 2000 census data, Baltimore has a population of 2,552,994 people; Atlanta 
has 4, 1 12, 198 inhabitants; and Orlando has a population of 1 ,644,561 .  The sheer size of 
the cities acts as a magnifying glass for this research. That is, if sprawl has produced 
pathological trends, and if these trends are affected by smart growth measures, I would 
expect to observe these things more easily in large cities than in small cities. 
Another reason for selecting these cities is that each has a reputation as a 
sprawling monolith, with a voracious appetite for greenspaces, farmland, and other rural 
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areas ("Per Capita" 1990, "Sprawl Guide" 2000). I am especially interested in what has 
happened in these cities because they are generally recognized by researchers as 
"sprawling" areas (Burby and May 1997, DeGove and Miness 1992, Johnson 2002, 
Knaap 2002, Weitz 1999). If smart growth legislation has positively impacted growth 
factors in these cities, I might reasonably expect it to have benefits in other cities, where 
the implications of sprawl have been less severe. On the other hand, it stands to reason 
that the opposite might instead be true. It may be that desired effects of the legislation 
are seen in the test cities because of the tremendous extent of damage from sprawl; while 
smaller cities, or cities with a lesser degree of damage from unhealthy gro� would less 
likely exhibit dramatic improvement. While my research is limited to the evaluation of 
Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, contemplating the results of similar studies on smaller 
cities, or those with less profound damage, is tantalizing and suggests an avenue for 
future research. 
Finally, I will use these three cities because data and information is available for 
each. Census data are available for each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and its 
component parts. This means that, for example, I know how many people live within the 
city limits of Orlando and how many live in the suburbs. These two numbers added 
together make up the MSA population estimates. The Census division between central 
city and suburbs is particularly useful to portions of my research that require a 
comparison between the two areas. Information on housing, poverty, and other variables 
is also available for these cities (Bureau of Census "State" and "Summary" 2004). 
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Selection of Dependent Variables 
I will conduct a preliminary evaluation of the success of smart growth legislation 
by examining relevant dependent variables, or indicators, for Baltimore, Atlanta, and 
Orlando. The evaluation is divided into parts based on the objectives of smart growth 
policies identified in Chapter II. Within each section, I will examine the change over 
time in a number of dependent variables. These variables are used to determine whether 
or not the corresponding objectives are being met in each city. Variables are chosen so 
that when examined together they are reflective of some aspect of the respective 
objective. The following is a listing of the five main smart growth objectives and the 
indicators I will examine for each. 
Objective # 1 :  Revitalize central cities 
A. Health of central cities v. suburbs 
1 .  Population trends 
2. Segregation trends 
3. Poverty trends 
Objective #2: Control Development 
A. Population density 
1 .  Population density per sq. mile of land 
2. Population v. land area 
Objective #3: Create and improve transportation options 
A. Roadway congestion 
1 .  Roadway Congestion Index 
2. Annual highway congestion costs 
3. Annual hours of traffic delay per person 
4. Annual wasted fuel due to congestion 
Objective #4: Protect natural resources 
A. Air quality 
1 .  Good v. unhealthy air quality days 
2. Ozone v. particulate matter days 
Objective #5 : Create equitable, desirable neighborhoods 
A. Housing 
1 .  Total units available 
2. Median household rent 
3. Housing cost burden 
4. Households with "any housing problems" 
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I will use Objective #4 to illustrate. The fourth objective of smart growth 
programs is to protect natural resources. This goal includes many component goals, so I 
chose to limit my evaluation to protection of air quality. In order to determine if the 
quality of air in my three test cities was improving or declining after smart growth 
legislation adoption, I analyzed time series data for several variables. I compared healthy 
air days with unhealthy air days over time. I also compared ozone days with particulate 
matter days over time. If smart growth legislation has impacted air quality in these cities, 
I expect to see a change in air quality, as evidenced by these indicators, after the date of 
program implementation. I will further clarify my research procedures in the following 
sections. 
Research Design 
This research is based on a number of pretest-posttest designs and several posttest 
only research designs. As mentioned above, in every instance possible, data was 
collected from both before and after implementation of x, the smart _growth programs. 
Many of the designs are longitudinal in nature, including both multiple pretests and 
multiple posttests. These take the following basic form (where x is the point of program 
implementation, and the Os are sequential observations, or data points, both before and 
after the program began): 
01 02 03 x 04 Os 06 
Of the designs employed in this research, this type is most desirable from a 
methodological perspective because it allows for examination of the trend before 
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program implementation (Campbell and Stanley 1963). This point will be further 
discussed in the next section. 
Due to data constraints, a few of the dependent variables will be examined 
utilizing the posttest only design. These take the following form ( where x is the point of 
program implementation, and the Os are sequential observations, or data points): 
X 01 02 03 
The drawback with using the posttest only design is that it does not provide an 
examination of the dependent variable before x. This makes it more difficult to exclude 
rival explanatory factors. For example, if x is a new law requiring the use of seatbelts, 
and three observations, or measurements, taken after implementation of x show a steady 
decrease in the incidence of traffic fatalities, it is not necessarily the case that x was 
responsible for y, the decrease in fatalities. Pretest measures of fatalities, which are not 
considered in this example, may have shown a gradual decrease in fatalities over the 
previous 10-year period, perhaps attributable to a decrease in the number of teenagers in 
the area. In short, if no data are available from before program implementation, it 
seriously limits the ability to establish x as causal (Campbell and Stanley 1963, Nachmias 
and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). 
Both of these types of research designs are considered to be "pre-experimental" in 
nature (Campbell and Stanley 1963). Experimental designs, while generally desirable, 
are often difficult to employ in social science because the researcher cannot exercise a 
high level of control over the test subjects or their environment. A true experimental 
design is methodologically sound because it includes a control group and randomized 
selection of test subjects. The inclusion of a control group allows for comparison 
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between groups exposed to x and groups unexposed to x. The randomized selection of 
test subjects means that those people, cities, or other subjects, are representative of the 
entire population, and research findings can be generalized from the sample to the 
population as a whole. The "pre-experimental" designation of the designs included in 
this research presents certain methodological challenges that �e detailed in a following 
section (Campbell and Stanley 1963, Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). 
Case Study Approach 
This research essentially consists of three case studies on the effects of smart 
growth programs in Baltimore, MD, Atlanta, GA, and Orlando, FL. They may be 
considered to be case studies because for each of the three, I examine: ( 1) the respective 
state legislation, the primary x variable; (2) local level programs, the intervening x 
variable; and (3) measurements of numerous dependent variables. For each city, I 
consider results of the data analysis in light of the city's planning or growth management 
background and in light of the circumstances that make each city unique, such as history, 
geography, and social conditions. In other words, this is not strictly quantitative 
evaluation, but also includes a detailed look at each city. 
Case studies are an important part of the process of understanding or predicting 
phenomena. They are usually employed as the front line research technique in the 
analysis of new or otherwise previously un-studied research subjects. They are used first 
because when a subject is new to researchers, data and information regarding the subject 
are generally limited. Data collected through the case study approach may consist of a 
combination of objective, quantifiable measures, and subjective information, such as 
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interview responses and personal accounts (Babbie 1998, Nachmias and Frankfort­
Nachmias 1996). 
Case studies also provide critical research avenues when no other approach may 
be employed. For example, the best way to understand a primitive tribe isolated in a rain 
forest may be to live among them for several months, collecting information in a case 
study approach. It would certainly be impossible to select a random sample from the 
population of existing primitive tribes in order to administer a written survey (Babbie 
1998, Nachmias and Frankfort-N�chmias 1996). 
Case studies are also important for the rich detail they provide. This contrasts with 
the sometimes sterile or clinical nature of purely quantitative studies (Babbie 1998, 
Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). In case studies, personal stories from 
individuals and vivid descriptions by researchers develop an intimate, realistic 
understanding of a subject or event. For instance, studies of the American presidency 
usually contain stories and remembrances by presidents that add a depth of insight into 
the office perhaps impossible through the mere manipulation of numbers (Di Clerico 
2000). The negative aspect of this is that it is harder to develop and test theory from a 
collection of case studies than from statistical studies, for example. Research methods 
utilized within case studies vary, which complicates the compilation of data, a standard · 
precursor to theory development. On the other hand, case studies do help researchers 
develop testable hypotheses. For example, accounts of experiences with a number of 
primitive tribes may lead to the hypothesis that matriarchic trib�s are less aggressive than 
patriarchic tribes (Babbie 1998, Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). 
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In conclusion, the case study approach has been useful to this research in a couple 
of ways. One is that because smart growth legislation is fairly ''young" from a policy 
implementation perspective, I have used the approach to collect basic information 
regarding both state and local programs as well as local conditions the programs are 
designed to address. For example, there is no database cataloguing what smart growth 
programs cities have in place. In order to assemble that information, I have scoured city 
documents, web sites, and other sources. 
The case study method has also been helpful with interpretation of data. Instead 
of relying primarily on numerical data, I have taken each city's unique features into 
consideration as part of the analysis. This has allowed me to have a fuller understanding 
of smart growth in the cities. For example, an examination of the data shows a decline in 
the cost of rent in Baltimore's central city (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). When this 
information is considered in light of the city's struggle against poverty, crime, and inner­
city abandonment, it becomes clear that a decline in the cost of rents in Baltimore is not 
in line with smart growth objectives. The decrease is, instead, indicative of deteriorating 
housing stock and low levels of consumer demand due to continued flight to the suburbs 
(City of Baltimore 2004). 
Methodological Challenges 
Determining the effectiveness of smart growth programs presents a number of 
methodological challenges. One is demonstrating a causal link between the change in 
each dependent variable and introduction of the independent variable, smart growth 
programs. A second challenge I face is selecting y variables for analysis that are valid 
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indicators of the five smart growth objectives listed above (Babbie 1998, Campbell and 
Stanley 1963, Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). In order to support the 
methodological stability of this research design, I will need to address a host of issues 
related to causality and validity. These issues are detailed in the following sections. 
Causality 
One of the most basic concerns I have is satisfying the criteria for causality. For 
any of the effectiveness measures to be meaningful, I must be reasonably certain that 
smart growth programs, and not some other independent variable( s) cause the phenomena 
being measured. The requirements for causality are that: ( 1) the cause precedes the effect 
in time; (2) a change in one variable is associated with a change in the other ( correlation); 
and (3) plausible rival hypotheses are excluded (Lazarsfeld 1959). I want to show that in 
each of the three cities, state initiated smart growth programs are responsible for the 
changes in dependent variables I will present. 
The first criterion will be easily satisfied because I know when the independent 
variable, the legislation, was implemented in each state. The years oflegislation adoption 
were 1992 and 1997 in Maryland, 1989 in Georgia, and 1985 in Florida. I want to 
establish the smart growth legislation as causal; therefore, my goal will be to observe 
changes in the dependent variables after these years. 
The second criterion of causality, correlation of variables, is somewhat more 
challenging to demonstrate. The dependent and independent variables must be shown to 
change together over time. Within this research, some change must be recorded in the 
dependent variable after the independent variable is introduced (Lazarsfeld 1959). 
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Accordingly, in each instance possible, a measure of each dependent variable will be 
obtained from the time period both before and after implementation of the legislation. In 
short, I expect to find that when state legislation changes to include smart growth 
programs, there will eventually be a change in population density, for example. 
The challenge of insuring correlation will be obtaining data for dependent 
variables that meets three criteria. One is that the information must be of sufficient 
· quality and detail that I can observe significant changes over time. A second concern is 
that ideally I need data points from both before and after program inception. Lastly, the 
data for each y variable must be uniform with regard to the manner in which it was 
collected and reported (Babbie 1998, Campbell and Stanley 1963, Nachmias and 
Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). 
I have made every effort to obtain data for the dependent variables that meets 
these requirements to the greatest degree possible. Due to the difficulty of collecting 
secondary data that meets the prescriptions of this research, some of the data I will utilize 
does have limitations. One limitation is that in several cases, data was not available for 
indicators prior to the adoption of smart growth legislation. For example, EPA air quality 
data I will utilize begins with 1993, four years after Georgia's smart growth legislation 
was enacted (EPA "AirData" 2004 ). The second limitation is that in some cases, data is 
only available for decennial census years. As a result, my analysis of the difference in 
rental housing costs between inner cities and suburbs, for example, is restricted to one 
data point every ten years. I could gain a more detailed understanding of rental cost 
trends if data had been collected, for instance, every five years. 
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The third criterion of causality will not be easily satisfied. Public policies such as 
smart growth programs are rarely concluded to be the sole cause of any phenomenon. 
This is often true for social science research when it is impossible to control for spurious 
or confounding factors. In the case of smart growth legislation, policies are implemented 
to produce changes in the conditions of variables, while those variables may continue to 
be affected by a variety of other factors. If the desired change in conditions is realized, it 
may be unclear whether that change was due to smart growth legislation or some 
alteration of those factors that were previously causal (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1 993, 
Campbell and Stanley 1963). For example, heavy traffic congestion in a city may be 
caused by an increased number of tourists, ongoing roadway construction, or a decrease 
in the cost of gasoline. If a decrease in congestion is recorded after a smart growth 
initiative is launched that provides incentives for individuals to use public transportation, 
the decrease in congestion may still potentially be accounted for by a variety of other 
factors. In order to determine conclusively what caused the improvement in traffic 
conditions, number of tourists, roadway construction records, and gasoline price trends 
would all need to be examined in addition to the smart growth initiative. 
In social science research, and in policy analysis in particular, it is not easy to 
identify all competing causal factors and systematically eliminate each one. Possible 
rival hypotheses, such as gasoline price trends in the above example, may be 
mathematically controlled for, and potentially eliminated as causal, if certain statistical 
methods, such as multiple regression, are used. In this study, however, where the n is 
very small, regression cannot be employed (Babbie 1998). Therefore I will use a number 
of other means in order to rule out competing explanations. First, I will rely on theory to 
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guide selection of dependent variables. In other words, I will use variables in the analysis 
that one could reasonably expect to be affected by the programs. Second, I will use 
multiple indicators to evaluate each objective. This will allow me to obtain a more 
thorough understanding of what changed and how. Third, wherever possible, I will 
compare the values of the dependent variables in each city with "average" values for 
cities of approximately the same population. This comparison is helpful for identifying 
unusual trends. Each of these three approaches contributes to a fuller understanding of 
how a variable has changed over time, and ultimately, whether smart growth policy may 
be responsible (Babbie 1998, Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). 
Finally, I will consider "pre-test" data in instances where it is available. In other 
words, when possible, I will examine the overall trend in the values of dependent 
variables before the program was implemented. This practice will allow me to determine 
whether "post-test" values, or those observed after policy implementation, are simply 
artifacts of the historical trend, or whether they are real changes possibly caused by smart 
growth laws (Babbie 1998, Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). For example, if 
the number of new homes being built on a vulnerable coastline has been decreasing 
steadily in the ten years preceding a smart growth program geared in part toward that end, 
then a continuation of that trend cannot be fully attributed to the program. In sum, the 
historical trend of a variable can be a sort of competing explanation that I will consider as 
part of the policy evaluation whenever possible. 
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Validity 
In addition to causality, validity is another methodological challenge for this 
research. To achieve validity, I must measure what I am intending to measure and not 
something else (Babbie 1998, Lazarsfeld 1959, Nachmias and Frankfort-Nachmias 1996). 
While this sounds like a simple task, it is not. For example, if l wanted to know whether 
city officials were attempting to make a community more pedestrian friendly, I could 
measure the number of miles of sidewalk installed as part of the initiative ( assuming such 
information was available). Sidewalks are paved expressly for protecting pedestrians 
from traffic, and not meant for bicyclists or those utilizing any other means of personal 
transport. That would be a single valid indicator of a program designed to encourage 
pedestrians. On the other hand, obtaining information regarding the number of pairs of 
sneakers sold in a community is not a valid indicator of the hypothetical program 
described. There is, at best, a weak causal link between sales of sneakers and increasing 
foot traffic in a community. I might argue that many individuals who buy sneakers do so 
because those types of shoes are comfortable, and that those individuals may have no 
intention of changing their transportation habits. 
My goal is to measure the effectiveness of state initiated smart growth laws at the 
city level. I will strive for validity in respect to my goal by employing several tactics. 
One is that I will reduce the concept smart growth to the five objectives detailed in 
Chapter II and outlined above (Babbie 1998). These are to protect natural resources, 
create and improve transportation options, control development, revitalize central cities, 
and create equitable, desirable neighborhoods. I will then select indicators for each of 
these five objectives. This contributes to validity because the concept of smart growth 
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includes many diverse facets. In order to gain a true picture of success or failure with 
smart growth, each of the five objectives must be included in the analysis. 
My second tactic for insuring validity is that I will analyze several indicators for 
each of the objectives. This is a practice known as triangulation (Babbie 1998). My 
rationale is that my understanding of long-term trends in roadway congestion, for 
example, will be more complete if I analyze four indicators rather than one. To clarify, 
for the second smart growth objective of creation and improvement of transportation 
options, I will examine four indicators of roadway congestion. These are the Roadway 
Congestion Index produced by the Texas Transportation Institute (200 1), annual highway 
congestion costs, annual hours of traffic delay per person, and annual wasted fuel due to 
congestion. 
Thirdly, I have sought to maximize validity by using standard indicators of smart 
growth that are commonly referenced in academic literature (Babbie 1998). While the 
indicators ·are widely used, each has been controversial in some way. I will address the 
criticisms of each indicator and my defense of the use of each in the data presentation and 
analysis section of Chapter N. 
Individuality of Cities 
The smart growth initiatives adopted by Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando are as 
unique as the state level legislation associated with each. While each of the cities has 
exhibited the usual conditions associated with sprawl, their unique history, location, and 
culture have created some growth management concerns that are specific to each. In this 
section I will detail the most serious growth concerns, followed by major smart growth 
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programs for each of the three cities. Where possible I will list local smart growth 
initiatives according to which of the five smart growth objectives each is intended to 
accomplish. In many cases, as will be shown below, however, a single program is 
designed to address multiple goals. 
Baltimore, MD 
The City of Baltimore offers many amenities to residents, investors, and tourists, 
including a busy Inner Harbor and notable research universities such as Johns Hopkins. 
However, the city also has many challenges to overcome in order to achieve smart 
growth and secure the loyalty of those groups (City of Baltimore 2004). 
Long-term Challenges 
Baltimore is a classic example of an "old" city ( established in 1797) that boomed 
during the Industrial Revolution and through World War II, then steadily lost population, 
economic investment, and jobs after that time. Gradually, residents who could afford to 
do so left the inner city for the suburbs, sparking a chain reaction of events that the city 
has yet to recover from. According to one report, the city lost about 1/3 of its population 
from 1950 to 2000 ("Plan" 1999). Furthermore, as recently as 2001 ,  there were 14,000 
vacant and uninhabitable properties in the city. Combined with the 4,000 habitable yet 
vacant city properties, there were a total of 18,000 vacant buildings in the City of 
Baltimore that year. These facts illustrate the continuing severity of Baltimore's  inner 
city abandonment (City of Baltimore 2004). 
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The exodus of the middle class left a mainly poor, mainly minority population in 
the city of Baltimore. Many jobs also left the city as businesses relocated to the suburbs. 
Joblessness and poverty were reinforced as buildings and infrastructures deteriorated, 
discouraging new business investment ("Plan" 1999). In short, a perpetual cycle of 
poverty developed within the inner city, where jobs were unavailable because they had 
moved to the suburbs, and no new jobs were created because businesses did not want to 
invest in the decaying city (City of Baltimore 2004). According to David Rusk (1996), 
former mayor of Albuquerque and urban studies scholar, the results of these conditions 
were high crime rates, drug addiction, family disintegration, and welfare dependency, all 
part of what he calls "social dynamite". 
Another major concern for growth advocates in Baltimore is related to the 
educational attainment and job skills of the citizenry. Statistics provided by the city 
starkly illustrate the concern. For instance, in 200 1 ,  57% of Baltimore's adult workforce 
did not complete high school, compared with 1 1  % at the national level. Further, only 
16% of the city's workforce had any college or other post-secondary training. City 
officials maintain that improvement in these areas would not only lead to a better quality 
of life for citizens, but would also draw businesses that need educated employees. A 
large part of the problem is the poor quality of schools in the inner city. Not only are 
inner city students disadvantaged, but flight from the city is reinforced, as middle class 
families with children move to areas with better schools (City of Baltimore 2004). 
As awareness of these conditions increased, the city did begin limited 
revitalization efforts in the 1960s. For example, the shoreline of the Inner Harbor was 
opened to the public in 1964 as a means of encouraging foot traffic and repopulation of 
1 13 
both commercial and residential neighborhoods near the waterfront. However, critics 
have charged that in the decades since World War II, city officials in Baltimore have 
simply "managed the deterioration" of the city, rather than forging strategic initiatives 
toward revitalization (City of Baltimore 2004, "Plan" 1999). 
Finally, environmental degradation has also been a major concern for residents of 
Baltimore. As I detailed in Chapter m, concern for the health of the Chesapeake Bay 
was a primary factor in the initiation of growth management in the State of Maryland. 
While residents of Baltimore are sentimental toward the Bay, the city has contributed to 
its pollution over time. Environmental abuses occurred during Baltimore's development 
as a seaport and shipbuilding center on the Chesapeake ("Smart Growth in Maryland" 
2003). In addition, air quality is a serious concern in Baltimore. Decades of automobile 
exhaust and industrial air emissions led to unhealthy air quality in the city. In fact, 
Baltimore is currently a "nonattainment" area for safe ozone levels, as designated by the 
EPA (EPA "National" 2000). 
In the next section, I will discuss some of the smart growth programs 
implemented in Baltimore in order to improve the conditions described above. 
Local Smart Growth Initiatives 
In order to address the City of Baltimore's concern with the profound loss of 
population and prosperity in the central city, many initiatives have been adopted that have 
the triple purpose of revitalizing the city, increasing population density, and creating 
affordable housing in the city. One creative program is called Buying Into Baltimore. 
The program consists of periodic home-buying fairs that concentrate on different areas of 
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the city. On Fair days, the public is invited to take trolley tours of a section of the city in 
order to see the homes that qualify for the program. The city then rewards the first 50 
individuals who buy homes within 90 days with $3,000 toward downpayment costs. 
Participants are also invited to homeownership and renovation mini courses the day of 
the Fair (City of Baltimore 2004). 
Another initiative with a similar purpose is the Baltimore City Employee 
Homeownership Program. City employees who buy homes within the city limits may 
receive a $3,000 loan that "evaporates" at the rate of 20% a year over five years. If the 
home is located within certain neighborhoods targeted for revitalization, the city 
employee may receive an additional $750. According to Baltimore's Department of 
Housing, over $5 million has been distributed by the city for the costs of this program 
since it began in 1994 (City of Baltimore 2004). 
The City of Baltimore has launched numerous other revitalization efforts in the 
downtown area. A primary strategy for revamping economic development has been to 
focus on improving existing assets in order to attract new business investments ("Plan'' 
1999). For example, one goal has been to leverage the prestigious universities and 
colleges located in the area to create university-industry partnerships, attract students and 
talented faculty, nurture. innovation, and create business opportunities. According to city 
officials, improvement to the physical environment surrounding the city's universities 
and colleges will attract research firms whose dealings with the schools require that they 
be located near one another. In short, officials believe that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between the healthy growth ofBaltimore and the healthy growth of the city's 
universities and colleges (City of Baltimore 2004). 
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The city is also dedicated to improving the quality of its public schools and 
increasing the education level of its population as a whole. According to city documents: 
"An educated and skilled workforce is one of the most important factors in an 
area 's ability to attract businesses and help them grow and prosper. Therefore, 
building the skills of our most critical asset-our human capital-must be at the 
heart of Baltimore 's economic growth strategy" (City of Baltimore 2004, quoted 
p �  
In accordance with this view, Baltimore offers a variety of programs to increase the 
education and job training levels of its citizenry, and to prevent families with children 
from leaving the central city area. Programs provided by the city include high school 
drop out prevention, computer learning both in schools and in public centers throughout 
the community, career skills for high school students, after school programs, and GED 
completion programs for adults. In addition, the city's Department of Labor Youth 
Opportunity initiative provides young residents with many resources and support systems 
designed to encourage completion of high school (City ofBaltimore 2004). 
In addition to improving existing physical assets as well as human resources, the 
City of Baltimore continues to focus on eliminating "crime and grime". Many historical 
buildings that were once used for industrial purposes, and then abandoned, have been 
converted to retail or office space. The city also routinely sponsors neighborhood 
cleanups (City of Baltimore 2004). 
The City of Baltimore accomplishes most of its transportation planning by 
participating in the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board (BRTB). Membership on 
the BR TB also includes the city of Annapolis, the counties of Anne Arundel, Baltimore, 
Carroll, Harford, and Howard, the Maryland Department of Transportation, the Maryland 
Department of the Environment, and the Maryland Department of Planning. The 
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Baltimore metropolitan area has an extensive transportation infrastructure to maintain and 
improve. In addition to the highway system, planning efforts also include the BWI 
airport, the Port of Baltimore, Amtrak's Penn Station, and MARC trains. The BRTB 
seeks to improve and promote these structures and services in order to retain and 
encourage business growth in the city, enhance local quality of life, and promote tourism 
(City of Baltimore 2004 ). 
Both the city and the BR TB emphasize the importance of public transportation 
options as a means of reducing traffic congestion and improving air quality. The city 
provides both rapid rail and bus service. Baltimore is unusual in that over 6% of inner 
city workers use public transportation. Even so, the percentage using mass transit 
actually fell from 7.7% in 1990 to 6.2% in 2000 (City of Baltimore 2004). According to 
a Baltimore citizens' group, the relocation of jobs from the city to the suburbs, combined 
with the mismatch in bus service between workers' homes and employment places, have 
both led to a decrease in use of mass transit (National 2000). 
Improving air quality, particularly in terms of ozone formation, is a top concern 
for the city and the region as a whole. In addition to encouraging the use of public transit 
as a means of reducing auto emissions, the city also seeks to improve air quality by 
educating the public. A major awareness campaign is called the Ozone Action Days 
Program. When high ozone level days are forecasted, and when they occur, the city 
initiates the Code Red Ozone Action Day Plan. Citizens are advised of the plan through 
local television newscasts, print news sources, Internet sources, and an extensive 
employer participation program. Individuals are encouraged to protect themselves by 
limiting outdoor activities, and they are also encouraged to stop behaviors that contribute 
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to ozone formation. The city provides some free bus service on high ozone days in order 
to reduce car emissions. In addition, citizens are asked to postpone the use of gas 
powered lawn equipment, oil-based paints and aerosols, and to ignite charcoal fires with 
electric lighters rather than lighter fluid (City of Baltimore 2004). 
Finally, the City of Baltimore has implemented numerous programs to increase 
homeownership, some of which are described above in connection with city revitalization 
efforts. In addition to offering properties for sale, the city also provides programs 
designed to prepare first time homebuyers for their purchase. One of these is called the 
Family Self Sufficiency Program. After completion of certain courses offered through 
the program, individuals become eligible for special loans and other financial incentives 
from the city (City of Baltimore 2004). 
I will now examine the characteristics and healthy growth strategies for the City 
of Atlanta. 
Atlanta, GA 
Atlanta is a city noted for its racial diversity, prime location in terms of both 
commerce and climate, and big city amenities. However, these features that make the 
city desirable to many people have also led to serious problems (Bullard 2000). In this 
section I will detail some of those challenges as well as efforts to address them. 
Long-term Challenges 
The topography of northern Georgia has had various effects on the development 
of Atlanta. The land area is flat and completely landlocked, so there are no mountains or 
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bodies of wate� nearby to form natural growth boundaries. This has had the effect of 
allowing Atlanta to sprawl outward in every direction. In fact, the Atlanta metropolitan 
area includes 20 counties (Bullard 2000). 
The location of the city has also contributed to its designation as a major 
transportation crossroads. In the early twentieth century, manufacturers wishing to ship 
their goods discovered that transport across the rugged Appalachians could be avoided 
altogether if a more southerly route through Georgia was used. The Atlanta region 
gradually became a transportation hub for highway, railway, and airway travel (Bullard 
2000). 
The associated economic and physical growth of Atlanta led to unique growth 
management concerns. Race related social inequality, severe traffic congestion with 
associated poor air quality, and the "urban heat island" effect are some of the major 
challenges that must be addressed by planners in Atlanta (Bullard 2000, Chapman 2000, 
Jaret et al. 2000). 
Racial disparity, particularly in the area of housing, continues to be a serious issue 
in the Atlanta metro area. Torres, Bullard, and Johnson (2000) have shown that while the 
availability of affordable housing has increased in Atlanta, residential sections of the city 
continue to be highly segregated. Both black and white households have moved from the 
city to the suburbs, but these two groups move to separate suburban neighborhoods. 
Torres et al. (2000) examined the Index of Dissimilarity between blacks (and other 
minorities) and whites from 1970-1997 and determined that segregation had not changed 
dramatically in the metropolitan area during those years. This index is used to measure 
the concentration of racial groups in comparison with one another within a specified 
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geographical boundary. At the county level, these researchers concluded that there had 
only been slight improvement in dissimilarity from 1980 to 1997. The index measure 
declined from 45.2% in 1980, to 44.4% in 1990, to 43.6% in 1997. Torres and his co­
authors also noted that there was a slight decline in dissimilarity at the "superdistrict" 
level, or inside the counties. The black and white populations in Dekalb county, for 
example, were somewhat more. evenly distributed in 1997 than in 1970. In sum, while 
the Index of Dissimilarity shows modest improvement in racial segregation, Torres, 
Bullard, and Johnson (2000) concluded that overall segregation had not drastically 
changed during the years under consideration. 
Traffic congestion and the air pollution associated with it are also serious 
problems for both citizens and visitors of Atlanta (Chapman 2000, City of Atlanta 2004). 
Traffic congestion in the Atlanta metropolitan area reached a level of severity that 
prompted Governor Roy Barnes to provide oversight for the development of the Georgia 
Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA) in 1999. GRTA is responsible for planning 
and implementing regional mass transit in any county that achieves "nonattainment" 
status from the EPA. Thirteen of the twenty counties that make-up the Atlanta metro area 
have been designated as nonattainment areas for safe ozone levels (EPA "National" 
2000). Plans for reducing traffic congestion and improving air quality often overlap in 
Atlanta, as well as in the other cities, because car emissions are believed to be the most 
significant cause of poor air quality (Chapman 2000). 
Another serious concern for residents of Atlanta is the city's loss of tree cover. 
Atlanta has become what is known in the scientific literature as an " urban heat island". 
As described in the previous chapters, when trees and greenspaces are replaced with 
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paved roads and dark colored buildings, heat becomes trapped and the temperature of the 
city rises. Not only does concrete retain heat, but also fewer plants means a loss of the 
evaporative cooling effects produced by vegetation (Audubon 2001). This effect is 
particularly remarkable in "Hotlanta", where on a sunny summer day� downtown can be 
as much as 12° Fahrenheit hotter than the surrounding areas. According to data from 
NASA's Landsat satellite, the Atlanta metropolitan area lost about 190,000 acres of tree 
cover from 1988 to 1998. In addition to the obvious physical discomfort, loss of tree 
cover in Atlanta has resulted in increased energy consumption, higher electric bills, 
pollution, soil erosion, and flooding (Creech and Brown 2000). 
Local Smart Growth Initiatives 
The City of Atlanta has implemented many smart growth initiatives that are 
reflective of smart growth policies adopted by the State of Georgia. While some of the 
city's programs are limited in scope and designed to achieve a single goal, such as 
insuring pedestrian safety, many of the programs are designed to achieve multiple smart 
growth goals ( City of Atlanta 2004 ). 
In terms of central city revitalization, the City of Atlanta offers a variety of 
financial incentives to encourage economic growth in existing urban areas. The Business 
Improvement Loan Fund is a program that provides financing to businesses in distressed 
areas for building improvements or equipment purchases. The Fulton County/City of 
Atlanta Land Bank Authority is another incentive program. It enables the city to forgive 
delinquent taxes and liens on properties so that nonprofit, community-based 
organizations can buy the properties and create affordable housing or employment 
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centers. In addition to these and other locally initiated programs, Atlanta participates in 
many programs sponsored by the federal government that are used to promote economic 
growth and revitalization within the city (City of Atlanta 2004). 
The City of Atlanta has also adopted programs with multiple goals that include 
urban revitalization, increased population density, and greater access to affordable 
housing. One of these is Atlanta's Livable Centers Initiative (LCI). According to 
Atlanta's Comprehensive Development Plan (2004 ), Livable Centers are one way that the 
city incorporates the principles of New Urbanism into its planning. mNew Urbanism' 
reflects the public's desire to live in neighborhoods that offer a wide range of services 
and activities in small-scale mixed-use environments that provide a sense of intimacy as 
well as convenience" (quoted. p. 20-19). 
The city has designated seven areas as Livable Centers. Each is located near an 
existing or proposed Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, or MAR TA, station. 
The objective is to encourage high-density, pedestrian friendly development in these 
areas that includes a range of affordable housing options as well as various services. The 
city provides planning and capital funding, including transportation improvement funds, 
to encourage growth in these areas (City of Atlanta 2004). 
The City of Atlanta has adopted numerous measures to achieve the smart growth 
objectives of reducing automobile traffic and encouraging the use of other means of 
transportation. In order to reduce traffic congestion, the city has made or planned for 
improvements to the interstate/highway system that include the installation of high 
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, freeway message signs, aerial surveillance systems, and 
"HERO" incident response vehicles (Chapman 2000). The city also has gradually 
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expanded MARTA services to alleviate heavy traffic. Currently, Atlanta's MARTA 
system has 46 miles of rapid rail service utilized by 238 train cars, and 1 ,500 miles of bus 
service utilized by 778 city buses (City of Atlanta 2004). 
As in Baltimore, air quality is a major concern for planning officials in Atlanta 
because of the city's designation as a "nonattainment" area for safe ozone levels by the 
EPA (2000). The City of Atlanta participates in Georgia's State Implementation Plan 
(SIP) for attaining Federal Clean Air Act standards. In accordance with the SIP, air 
quality control in Atlanta is necessarily entwined with reduction of automobile traffic and 
reestablishment of some healthy tree canopy within the city. In addition to those 
measures to alleviate traffic congestion described above, the city has also implemented an 
ordinance that limits the amount of time any vehicle may idle to fifteen minutes 
consecutively (City of Atlanta 2004 ). 
Encouraging bicycling as a means of transportation is another initiative adopted in 
part to reduce auto emissions. In 199 1  the city began a "greenway trails" plan to provide 
citizens with a number of bike trails connecting schools, businesses, and shopping 
centers. The city's Commuter On-Street Bike Plan, developed in 1995, is designed to 
allow bicyclists safe use of roadways. Under the plan, the city has created bike lanes and 
wide curb lanes on some streets. The city has also sought to insure secure parking for 
bikes in urban areas by installing hundreds of bike racks throughout the city. According 
to the city's website, these programs need greater publicizing throughout the city, as less 
than 1 % of residents currently ride bikes to school or work ( City of Atlanta 2004 ). 
The City of Atlanta has little to show in terms of programs for its determination to 
improve air quality by increasing plant life in urban areas. There is a Tree Ordinance in 
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place that is designed to encourage the placement of new trees within the city and limit 
which existing trees may be removed. The city's Comprehensive Development Plan 
makes it clear, however, that more resources are needed to fully implement and enforce 
the ordinance. The city also lists as goals the development of an "urban forest 
management plan" to include planting, maintenance, and protection of trees, and an 
expansion of the Bureau of Parks Forestry Division staff to implement that plan (City of 
Atlanta 2004 ). 
Finally, in regard to affordable, desirable housing, the City of Atlanta operates a 
variety ofprograms_(in addition to the Livable Centers Initiative described above). The 
Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) administers most of the major programs that provide 
housing to low-income families. Since the year 1995, AHA has reinvented itself, and 
transformed from an ineffective, poorly run organization to a "leader in affordable 
housing_development and management" (City of Atlanta 2004, quoted p. 7-6). One of 
the primary means through which this has been accomplished has been the 
implementation of the successful Olympic Legacy Program. Through this program, the 
city demolishes the most severely distressed public housing projects and replaces them 
with high quality mixed-income, mixed-use communities. The objective of Olympic 
Legacy is to de-concentrate poverty by allowing families with a broad range of incomes 
to live in the same neighborhoods (City of Atlanta 2004 ). 
Clearly the City of Atlanta has enacted many programs that may be classified as 
"smart" in nature, or having the potential to benefit the economy, community, and the 
environment. Many of these programs have been implemented in order to address the 
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wide range of critical growth issues outlined in the previous section. I will now examine 
the unique characteristics and smart growth programs of the City of Orlando. 
Orlando, FL 
People are drawn to Orlando for the warm weather, numerous amusement parks, 
and proximity to beaches on both the Gulf and Atlantic Coast. The city's population 
explosion has created some obstacles to healthy growth, however (City of Orlando 2004). 
In this section, I will examine these obstacles and the local programs implemented to 
overcome them. 
Long-term Challenges 
The social and economic development of Orlando contrasts with some aspects of 
the development of both Baltimore and Atlanta. Orlando is not an "old" industrial city as 
is Baltimore. Orlando was incorporated as a city in 1875, almost 100 years after the 
establishment of the City of Baltimore (City of Orlando 2004). Furthennore, Orlando 
was historically a citrus farming/cattle-raising city, rather than a major industrial hub as 
Baltimore was. The population of Orlando did surge in the mid-twentieth century and has 
continued to increase since. In the 1940s, military personnel increased the city's 
population when two air bases were established there. In the next decade, the population 
continued to expand as the agriculture economy in Orlando began to diversify and 
include a technological base. The impetus behind this development was the relocation of 
the Glenn L. Martin Company to the city. The company, now known as Lockheed 
Martin, continues to produce aircraft and defense technology in Orlando. Orlando 
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assumed another boom in population when it became a major tourist destination in 1971 
with the opening of Walt Disney World (City of Orlando 2004, Jelic 2003). 
The geography of Orlando has resulted in some of the major differences between 
the city and the City of Atlanta. As described above, Atlanta gradually became a major 
transportation crossroads due to its location. Orlando, on the other hand, is situated about 
1/3 of the way down the Florida peninsula. The development of the city was largely 
dictated by the fact that the peninsula is surrounded by ocean on three sides. This left 
Orlando in an out-of-the-way location in terms of commercial traffic flow across the 
Southern US (City of Orlando 2004). I will discuss later in this chapter how the 
geography of Orlando also gives the city an advantage over Baltimore and Atlanta in 
terms of maintaining air quality. 
Orlando's position as a tourist-Mecca further distinguishes it from Baltimore and 
Atlanta. Since the opening of Disney's Magic Kingdom, a handful of other major theme 
parks have opened in the Orlando area. These include Epcot, MGM Studios, Animal 
Kingdom, Sea World, and Universal Studios. Along with these parks, an array of hotels, 
restaurants, and other tourist venues have proliferated in and around the city. With an 
economy largely based on tourism, Orlando has unique planning and land use concerns 
(City of Orlando 2004). 
One unique consequence of Orlando's tourism economy is that average wages in 
the area are relatively low because many residents are employed in hourly wage positions 
at amusement parks. In fact, Walt Disney World is the largest private employer in the 
city. Because average incomes are low, access to affordable housing is of particular 
concern to planners and other city officials. A second result of the tourism economy is 
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that significant strain is put on the city's infrastructure. Tourists, who are largely non­
residents, utilize the city's roads, water, and sewage systems, yet they do not pay property 
taxes toward the maintenance of these systems. The third and final point that is of 
particular concern to the health and sensible growth of Orlando is severe traffic 
congestion. Congested roadways are associated with sprawl, but exacerbated in this case 
by the number of tourists in the area (City of Orlando 2004, Jelic 2003). 
Local Smart Growth Initiatives 
Both the City of Orlando's web site and Growth Management Plan make frequent 
mention of the city's implementation of smart growth practices (City of Orlando 2004). 
The following quote from the vision statement in the city's GMP reflects the basic values 
and goals of smart growth programs: 
"This plan establishes an agenda for Orlando that is founded on preserving 
Orlando 's natural and man-made environments, promoting community 
development, neighborhood preservation, reducing urban sprawl, promoting the 
efficient use of transportation and financial resources, and nurturing its most 
important asset - its people. " 
The City of_Orlando has adopted programs in regard to all five of the smart growth 
objectives addressed in this research: revitalization of central cities, control of 
development, creation and improvement of transportation options, protection of natural 
resources, and creation of equitable, desirable neighborhoods (City of Orlando 2004). 
The city of Orlando utilizes the principles of New Urbanism within the city to 
revitalize downtown areas and encourage infill development. Thornton Park and 
Baldwin Park are upscale, mixed use communities in urban Orlando. The cost of living 
in these neighborhoods is high, largely because of the great demand they have generated. 
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There are also a limited number of affordable housing projects in the metropolitan area 
that are of New Urbanism design. One of these is the Hampton Park community. In 
addition, the city provides incentives for commercial development downtown to utilize 
the principles of New Urbanism. For example, a 30% reduction in transportation impact 
fees is available for development that includes mixed uses and buildings that face the 
street ( City of Orlando 2004 ). 
Orlando also offers a variety of programs designed to encourage businesses to 
locate within the city, thereby stimulating the economy, creating jobs, and promoting 
infill development. The Job Creation Incentive Program provides grants to qualifying 
companies to assist with the costs of relocation or expansion. The city also provides 
financial assistance to businesses for physical improvements through the Infrastructure 
and Site Improvement Program and the Business Assistance Program (City of Orlando 
2004). 
The Transportation Concurrency Exception Area program is another important 
tool the City of Orlando uses to promote infill development and increase population 
density. As discussed in Chapters II and ID, the State of Florida has stringent 
"concurrency" requirements for new development. This means that certain utilities and 
services, including transportation facilities, must be in place (or, at least promised to be in 
place) before permits will be issued. In Orlando, TCEA is used to encourage infill 
development, regardless of whether transportation infrastructure is in place (City of 
Orlando 2004 ). 
Orlando also has a historic places preservation program that is credited with 
preserving and maintaining more than 35 historic landmarks within the city. This 
128 
program has not only helped to preserve the unique character of Orlando, but it has also 
helped the inner city to remain vital . The city has repeatedly refused offers to redevelop 
historic areas with commercial space ( City of Orlando 2004 ). 
Orlando's Neighborhood Horizons initiative has allowed citizens to provide input 
into some aspects of the planning process, including central city revitalization. Through 
Neighborhood Horizons, city officials meet with residents of various communities in 
order to develop a consensus regarding avenues for growth and improvement of the 
communities. Planners then develop criteria to periodically assess the progress made 
within the community. The program is available to all 88 neighborhoods within the city 
(City of Orlando 2004 ). 
Orlando's Growth Management Plan (City of Orlando 2004) indicates the city's 
commitment to alternative forms of transportation in order to decrease traffic congestion 
and maintain air quality. The transportation philosophy for the city is exemplified in 
plans for the development of a 19  ,300-acre area called the Southeast Sector: 
"Pedestrian and bicycle access will be provided between neighborhoods and 
communities, and between all of the developments in the Southeast Plan 
area . . .  Neighborhood streets of varying types will be designed to provide for 
pedestrian comfort and safety, and for efficient automobile movement. Slowing 
the automobile and increasing pedestrian activity encourages the casual meetings 
that form the bonds of community . . .  " 
Once again, the principles of both smart growth and New Urbanism are evident. 
The city of Orlando also encourages residents and visitors to use mass transit. 
The city utilizes the services of Lynx bus lines, which also services all of Orange County, 
plus Osceola and Seminole counties. Lynx has 208 buses currently in service. 
According to the City of Orlando's website, from 1992 to 2003, the number of bus 
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passengers doubled to more than 19 million people ann:oally. In addition, the city 
provides free bus service along a three-mile loop in the downtown area. The "Lymmo" 
service includes ten buses that carry about 4,000 passengers a week (City of Orlando 
2004). 
In terms of air quality, it is important to note that Orlando has not been designated 
a "nonattainment" area for air quality standards by the EPA, as both Baltimore and 
Atlanta have been (EPA "National" 2000). This is largely due to the city's location on the 
Florida peninsula. The entire peninsula benefits from the steady sea breeze that 
originates over the Gulf of Mexico and pushes air eastward toward the Atlantic Ocean. 
In Orlando, concentrations of air pollutants may be diminished or relocated by the 
incoming winds. Another advantage Orlando has over Baltimore and Atlanta is that it 
does not receive downwinds of potentially polluted air from northern manufacturing 
states, such as Michigan. The combination of its extreme southerly location and the Gulf 
sea breeze serve to (at least partially) maintain air quality in Orlando (EPA ''National" 
2000). 
Nevertheless, the City of Orlando has a number of policies designed to maintain 
or improve air quality. A primary strategy is the regional planning that the city does with 
the Metropolitan Planning Organization, which includes the four counties that make up 
the Orlando metropolitan area. The city and the metropolitan organization work together 
with regard to interjurisdictional environmental, transportation, and economic planning. 
The City of Orlando also has policies in place to reduce auto emissions. Various mass 
transit systems are in operation, including bus and rail service described above. The city 
also has programs similar to those in Atlanta designed to encourage individuals to car-
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pool or ride bicycles as alternatives to driving alone to work or school. Finally, the city 
has ordinances in place to restrict open burning, which is known to produce carbon 
monoxide and particulate matter, in particular (City of Orlando 2004). 
Many programs designed to increase housing affordability and quality are 
available to residents of Orlando. The Downpayment Assistance Program helps low to 
moderate income first time homebuyers purchase homes within the city limits. The total 
funding available per home ranges from $5,000 to $14,999, depending on income. In 
order to qualify, potential recipients of funds must agree to live in the home for a 
minimum of five years. The city also offers a Foreclosure Prevention Strategy for those 
homeowners who received financial assistance from the city for the purchase of their 
home. Individuals who obtain help with mortgage payments are required by the city to 
attend credit counseling classes (City of Orlando 2004). 
Homeowners in Orlando may also benefit from a variety of housing rehabilitation 
assistance programs. Low income homeowners may receive up to $5,000 to repair "life 
threatening" conditions on their property through the Emergency Repair Program. 
Qualifying conditions include severe roof leaks and serious electrical problems. In a 
similar program, Housing Code Assistance, low-income homeowners may receive money 
from the city to correct code violations. Examples of violations include peeling paint and 
decrepit porches (City of Orlando 2004). 
In order to increase_ the amount of affordable, quality rental units, the City of 
Orlando operates a Rental Rehabilitation Program. Investors or owners of rental property 
may be eligible for low interest or deferred loans toward the cost of rehabilitating housing 
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for low-income residents. Upon completion of improvements, the city places limits on 
the amount of rent that owners may collect from tenants (City of Orlando 2004). 
In summary, the City of Orlando has implemented many smart growth programs 
designed to reverse the conditions associated with unhealthy growth,· as have Baltimore 
and Atlanta. My next task is to determine which city has been most successful in terms 
of achieving tp.e goals of smart growth. Later in this chapter I will analyze indicators of 
smart growth for Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando in order to determine if these programs, 
and the state level programs associated with them, have been effective. 
Data Presentation and Interpretation 
The remainder of Chapter IV will be devoted to presenting and interpreting data 
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of smart growth programs. Five sections will be 
developed based on the five objectives of smart growth outlined above. In each section, I 
will present data for indicators I have selected to gauge smart growth attainment of the 
respective objective. For example, in the first section, I will evaluate the three case cities 
in regard to achieving the revitalization of central cities. My means for doing so will be 
to compare the "health" of central cities versus suburbs for several dependent variables. 
The selected variables will be population growth, segregation, poverty, and crime. 
For each indicator, I will review data for Baltimore, MD then Atlanta, GA then 
Orlando, FL. I will proceed in this manner for a couple of reasons. One is that 
establishing an order and following it lessens confusion and requires less effort on the 
part of the reader. A second reason is that when the three cities are in the order specified, 
they are arrayed from least coercive to most coercive in terms of state smart growth 
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planning intervention according to my classification system. Keeping the level of 
coercion in mind will enhance the evaluation phase of this research. 
Objective #1 : Revitalize Central Cities 
Urban sprawl often leaves inner cities in a state of decline while suburbs prosper 
(Mitchell 2001 ). A central tenet of smart growth reform is to revitalize cities so that 
those who live or work in the city can enjoy the same quality of life as those who live or 
work in the suburbs. Additionally, programs seek to keep individuals from moving away 
from cities (Freilich 1999, Weitz 1999). In this section I will compare population 
growth, segregation trends, and incidence of poverty for both city and suburbs of 
Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando. All of the data used was obtained from the Bureau of 
Census website. 
It is important to evaluate the effects of state smart growth legislation on 
population growth patterns, segregation trends, and incidence of poverty because such 
legislative programs are inherently meant to affect these variables. Smart growth policies 
are aimed to: ( 1)  prevent inner-city population from declining while suburban population 
increases; (2) reduce segregation in the city particularly and also in the suburbs; and (3) 
reduce poverty in the city particularly and also in the suburbs (Anderson and Tregoning 
1998, Beaumont 1999). 
Some individuals argue that it is unrealistic to assume that smart growth programs 
can positively impact these variables, and that therefore examining these variables will 
not reveal any useful information about the effectiveness of smart growth laws. Their 
argument is that social pathologies such as population attrition, segregation, and poverty 
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are caused by a host of factors ranging from cultural norms to median level of education, 
and that any legitimate attempt to reverse these would: have to be complex, with 
numerous avenues of"attack" (Gordon and Richardson 1998, Holcombe and Stanley 
2001 ,  Staley "Markets" 200 1 ). My response to such a challenge is that that is exactly 
what smart growth policy is meant to be, a multi-pronged weapon of attack against a 
multitude of ills that are related to or exacerbated by urban sprawl. I provided numerous 
examples of how this might work earlier in this chapter, as I discussed city-level 
initiatives. For instance, a smart growth policy that provides businesses with financial 
incentives to relocate in an inner city might have many primary and secondary effects. If 
individuals who live in the city obtain jobs as a result, poverty may be lessened. If 
relocation of the business stimulates activity and further development downtown, the 
standard of living may rise and segregation may be lessened as a variety of populations 
are attracted to the area. Further, if the area consequently becomes active and a demand 
for housing is created, that may impact segregation. 
It is important to investigate changes in these variables in relation to introduction 
of smart growth laws in part because the laws are expressly designed to have an impact in 
these areas. In addition, as I have mentioned earlier in Chapter IV, it would be unwise in 
any case to attribute, say, a decrease in segregation, to any single cause (such as smart 
growth). Within this study I mean only to examine a wide variety of intended targets of 
smart growth legislation, then to draw preliminary and cautious conclusions from those. 
In short, the dialogue regarding the effectiveness of smart growth laws must begin at 
some place, even if the place is imperfect. 
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Population Growth 
Figures A-9, A-10, and A-1 I demonstrate the drastic difference in population 
trends between inner city and suburbs for each of the three metropolitan areas (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004 ). In each instance, population in the suburbs has steadily increased 
over time. What varies between the three cities is the trend in central city population. I 
must remind the reader at this point that smart growth is not "no growth" or "slow 
growth". There is nothing inherently antithetical to smart growth goals about population 
increasing in the suburbs of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) (Freilich 1999). What 
is undesirable according to smart growth theory, and what is generally associated with 
urban sprawl, is for suburban population to grow while inner city population declines. A 
successful smart growth initiative prevents the inner city from losing population, or at 
least keeps totals constant (Porter 1997 and 1998). 
The extent of inner city deterioration in both Baltimore and Atlanta is 
demonstrated by their designations as Renewal Communities by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Department 2004 ). The Renewal 
Communities program was created in 2000 as part of the federal government's 
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act. The program allowed for 40 distressed cities to be 
designated as Renewal Communities. The cities then became eligible for regulatory 
relief and tax breaks that are designed to stimulate job growth, promote economic 
development, and create affordable housing (Department 2004 ). 
Figure A-9 shows that Baltimore is a textbook example of abandonment of the 
central city (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). The line indicating population growth in 
the suburbs is in stark contrast to the line indicating population decline in the central city. 
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Population in the City of Baltimore fell from 905,759 people in 1970 to 651,154 people 
in 2000. Over the same time period, total population in the suburbs increased from 
1,153,741 people in 1970 to 1,866,002 people in 2000. Based on the (admittedly limited) 
census data presented here, Maryland's smart growth legislation, passed in 1992 and 
1997, was not able to stop the population flight from the city as of the year 2000. While 
there is only one data point available after legislation was enacted (for year 2000) the 
continuation of the trend line is evident. 
The trend in central city population for Atlanta is more desirable in terms of smart 
growth (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). Figure A-10 shows that in Atlanta, central city 
population was decreasing each decade until some time after the year 1990. From 1990 
to 2000 the central city experienced an increase of22,457 people. Since Georgia's smart 
growth legislation was enacted in 1989, immediately prior to the increase, it may have 
been responsible for some degree of that change. This is an encouraging finding in terms 
of smart growth achievement. Even so, the central city population total for 2000 is lower 
than what was recorded in 1980. Further, to return to 1970 population totals, over 80,000 
additional individuals would need to move to the city. 
The overall population trend in Orlando's central city has been "healthier" than 
what was seen in both Baltimore and Atlanta (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). Data for 
Orlando show a continuous, if somewhat uneven, increase in population totals for the 
central city (see Figure A-11). In fact, population rose from 98,965 people in 1970 to 
185,951 people in 2000. Most importantly, after 1985, when smart growth legislation 
was implemented, urban population continued to climb. While this may be due to 
norida' s legislation, and it is in accord with the goals of smart growth policy, it may also 
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be a continuation of the trend line, which clearly showed an increasing population from 
1970 onward. In short, the trend in population described is desirable, but may not be 
attributable to Florida's smart growth legislation. 
Segregation Trends 
The second indicator for central city revitalization that will be examined is the 
trend in segregation for central cities versus suburbs. As discussed previously, one 
typical consequence of urban sprawl is that wealthier, usually white individuals leave the 
city to live in the suburbs, where the standard of living is higher. Those left behind in the 
decaying city are those who cannot afford to move. They are often black, or other 
minorities, and generally less stable financially. A successful smart growth program 
would reverse this trend, or at least keep racial population differences the same within the 
city and suburbs (Freilich 1999, Porter 1998, Weitz 1999). 
Tables A-1 through A-3 and Figures A- 12 through A-21 provide a detailed 
account of how the racial make-up of each city is split between urban and suburban areas, 
and how that make-up has changed from 1980 to 2000 (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
Due to the volume of information presented, I will divide this section by city, into a total 
of three parts. 
Baltimore 
Table A- 1 shows what percentage of total population each race has comprised in 
both the central city and suburbs of Baltimore for 1980, 1990, and 2000 (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004 ). Within the city, the white population has diminished over time in 
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terms of percent of total population. It decreased from 44% of the total in 1980 to 31 % 
of the total in 2000. In its place, black population gained as a proportion of total central 
city population. Blacks increased from 54% of total population in 1980 to 64% in 2000. 
In the suburbs of Baltimore the patterns of change were similar (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004). The proportion of whites decreased as the proportion of blacks increased. 
White population fell from being 89% of the total to 79% of the total. Blacks, in turn, 
increased from 8% of the total suburban population to 14%. Hispanics and "other" races 
continuously held a few percentage points of total population in the suburbs as well as the 
central city. 
Figures A-12  and A-13  show that white and black population trends in Baltimore 
were generally similar to one another over time, although there was tremendous 
difference in the actual population numbers (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). Both races 
generally lost population in the central city and both generally gained population in the 
suburbs. The loss for the white population total in the central city was more pronounced 
from 1980 to 2000. While the white population decreased by 141 ,762 members, the 
black population decreased by only 10,653 in the city. 
Finally, Figure A-14 shows that while the population of both races grew in the 
suburbs of Baltimore from 1980 to 2000, white population totals were consistently over 1 
million people more than black population totals (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). 
This collection of evidence points to a conclusion with mixed results for 
Baltimore in terms of smart growth achievement with segregation trends. As I 
determined at the beginning of the section "Objective # 1 ", the segregation data shows 
that Baltimore is a classic case of inner-city abandonment, that I can now state has been 
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abandoned by both white and black populations. In terms of total population, including 
both races, it is an undesirable finding that both populations have lost members in the 
"flight" from the cities. In regard to evaluating segregation, it is notable that blacks 
continued to be less likely to leave the urban area than whites, as their rate of decrease 
was significantly slower, and did not be�n until 1990. This disparity is likely indicative 
of economic inequalities between the races. In other words, blacks were less likely to 
leave because they largely could not afford to leave. Still, it may be a positive finding in 
terms of smart growth that blacks were more able to leave the city if they wished during 
the decade Maryland's smart growth legislation was enacted. 
A cautionary note here is that for the white population in the central city, some 
degree of the downward trend may be a continuation of the trend line. Maryland did not 
implement smart growth legislation until 1992 and 1997. During the decade of program 
implementation, the decrease in white numbers continued, as it had during the previous 
decade. 
On the other hand, it is a positive finding in terms of smart growth that numbers 
of blacks in Baltimore' s suburbs have continued to grow. The growth line was 
remarkably steeper after 1990, during the decade of smart growth implementation. 
Atlanta 
Table A-2 shows trends in segregation for the Atlanta MSA, divided between 
central city and suburbs (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). Unlike the trends shown for 
Baltimore, the make-up of Atlanta's central city population has changed very little over 
the 20-year period. The African American population has remained between 61 % and 
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66%, while white population has stayed between 30% and 32% of the total. However, 
there were two noteworthy trends. One is that blacks lost 6% of their population from 
1990 to 2000, and the Hispanic population increased from 1 % in 1980 to 5% in 2000. 
Population patterns in the suburbs were more dramatic (Bureau ·of Census "State" 
2004 ). The overall trend was a decrease in the dominance of white population totals that 
existed in 1980 while there was a simultaneous increase in black population totals. White 
population fell from 84% of total suburban population in 1980 to 63% of the total in 
2000. The corresponding increase in black population make-up rose from 14% in 1980 
to 25% in 2000. Hispanic percents also increased from 1 % of suburban total population 
in 1980 to 7% in 2000. 
Figures A-15 and A-16 provide further insight into the trends described above in 
terms of population totals rather than percentages (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). In 
Figure A-15, white population is shown to remain fairly steady over time in the central · 
city, while increasing in the suburbs. It is remarkable that while white population in 
Atlanta 's suburbs increased over the 20-year period, white population as a percent of 
total population decreased at the same time. Figure A-16 shows how this occurred. The 
black population in Atlanta's suburbs skyrocketed over the 20 years, particularly from 
1990 to 2000. The rate of that growth was substantial enough to change the percent 
divisions between the races. 
Finally, Figure A-17 shows a comparison between white and black population 
growth over time in suburban Atlanta (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). While both 
populations increased, the wpite population total continued to be greater than the black 
total. 
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The totality of evidence presented suggests desirable changes in segregation 
trends for Atlanta MSA in terms of smart growth objectives. One finding is that 
conditions did not worsen over time in the central city. The ratio of races remained 
essentially the same over time. In fact, conditions somewhat improved for blacks as they 
lost 5% of the total central city population in their flight to the suburbs. A second finding 
is that blacks have not been excluded from occupying the suburbs of Atlanta. While 
pockets of segregation in the suburbs certainly continue to exist, overall the rate of black 
population growth has surpassed the rate of white population growth. In other words, if 
whites and blacks live in separate suburban neighborhoods, it is not because there are no 
blacks in the suburbs. 
Georgia's smart growth legislation, enacted in 1989, may be responsible for some 
of these changes. While these trends were evident prior to 1989, they became more 
evident after 1989. For example, black population growth in the suburbs grew more 
quickly after 1989 than it did prior to that year. 
Orlando 
The history of segregation trends in Orlando MSA has evolved very differently 
than trends seen in Atlanta MSA (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). Table A-3 shows the 
differences in population make-up between Orlando's central city and suburbs over a 20-
year period. In the central city, white population as a percent of total population fell from 
65% in 1980 to 50% in 2000. Black population as a percent of total population also fell, 
from 30% in 1980 to 26% in 2000. These trends were largely a result of the booming 
Hispanic population that became established in the city. The population of Hispanics in 
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the city grew from 4% of the total to 18% of the total population over the 20-year period. 
{I did not discuss Hispanic population trends for Atlanta because they were a much less 
significant part of the whole.) 
Some similar trends developed in Orlando's suburbs (Bureau of Census "State" 
2004). The white population decreased as a percent of the total, from 86% in 1980 to 
67% in 2000. The Hispanic portion of the population in the suburbs increased from 3% 
of the total in 1980 to 16% of the total in 2000. In contrast to central city trends, the 
black population remained relatively constant, staying between 9% and Ii% of the total 
suburban population over time. 
Figures A-18, A-19, and A-20 show white, black, and Hispanic populations 
respectively as they have changed over time in Orlando (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
It is clear from these three charts that growth in black and Hispanic populations has 
increased at a faster rate than that of the white population for the entire MSA, and 
particularly in the suburbs. The white segment of the population was the only segment to 
show a decrease in population in the central city. The number of white residents in the 
central city fell from 103,740 in 1990 to 94,452 in 2000. 
Patterns of growth were similar between Orlando's black and Hispanic 
populations, although the actual population totals were disparate, as the figures indicate 
(Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). Black and Hispanic populations increased in the city 
and suburbs over time. Furthermore, both populations exhibited a jump in the rate of 
suburban population growth from 1990 to 2000. 
Figure A-21 compares suburban population growth for each of the three 
populations (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). Despite the overall decrease in proportion 
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of total population for the white segment, the total of white individuals continued to 
significantly outnumber both black and Hispanic populations. It is also evident from the 
graph that the Hispanic population grew at a faster rate than the black population did, 
especially from 1990 to 2000. 
In terms of achieving smart growth goals, results for Orlando are mixed, yet 
promising. After 1985, the year of Florida's program inception, the white population was 
the only population to lose members in the central city. In fact, white population 
increased from 84,055 in 1980 to 103,740 in 1990 before it fell to 94,452 in 2000. Some 
degree of increased segregation is evident because as whites were moving out of the city, 
blacks and Hispanics were moving into the city. On the other hand, after 1985 both black 
and Hispanic populations experienced tremendous jumps in their suburban totals. This is 
a positive finding because it shows increased accessibility to suburban homes for both 
minority groups. 
Poverty Trends 
Another method of gauging the health of the central city in relation to nearby 
suburbs is to compare poverty trends between the two. Smart growth programs seek to 
lessen poverty, particularly in the urban core, where it is usually greatest. Methods of 
decreasing the incidence of poverty in the city include offering businesses financial 
incentives for relocating downtown and offering families incentives for buying homes in 
the urban area. The intended result of these programs is to provide the central city with 
economic stimulation, so that eventually jobs will return to an area, thus relieving some 
degree of poverty (Freilich 1999, Porter 1 998, Weitz 1999). 
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Figures A-22, A-23, and A-24 illustrate the difference in poverty trends between 
central city and suburbs for Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, respectively (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004 ). The data used to generate these charts was obtained from the State 
of the Cities data set produced by the US Census Bureau. The definition of poverty used 
here is the Census Bureau's definition of poverty. In order to determine whether a 
household qualifies as "living in poverty", the Census Bureau considers the number of 
people in the household and their ages. Based on that number, the household is assigned 
into one of 48 "poverty threshold" classifications. If the total income of the household 
falls below the poverty threshold number, that household is considered to be in poverty. 
(The determination of poverty is complex, and I refer the reader to the following web 
address for more information: http://www.census. gov/hhes/poverty/povdef.html) 
The graph for Baltimore (see Figure A-22) shows tremendously higher poverty 
levels in the central city as compared with the suburbs over time (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004 ). While suburban poverty hovered around 5% each year, central city 
poverty rose from 18% in 1969 to 22. 9% in 1979 and 1999. I am interested in the 
changes in the figures from 1989 to 1999 because Maryland's smart growth program was 
enacted in 1992 and 1997. Based on a comparison of those two years, the state's smart 
growth program appears to have possibly had the undesirable effect of increasing poverty 
rates in the city and suburbs. From 1989 to 1999, poverty grew in Baltimore's central city 
from 21.9% to 22.9%. Poverty in the suburbs grew from 4.7% to 5.2% during that same 
time. Furthermore, this finding is reinforced when the 1979 data is taken into account. 
Poverty had decreased from 1979 to 1989 in both urban and suburban areas of Baltimore. 
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Figure A-23 shows that as was the case in Baltimore, Atlanta exhibited a 
significantly higher incidence of poverty over time in the central city as compared with 
the suburbs (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). Poverty in the city of Atlanta increased 
from 1969 to 1979, and then began to gradually fall after 1979. In the suburbs, there was 
a decrease in poverty rate each year until 1999, when it increased by a tiny .2%. 
For Atlanta MSA, I am interested in comparing the trends both before and after 
1989, the year Georgia implemented smart growth legislation. The results of this 
analysis are basically positive in terms of smart growth objectives. After 1989, poverty in 
the central city decreased from 27.3% to 24.4%. It should be noted, however, that there 
was a less significant decrease in poverty (-.2%) from 1979 to 1989. If the changes seen 
in central city Atlanta's poverty rate were a continuation of the trend from 1979, then that 
trend changed dramatically after 1989. It is more likely that Georgia's legislation began 
to produce desirable changes after 1989. 
As I mentioned above, poverty in Atlanta's suburbs increased by a fraction of a 
percentage point from 1989 to 1999. While a continuation of the downward trend in the 
incidence of poverty in the suburbs as shown in Figure A-23 would have been desirable, 
in light of the tremendous population increase in the suburbs of Atlanta over this time, a 
near-stabilization of the trend is probably a positive finding. 
The trends for poverty rate in Orlando are shown in Figure A-24 (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004 ). It is clear that Orlando has experienced an overall less�r degree of 
disparity between conditions in the city and in the suburbs than have both Baltimore and 
Atlanta. However, poverty in the city of Orlando was consistently about 5% higher than 
in the suburbs. As for the effects of Florida's smart growth legislation passed in 1985, it 
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appears to have had a slightly undesirable impact on poverty rates. The poverty trend for 
both city and suburbs was decreasing from 1969 to 1989. Figure A-24 shows that city 
poverty levels fell from 19.5% in 1969 to 1 5 .8% in 1989. For those same years, poverty 
fell in the suburbs as well, from 14.7% to 9.3%. 
After smart growth legislation was enacted in 1985, however, the rate of poverty 
in both city and suburbs slightly increased. It rose . 1  % in the city and . 7% in the suburbs. 
These figures appear to be negligible when viewed without the data for previous years. 
In light of the preceding decrease in poverty rates for both city and suburbs, I will 
conclude that the 1985 law had an undesirable impact for this measure. 
Summary Conclusions 
In Chapter V, I will present a detailed conclusion regarding the analysis of each 
dependent variable. Here, and at the end of each data presentation section throughout the 
remainder of Chapter IV, I will provide a brief summary conclusion of findings. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Atlanta yielded results most in accord with smart growth 
when quality of life variables were compared between central cities and suburbs for each 
of the metropolitan areas. Atlanta had desirable findings for population trends, 
segregation and poverty measures. ·While the city did lose population in its urban core 
over time, the trend appears to have begun a reversal after state smart growth 
implementation. Orlando demonstrated a growing urban population, a finding that is 
clearly desirable in terms of smart growth. On the other hand, Orlando had mixed results 
for segregation and poor findings in terms of poverty. Baltimore, unfortunately, showed 
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a continuous loss of population in the city, increased poverty, and mixed results for the 
segregation variable. 
Objective #2: Control Development 
The second smart growth objective I will examine is limitation of undesirable 
development. Smart growth initiatives generally seek to increase population density, or 
the number of people per unit of land, by encouraging infill development so that while 
the total population of a city grows, the land area of the city will not increase 
disproportionately (Mitchell 2001 ). Smart growth programs are designed to control 
growth either through coercion, such as growth boundaries and restriction of capital 
improvement funds, or through incentives, such as providing businesses with tax breaks 
to encourage them to locate within an inner city, or through some combination of both 
(Danielson and Lang 1998). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this aspect of smart 
growth legislation in Baltimore, Atlanta, Orlando, I will analyze and interpret trends in 
the expansion of each city's total land area in relation to population growth. 
The Census Bureau data I will utilize in this section is for urbanized areas. In 
other sections of Chapter IV, I utilize Census data for metropolitan statistical areas, or 
MSAs. Urbanized area data is more appropriate here, for an evaluation of population 
density and sprawl, because it includes a more limited land area than MSA data. 
According to the Census Bureau ("Summary" 2004 ), urbanized areas contain an urban 
core ( or, inner city) and contiguous development that has a population density of at least 
1 ,000 people per square mile. Development must be continuous outward from the inner 
city and no rural areas are included. Metropolitan statistical areas, on the other hand, 
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contain the urban core and "adjacent communities having a high degree of social and 
economic integration with that core". MSAs include the entire land area of each county 
that contains part of the city or its suburbs. Rural land is included because there is no 
population density restriction for including suburbs and because parts of some counties 
may be rural. MSA data is most useful for comparing conditions in city and suburbs. 
Urbanized areas data makes no distinction between central city and suburbs (Bureau of 
Census "Summary" 2004 ). 
Population Density 
Population density refers to the number of people per unit of land in a city. It is 
calculated by dividing population by land area. Population density is the inverse of per 
capita land consumption, which is the amount of land each person in a city occupies in 
theory. Per capita land consumption is found by dividing total land area by total number 
of people (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 ). These two measures essentially provide 
the same information, so only population density will be examined here. 
According to the goals of smart growth programs, it is undesirable for the 
population of a city to be increasing while population density is decreasing ("Sprawl 
Guide" 2000). Such a condition indicates that land is being consumed at a faster rate 
than population is growing ("Per Capita" 1990). However, it is also undesirable for 
density to increase indefinitely. Indeed, at some undefined point a high concentration of 
people in an area creates problems such as crowded housing conditions and increased 
pollution (Danielson and Lang 1998). 
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As stated above, the Census Bureau considers a population density of less than 
1 ,000 people per square mile to be rural (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 ). While 
this designation perhaps oversimplifies a complex concept, it does provide a reference 
figure for examining population density. 
Figure A-25 shows the changes in each city's population density over a 30-year 
period (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 ). Findings for Baltimore are most dramatic 
for this indicator. In 1970, population in Baltimore's urbanized area was at a density of 
5, 1 02.7 people per square mile. That figure plummeted to 3,041.3 people per square mile 
by 2000 ( while total population increased). The good news in terms of smart growth is 
that during the decade smart growth legislation was enacted in Maryland, from 1990-
2000, the rate of the decrease in population density slowed. The rate was a loss of 168.6 
people per square mile from 1 980 to 1990, and then slowed to a loss of 148.7 people per 
square mile the following decade. In other words, population density continued to follow 
the trend line, but with some modest improvement that could be attributable to program 
inception. 
Atlanta also showed a net decrease in population density over the 30-year period 
(Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 ). There was some improvement, or increase in 
density, from 1980 to 1990, but after smart growth implementation in 1989, population 
density fell once again. The city reached its lowest density for the 30-year period at 
1,783.3 people per square mile in 2000. If smart growth legislation impacted population 
density in Atlanta, it appears to have had a slightly negative affect, particularly in light of 
the improvement seen in the decade before program inception. 
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Of the three cities, Orlando was the only one to have urban population increasing 
while population density was also increasing overall (Bureau of Census "Summary" 
2004). The net increase in density was 234.5 people per square mile. The trend appears 
to be a victory for smart growth program efforts. The chart shows that population density 
did decrease somewhat from 1970 to 1980. After Florida's smart growth program was 
implemented in 1985, however, density increased. 
Population v. Land Area 
The second indicator I will present for the second smart growth objective of 
controlling development is a side-by-side comparison of population growth and land area 
growth. A successful smart growth initiative will limit land consumption by increasing 
density, even as population grows (Freilich 1999, Weitz 1999). Figures A-26, A-27, and 
A-28 show a comparison in the rate of change between population and land area for each 
of the three urbanized areas (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 ). 
Figure A-26 illustrates that positive changes to growth patterns have taken place 
in Baltimore, although smart growth legislation may not have been the cause (Bureau of 
Census "Summary" 2004). From 1970 to 1980, the physical size of the city mushroomed 
by 68. 8%, while population only grew by 11.1 %. In the following two decades, the rate 
of growth in land area significantly slowed, to a 13.4% increase from 1980 to 1990 and a 
15.2% increase thereafter. So, while improvement may be seen as early as the 1980s, 
Maryland did not pass smart growth laws until 1992 and 1997. Trends in Baltimore's 
land mass have been in accord with the goals of smart growth, but the legislation 
probably was not the cause of those trends. 
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The trends seen in Atlanta are quite different. Figure A-27 shows that while in 
the first decade of analysis growth in land area surpassed population growth, during the 
second decade, population growth was the greater of the two, followed by a return to the 
original relationship in the third decade (Bureau of Census "SUl111llary" 2004 ). The 
greatest discrepancy between population and area growth occurred from 1970 to 1980. 
During that decade, population increased 37. 1 %, while land area-increased by a 
whopping 107.8%. From 1980 to 1990, population growth exceeded land area growth by 
only 8. 1%. After statewide smart growth program implementation in 1989, land area was 
once again greater, although the difference between the two growth rates was less 
dramatic. Nevertheless, both grew by over 50% of 1990 levels in the final decade. 
In terms of achieving smart growth in Atlanta, these results are mixed. After 
Georgia's legislation was adopted in 1989, land area growth exceeded population growth, 
which is generally undesirable. This is particularly a concern after the positive changes 
seen in the prior decade. On the other hand, I know from my evaluation of "Objective 
# 1" that from 1990 to 2000 both the city and suburbs of Atlanta experienced significant 
population growth. Taking that into consideration, it may be true that Georgia' s smart 
growth legislation kept the increase in land area from outpacing population growth at any 
higher rate. 
Once again, Orlando shows changes most consistent with smart growth based on 
the data trends (see Figure A-28) (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004). From 1980 to 
2000, population growth in urbanized Orlando outpaced land area growth. While this is 
a desirable finding by itself, it becomes more so when considered with the information 
presented for years 1970 to 1980. Prior to 1985, the year the state of Florida enacted 
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smart growth legislation, the overall trend was a faster rate of growth in Orlando's land 
area than in its population. Data for the next decade, 1980 to 1990, shows that at some 
point area growth slowed and was surpassed by the rate of growth in population. Based 
on this data, I cannot pinpoint the year the change took place, but the trend is clear and in 
line with smart growth goals. This finding may be a victory for Florida's smart growth 
program. 
Summary Conclusions 
In terms of controlling development by increasing population density, Orlando 
clearly had the best results. Orlando was the only city that had an increasing population 
density over time. The city managed to generally keep its growth in land area slower 
than its growth in population. Both Atlanta and Baltimore showed improvement for this 
indicator over time, but both consumed huge land areas in relation to population over all. 
Objective #3: Create and Improve Transportation Options 
In this section, I will consider aspects of each city's success or failure with the 
creation and improvement of transportation options. The analysis of transportation data 
is an important part of evaluating smart growth programs. As discussed in previous 
sections, transportation options and traffic conditions affect many aspects of life for 
citizens (Porter 1997, "Sprawl Guide" 2000). Transportation decisions made in a 
metropolitan area impact quality of life concerns, such as commute time, incidence of 
asthma attacks, and number of car crashes; environmental factors, such as air and noise 
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pollution; and the pace of sprawl itself, when roads are "connected to everywhere" 
(Chapman 2000, quoted p. 69; Giuliano and Wachs 1993). 
I have restricted this section to an examination of conditions associated with 
highway traffic. To this end, I will evaluate trends in highway congestion, traffic delay, 
and wasted fuel for Balti_more, Atlanta, and Orlando. There are several reasons for my 
focus on highway traffic. One is that the smart growth objective of creating and 
improving transportation options might include many features, so I was forced to limit 
the subject in order to make it manageable (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Jeffords 
2000). A second reason is that uniform traffic-related data measures were available for 
each of my three test cities (Texas 2001 ). Third, an examination of highway traffic 
congestion provides a variety of information. It shows some aspects of quality of life for 
residents of the cities, in terms of hours spent in traffic, for example (Anderson and 
Tregoning 1998, Jeffords 2000, Sierra "Sprawl" 200 1). Indirectly it might also indicate 
whether residents of a city are using public transportation more or less over time. Earlier 
in this chapter I described how each of the three cities has encouraged use of public 
transportation. If I assume that there is a negative relationship between roadway 
congestion and use of public transportation ( as one increases the other decreases), these 
figures may be telling in this regard. Finally, some of the information revealed here is 
also useful to my analysis of air quality in the next section. Smart growth theory makes 
the assumption that heavy automobile traffic is largely responsible for poor air quality in 
many cities (Godschalk 1992, Green 2001 ,  Merriam 2003). In light of this relationship, it 
is almost impossible to study these two factors apart from one another. I will explore this 
topic further in the next section of Chapter N. 
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Despite the useful attributes discussed above, analysis of highway traffic 
congestion as a measure of smart growth legislation effectiveness is not without criticism. 
The main criticism is that it is difficult to exclude rival explanatory factors in the 
analysis. In short, cities design smart growth programs to primarily affect the behavior 
and choices of residents, but both residents and nonresidents utilize roadways ( Green 
2001, Holcombe and Staley 2001 ). This means that it is difficult to attribute changes in 
traffic conditions solely to t�ese programs. For example, each of the three test cities 
encourages residents to buy homes near public transit stations so that they may use their 
cars less as they use public transportation more. However, even if roadway congestion is 
shown to have decreased after many such homes were purchased, it may be in part due to 
the choices of tourists or commuters from surrounding areas rather than those 
homeowners, who are city residents. 
In regard to the criticism described above, it provides a useful reminder that 
determining causality is not a simple task (Campbell and Stanley 1963). I have elected to 
use highway traffic data as part ofmy evaluation based on the three reasons provided 
above. At the same time, I am fully aware that the results of the data analysis must be 
considered in light of other variables, such as amount of tourist traffic and availability of 
subway service. Further, even when all of these factors are considered, the conclusions 
reached must be considered preliminary. As the programs mature and more studies are 
conducted, cumulative research results may gradually be compiled into more conclusive 
findings. In short, no single indicator is perfect for determining causality (Babbie 1998, 
Campbell and Stanley 1963 ). 
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Roadway Congestion Index 
The Roadway Congestion Index (RCI) was developed by the Texas 
Transportation Institute (2001) to measure traffic density on major roadways in urban 
areas. An RCI exceeding 1.0 indicates an undesirable congestion level on freeways and 
principal arterial streets during peak traffic times. Figure A-29 shows a comparison of 
trends in traffic congestion, based on the Roadway Congestion Index, for Baltimore, 
Atlanta, and Orlando. 
Each of the three cities came close to reaching an undesirable index of 1. 0 in 1992 
(Texas 2001). After 1992, traffic congestion in Atlanta basically continued to increase 
through the year 2000. In 2000, the Transportation Institute rated Atlanta at 1.32, 
indicating very heavy traffic on major highways at rush hour times. Neither Baltimore 
nor Orlando experienced an increase in RCI to the extent that Atlanta did after 1992. 
Baltimore generally had index values slightly higher than Orlando until 1998, when 
traffic density in the two cities began to grow at about the same rate. In the year 2000, 
Baltimore was rated as 1.1 and Orlando was 1.11. Of the three cities, Orlando's traffic 
density continued to be lowest over time. As the graph indicates, Orlando did not surpass 
the 1.0 threshold until after 1996. In the following paragraphs I will examine these trends 
in light of each respective state's date of smart growth legislation implementation. 
The next three charts (Figures A-30 through A-32) show the Road Congestion 
Index for Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando each compared against the "average" RCI for 
cities of similar size (Texas 2001). The Texas Transportation Institute categorizes each 
of the three cities as "large urban areas", having populations over 1 million but less than 
3 million at the time data was collected. Accordingly, I have graphed my three test cities 
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individually with the average data for large urban areas in order to illustrate the 
differences. 
Figure A-30 shows that the results for Baltimore are mixed in terms of smart 
growth achievement (Texas 2001 ). After 1992, the year of program implementation in 
Maryland, the Roadway Congestion Index leveled off for 1 year, remaining at . 97 for 
1993. While that finding is noteworthy, it becomes rather insignificant when the 
previous couple of data points are examined. In 1990 and 1991, Baltimore's RCI stayed 
constant at .95. The state's smart growth program may not have been responsible for the 
index reading in 1993. It may have been simply a continuation of the trend- one of a 
slow, modest increase. 
On the other hand, beginning in 1997, the year of then-Governor Glendening's 
programs, Baltimore's congestion index began to gradually fall below the average (Texas 
2001 ). This is an important observation because the timing coincides with smart growth 
legislation and also because Baltimore's index was historically above average. 
Figure A-31 shows that Atlanta has consistently had a higher level of traffic 
congestion than what has been average for the same size cities (Texas 2001 ). This is not 
surprising given the city's reputation for highway and interstate gridlock. It is interesting 
to note, however, that the trend for Atlanta shown here is much closer to the average than 
what is observed for the following few traffic measures. 
In terms of achieving smart growth goals, Figure A-31 does show some 
improvement after the legislation was enacted in 1989 (Texas 2001 ). While it is clear 
that roadway congestion in Atlanta did generally increase over the 18-year period, there 
was nearly a leveling off of the trend for at least the first 3 years. The RCI for the city 
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was .98 in 1990, .97 in 1991, and .99 in 1992. After that year Atlanta's index surpassed 
the 1.0 threshold, but the yearly growth rate was uneven. It was not the steady climb 
exhibited in the average trend. 
Figure A-32 provides some evidence that Florida's smart growth legislation did 
have an impact on roadway congestion in Orlando (Texas 2001 ). After the law's 
implementation in 1985, the RCI for Orlando nearly leveled off for a 10;..year period. As 
shown in the chart, between 1985 and 1995, the index figure remained between .93 and 
.97. The other noteworthy point is that Orlando's RCI was above average until 1993, but 
after that year it remained below the average for same size cities for the remainder of the 
study. These two pieces of evidence suggest that Florida's smart growth legislation was 
effective to some degree. 
Traffic Congestion Costs 
The second measure of traffic congestion I will examine is annual traffic 
congestion cost trends, also based on research from the Texas Transportation Institute 
. (2001 ). Data trends for congestion cost are presented graphically in Figures A-33 
through A-36. 
Figure A-33 illustrates the translation of total yearly nonproductive hours spent in 
traffic and the associated wasted fuel, into dollar amounts, in millions of dollars {Texas 
2001 ). Although this measure is only available for three years; 1998, 1999, and 2000, it 
is useful to this research for a couple of reasons. One is that it shows the tremendous 
difference between Atlanta and the other two cities for this measure. It also provides a 
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close look at the three most recent years available for this particular aspect of traffic 
congestion. 
As is vividly shown in Figure A-33, congestion costs in Atlanta far exceeded 
costs in the other cities for these three years (Texas 2001). Baltimore dollar totals did 
steadily increase each year, but they were consistently less than ½ of costs in Atlanta. 
While there was a decrease of $100 million in Atlanta from 1998 to 1999, costs jumped 
to $1,885 million in 2000. Totals in Orlando for each of the years were barely above 1/3 
of the congestion costs in Atlanta. Orlando, in fact, remained at $520 million for years 
1998 and 1999, before increasing to $690 million in 2000. 
Another manner of examining the financial costs of traffic congestion is 
considering the losses per capita, or according to population (Texas 2001 ). This is a 
valuable indicator for smart growth evaluation because rather than using raw dollar totals, 
as in Figure A-33, per capita cost figures standardize data by taking into account 
differences in population totals. Figures A-34, A-35, and A-36 show comparisons of 
each city's per capita costs versus what the average per capita costs have been for cities 
of about the same size. As with the previous measure of traffic costs in millions of 
dollars, the costs per person considered here are inclusive of annual hours spent in heavy 
traffic and associated fuel expenses (Texas 2001 ). 
The average per capita costs for similarly sized cities, which are seen in each of 
the three figures, gradually increased by about $40 each of the three years (Texas 2001). 
For example, individuals in large cities lost, on average, about $344 in 1998 and $424 in 
2000 due to time and gasoline wasted in traffic congestion. 
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In the case of Baltimore, per capita cost figures are reflective of congestion index 
data reviewed above {Texas 2001 ). While the trend in Baltimore was one of a gradual 
increase in cost due to traffic, from $315 per capita in 1998 to $395 per capita in 2000, 
Figure A-34 indicates that those totals were consistently below average for each of the 
three years- a positive finding. As I concluded in the previous section, data for 1998, 
1999, and 2000 might be indicative of smart growth because per capita costs were kept 
below average. At the same time, that conclusion is tentative at best because costs were 
not held constant or reduced. 
Figure A-35 shows that per capita congestion costs fluctuated in Atlanta during 
the 3-year period (Texas 2001). This is consistent with Atlanta's RCI for those years. 
While the decrease by $45 per capita in 1999 was an improvement, in the following year 
per capita costs increased by over $100. In addition, costs in Atlanta have consistently 
been $150-$200 higher than average. While I acknowledge that only a limited evaluation 
can be made based on Figure A-35, I do not observe any clear benefit from smart growth 
legislation. Rather, evidence of Atlanta's severe traffic conditions is reinforced. 
· The findings for per capita costs in Orlando are somewhat surprising (see Figure 
A-36) (Texas 2001). While the Roadway Congestion Index for Orlando was below 
average for 1998, 1999, and 2000, per capita congestion costs for those years were above 
average. When population is accounted for, it appears that individuals in Orlando lost 
more money due to traffic congestion than what one would expect based on the city's 
RCI. While the per capita cost data appears to be disappointing in terms of smart growth 
at first glance, I believe such a conclusion would be incorrect. On the contrary, highway 
traffic in Orlando is congested largely because of the huge tourist population, which is 
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not factored in for this data. While the burden of crowded roadways is evident, Figure A-
36 is inconclusive in terms of smart growth because the tourist population is clearly a 
confounding variable. 
Traffic Delay Hours 
The next few figures get to the heart of one of the most basic arguments for 
controlling sprawl by presenting longitudinal data for the number of hours individuals 
spent in traffic delays per year. As mentioned in a previous chapter, smart growth 
advocates often appeal to their audience by describing sprawl in terms that the average 
person can identify with (Mitchell 2001, "Problems" 2000). One method is by detailing 
the average amount of time lost because of traffic conditions. 
Figure A-37 shows Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, graphed together over an 18-
year period (Texas 2001 ). Findings from the previous few traffic congestion s�ctions are 
reinforced. In comparison with each other, it is evident that individuals in Atlanta have 
spent the most time in gridlock overall, while those in Baltimore have spent the least. In 
fact, theoretically, in the year 2000, every individual in Atlanta spent 33 hours delayed in 
traffic, while those in Baltimore spent only 20 hours apiece in congestion. Orlando 
showed an unsteady upward trend in delay hours as well, with residents spending 31 
hours each sitting in traffic in 2000. Figures A-38, A-39, and A-40 compare each of the 
cities individually with the average annual hours of delay for other cities in the same size 
category. 
Baltimore fared better than both other cities for the measure of traffic delay hours 
per person (see Figure A-38) (Texas 2001). It is interesting to note, however, that the 
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series of data points reveals great fluctuation and irregularity in the trend. After state 
legislation passed in 1992, no dramatic effect on delay hours is seen for several years. 
After 1997, however, the year of Governor Glendening's program implementation, delay 
hours dropped for the consecutive 2 years. For the final four years of the study, the net 
increase in per person hours of traffic delay was only one. Overall, delay hours in 
Baltimore followed the trend for average hours fairly closely. In terms of smart growth, 
positive results are apparent after 1997. 
Figure A-39 shows some positive findings for Atlanta in the years immediately 
after Georgia's smart growth legislation was enacted in 1989 (Texas 200 1). Not only 
was there a decrease in hours of delay from 1990 to 1991 ,  but also delay hours in Atlanta 
dropped below average in 1990, 1991 ,  and 1992. Annual person hours of congestion 
delay in Atlanta were above average before the law was enacted. It appears that the law 
did have some effect on hours spent in traffic, although those effects were not long 
lasting. In fact, from 1992 through 1996, delay hours climbed steadily. After that year, 
there was fluctuation, and perhaps some leveling-off of the trend. 
In terms of smart growth achievement for this measure in Orlando, the data shows 
mixed results that are more negative than positive (see Figure A-40) (Texas 2001). After 
year 1985, when Florida's  smart growth law was enacted, personal hours of traffic delay 
generally continued on an upward trend through the year 2000. However, the trend was 
not one of a steady increase. Rather, the graph reveals that there was leveling-off of 
delay hours in 1993, 1994, and 1995. There was also a dip in hours from 1998 to 1999. 
It is possible that the legislation was responsible for keeping the delay hours from 
. skyrocketing, as was eventually the case in Atlanta. 
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On the other hand, annual hours of per person traffic delay in Orlando were 
consistently above average for each year except 1990 (Texas 200 1 ). According to the 
data, person hours for Orlando began to quickly outpace average hours in 1996. In 1998, 
individuals in Orlando spent seven more hours in traffic delays than did those in other 
large cities, and by 2000, the difference had increased to nine hours. 
Wasted Fuel 
In this section I will examine longitudinal trends in wasted fuel for each city. 
Traffic congestion results in wasted gasoline and diesel fuel, in addition to lost time and 
money. The Texas Transportation Institute (200 1 )  developed a measure for gauging 
wasted fuel over time. According to the TTI website, "wasted" fuel is the difference 
between the true amount of fuel consumed under existing conditions on freeways and 
principal arterial roadways, and the amount of fuel consumed under ideal conditions, or if 
all traffic was "free-flowing". 
Based on this formula, Figure A-41 shows annual wasted fuel in Baltimore, 
Atlanta, and Orlando in millions of gallons (Texas 200 1). In comparison with each other, 
Orlando had the least wasted· fuel in each of the years. Atlanta and Baltimore had similar 
figures to each other from 1982 to 1992. After that time, wasted gallons of fuel in 
Atlanta soared, while the trend in Baltimore was one of a less dramatic increase. In the 
year 2000, Orlando and Baltimore showed 58 million and 75 million wasted gallons each, 
respectively, while Atlanta significantly surpassed them both with 166 million gallons of 
wasted fuel. Figures A-42 through A-44 illustrate the difference in trends between each 
city and the "average" for other large cities. 
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Figure A-42 shows that the pattern of increase in wasted fuel for Baltimore varied 
tremendously by yearly totals (Texas 2001). Fuel totals stayed close to average from 
1982 to 1985, and then skyrocketed. Wasted fuel in Baltimore increased from 18 million 
gallons in 1985 to 49 million gallons in 1990. Figures for Baltimore were consistently 
above what was average for cities of the same size. 
Maryland's smart growth initiative may have had some positive effect on wasted 
fuel totals (Texas 2001 ). After 1992, traffic congestion did continued to consume more 
gasoline in each progressive year, but there was a slight decrease in the rate of growth 
from 1994 to 1996. After 1997, total wasted fuel dropped from 69 million gallons to 64 
million in 1998. In 1999, it rose once again, to 67 million gallons. While I consider 
Maryland's smart growth program to have begun in 1992, 1997 was the year Glendening 
instituted the state's "official" smart growth plans. If the dip in wasted gas totals from 
1997 to 1999 was due to Glendening' s programs, that decrease was a tremendous 
achievement when compared with results in Orlando ( detailed below). 
Wasted fuel totals in Atlanta also largely outpaced what was average for cities in 
the "large" population category (see Figure A-43) (Texas 2001). Atlanta stayed about 20 
million gallons higher each year, until 1993 when wasted fuel readings in the city began 
to skyrocket. 
Smart growth legislation in Georgia does not appear to have had more than only a 
short-lived effect on the amount of wasted fuel in Atlanta (Texas 2001). Figure A-43 
indicates that after 1989, when the law was enacted, wasted fuel totals dropped slightly 
from 42 million gallons in 1990 to 41 million galions in 1991. After 1991, however, the 
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steady increase began. A drop in wasted fuel totals was seen in 1999, but in the 
following year continued to spike upward. 
Figures for Orlando, on the other hand, remained below average for each of the 
years shown ( see Figure A-44) (Texas 2001 ). In addition, the rate of increase for the 
trend line in Orlando was less steady than that for other large cities. The annual amount 
of wasted fuel in the city varied from 12 million gallons below average in 1990 to just 3 
million gallons below average in 2000. 
After the inception of statewide smart growth requirements in 1985, the annual 
amount of wasted fuel in Orlando continued to climb (Texas 2001 ). The single exception 
to the trend was from 1998 to 1999, when wasted fuel totals held at 47 million gallons. 
As mentioned, the amount of yearly increase fluctuated widely. Smart growth legislation 
may have modest success in this case by keeping yearly totally from radically jumping 
between about 1991 and 1997. Overall, however, wasted fuel has continued to increase 
over time. 
Summary Conclusions 
Each of these three cities showed significant roadway congestion. Of the three, 
roadway congestion trends in Orlando were most promising in terms of smart growth 
goals. Orlando generally showed results similar to or better than "average" for other 
large cities. In particular, wasted fuel totals were lowest in the city. For the remaining 
variables, including the RCI, costs of congestion, and hours of delay, Orlando showed 
mixed, yet encouraging results. 
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Baltimore's roadway congestion trends results placed that city after Orlando, but 
clearly ahead of Atlanta. In several instances, measures for Baltimore were below what 
was average for same sized cities, yet the trend was always one of increase toward less 
desirable measures. Atlanta consistently fared the most poorly with skyrocketing traffic 
congestion, delays, and wasted gasoline. 
Objective #4: Protect Natural Resources 
Protection of natural resources is a central tenet of smart growth philosophy 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Beaumont 1999, Briechle 1999). Indeed, as discussed 
throughout earlier chapters, it has often been the exploitation of natural resources that 
eventually led to adoption of smart growth policies. Land, air, water, wildlife, and even 
human life are all valuable natural assets for states and cities (Audubon 200 1 ,  EPA "Air 
Quality" 2004 ). Protection of each of these elements contributes to the environmental 
component of a smart growth program (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Beaumont 1999, 
Briechle 1999). 
While protection of natural resources has many facets, as listed above, air quality 
is the factor selected for this study for a couple of reasons. One reason is that air quality 
is a vital and indisputable indicator of the health of an environment. It has been shown to 
affect the well-being of many living things, including humans, domesticated and wild 
animals, insects, and plant life (EPA "Air Quality" 2004). Air quality also affects the 
aesthetics of an area. When particulate matter is suspended in air in the form of smog, 
visibility is reduced. Heavy smog may in turn discourage tourism and other commerce, 
as well as cause traffic accidents (EPA "Air Quality" 2004 ). 
165 
A second reason for selecting air quality is that longitudinal data is available for 
each of the three test cities from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 
"AirData" 2004). Details on EPA data I will utilize are included in the following section. 
Since the EPA assembles data at the national level, I can reasonably assume that 
collection and reporting measures are standardized for cities. While data is available for 
some of the other natural resource variables, much of it is county, region, or state level 
data, and therefore of little use in this research. In addition, information for many of the 
other variables is not collected in a standardized fashion. In some cases, states 
themselves collect data unilaterally, while in other cases, interest groups collect data that 
is limited to certain geographic areas. 
In spite of my reasoning for its inclusion, I must caution the reader that air quality 
is somewhat controversial as a measure of smart growth. Critics of its use charge that it 
is unreliable because many other factors also contribute to the condition of the air 
(Bishop and Tilley 2002, Gordon and Richardson 1998). S�me of these alternative 
causal variables are meteorological conditions including wind flow patterns, local 
geography that might tend to concentrate levels of harmful emissions, and industrial 
development ( Green 2001 ). The existence and contribution of each of these rival causal 
variables is indeed significant and important to recognize. The movement of currents of 
air is important to consider when examining trends of air pollution because they naturally 
flow freely across jurisdictional boundaries. In other words, car exhaust originating in 
Detroit may be swept into· the South and deposited as acid rain in Atlanta. Concern with 
geography is another logical criticism. Cities located in a valley surrounded by 
mountains may exhibit a higher incidence of air pollution, for example. Lastly, the extent 
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of industrialization of an area is also telling because of associated air and water emissions 
(Green 2001). lndee� each of these factors may impact local air quality. 
My rebuttal to the above criticism is that any single variable, including air quality, 
is flawed as indicative of the success or failure of a smart growth program. Responsible 
policy analysis requires consideration of multiple variables carefully measured over time, 
and examined within the context of other features of the local government (local 
topography, for example). It is within this context that I will consider air quality, as a 
single part of a complex whole. Further, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
evaluation of smart growth programs has become an important and timely research 
pursuit as programs mature and new ones are implemented. Preliminary research such as 
this will be dependent on available data. Perhaps as city and state governments recognize 
the importance of systematic evaluation of program goals, an increasing amount of useful 
data will be collected. 
In the following section I will provide a more detailed examination of what 
information the EPA collects and how I will use it to evaluate air quality trends in 
Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando. 
Air Quality Data 
As discussed above, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) collects and 
records information regarding air quality in metropolitan areas (EPA "Air Quality" 
2004 ). The data collected from hundreds of monitoring stations is used to calculate the 
daily AQI, or Air Quality Index, for a location. The AQI measures five major air 
pollutants that are regulated by the Clean Air Act. These are ground level ozone (03), 
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particulate pollution/matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and 
nitrogen dioxide (NO2). An explanation of the dangers associated with each of these 
pollutants and an examination of levels of these pollutants in each city will be provided 
later in this section. 
In large cities (those with populations over 350,000), including the three selected 
for this study, state and local agencies are required to report the AQI to the public each 
day. This data includes the entire metropolitan area, and does not distinguish between 
central city and suburbs. It is useful, as well as unavoidable, to monitor conditions for 
the MSA as a whole, because airborne pollutants are not restricted within the artificial 
boundaries of any jurisdiction. Based on this information, the number of days per year 
when air quality was "good" (AQI 0-50), "moderate" (AQI 5 1-100), "unhealthy for 
sensitive groups" (AQI 101-150), "unhealthy" (AQI 15 1-200), ''very unhealthy" (AQI 
201-300), or "hazardous" (AQI 301-500) is calculated. Generally, a daily AQI of 100 or 
less is considered by the EPA to be acceptable (EPA "Air Quality" 2004). 
Uniform data for air quality measurement is available from the EPA for a 10-year 
span, from 1993 to 2003 (EPA "AirData" 2004 ). Since 1993 is the earliest date available, 
I will be examining a trend that occurs entirely after each state's legislation was 
implemented. The one exception is that I will consider the effects of Maryland's second 
piece of smart growth legislation that was adopted in 1997. Since I cannot utilize a 
pretest/posttest approach with my examination of air quality, I am relying primarily on 
theory to ground my conclusions and tentatively eliminate z variables, where possible. 
The general line of theory I am employing throughout the examination of air quality is 
the following: Over the 10-year period that began in 1993, in Baltimore, Atlanta, 
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Orlando, many factors contributed both directly and indirectly to pollute the air. Some of 
these polluting factors may have included increased populations, heavier traffic, 
industrial development, and even lifestyle choices. Accordingly, there are few x 
variables that might reasonably explain an improvement in air quality besides an 
organized effort by the government, in the form of smart growth programs. However, as 
stated previously, I will not conclude that any one factor is solely responsible for either 
the deterioration or improvement of air quality. 
"Good" versus "Unhealthy" Air Quality Days 
In order to examine air quality in Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, I will graph a 
comparison between number of days with "good" air quality, and number of days with 
"unhealthy" air quality in each city over a 10-year period. I will utilize the EPA's 
definition for "good" air quality days, while for my analysis of "unhealthy" days, I 
collapse several categories, making an AQI of over 151 "unhealthy". 
Figure A-45 shows the comparison of good to unhealthy air quality days in 
Baltimore (EPA "AirData" 2004 ). Generally, the number of good air quality days per 
year increased from 1993 to 1996, then decreased after that time. As for unhealthy air 
quality days in Baltimore, the data for the 10-year period show a fairly stable trend, with 
no year having more than 19 days of unhealthy air. In addition, the year 2003 was a 
rebound year for healthy air in Baltimore, as unhealthy days dropped from 19 to 2, and 
good air days increased from 159 to 176. 
These are interesting findings in light of the dates Maryland enacted smart growth 
legislation. While I cannot observe pretest figures for the 1992 legislation, it is clear that 
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good air quality days were on the rise for at least three years afterward, increasing from 
233 days in 1993 to 277 days in 1996. I cannot state that Maryland's first piece of smart 
growth legislation was responsible for the positive tren� but, results seen are in line with 
smart growth objectives and the legislation cannot be excluded as possibly causal. 
On the other hand, findings for the 1997 legislation are not immediately 
suggestive of program success. The number of good air quality days in Baltimore 
decreased from 275 in 1997 to 159 in 2001 (and 2002). Given the steady increase in 
good air days prior to adoption of the 1997 law, it appears that adoption of the law 
coincides with a decrease in air quality. While this finding is perplexing, at least two 
explanations are possible. First, it must be noted that there was a gradual leveling-off of 
good air days prior to the second piece of legislation, in addition to a slight decrease in 
days from 1996 to 1 997. These two pieces of information suggest the possibility that 
annual number of good air days was beginning a trend of decline that would have 
occurred regardless of the adoption of smart growth legislation in 1997. In that case the 
law would be unrelated to the subsequent trend. 
However, it may also be true that the decline in healthy air days was due to the 
1997 legislation. While this is not immediately recognizable as desirable, it may in fact 
be, indirectly. It is possible that the legislation quickly spurred construction, demolition, 
or alteration of structures ( Green 2001 ). A sudden boom in construction of affordable 
housing, for example, might have temporarily harmed air quality due to exhaust from the 
equipment used and particulate matter generated. In short, the City of Baltimore may 
have sacrificed some degree of air quality in the short term in order to produce long-term 
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smart growth benefits. As for overall air quality measures in Baltimore, I will have to 
declare these results as mixed and inconclusive. 
I will now review trends in both good and unhealthy air days for Atlanta and 
Orlando from 1993 to 2003. I will remind the reader at this point that pretest data is not 
available for either city, as Georgia enacted smart growth legislation in 1989 and Florida 
enacted smart growth legislation in 1985. As a result, evaluations for these cities will be 
posttest trends only. 
Figure A-46 shows the comparison of good and unhealthy air quality days for the 
Atlanta metropolitan region (EPA "AirData" 2004 ). The graph displays trends similar to 
those of Baltimore, but with steeper peaks and valleys. The graph shows that while the 
number of days with an unhealthy AQI has remained fairly constant, at under 50 days per 
year since 1993, the number of good air quality days has varied widely. Like Baltimore, 
Atlanta experienced a marked decrease in the number of good air quality days after the 
year 1997. 1999 was the year of fewest good air quality days, totaling 69, before the 
gradual improvement through 2003. Overall, the number of good AQI days fell from 248 
in 1993 to 161 in 2003. This is clearly not a desirable long-term trend as far as smart 
growth achievement. 
Results for Atlanta are somewhat surprising. I expected to observe the 
tremendous dip in good air days to be prior to 1996 rather than beginning about two years 
later. This is because from 1993 to 1996 the City of Atlanta was in the final stages of 
preparing for the Olympics. During that time, the city was a virtual sea of construction 
equipment as new apartments and Olympic venues were created and infrastructure was 
updated (Bullard 2000). I expected airborne equipment emissions and related particulate 
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matter to negatively impact air quality during those years. If Olympic construction did 
harm air quality prior to the 1996, something occurred after 1996 to cause greater harm. 
As I hypothesized for Baltimore in the previous section, it may be the case that smart 
growth legislation was beginning to take effect in Atlanta after 1997, causing short term 
increases in air pollution as long term benefits were sought. On the other hand, it may be 
that increasing traffic congestion, as seen for Atlanta in previous graphs, contributed to 
reduce air quality over time. In either case, the trend seen in the graph is troubling within 
the context of this study. In spite of the rebound that occurred beginning in 2000, number 
of good quality air days in Atlanta is evidently leveling-off at about 161 per year. 
For the City of Orlando, overall air quality was reasonably good for the entire 10-
year period (see Figure A-47) {EPA "AirData" 2004). From 1993 to 2003, Orlando 
experienced only one day of unhealthy air quality, based on AQI data. That particular 
day was in 1998, as the graph illustrates. As for yearly totals of good quality air, both 
positive and negative findings are evident. The positive finding here is a historical one. 
For the entire IO-year span, good air days occurred at least 246 days out of 365. This is 
in stark contrast to results in both Baltimore and Atlanta. At the same time, the overall 
trend in good quality air days is clearly declining overall. In fact, healthy air days fell 
from a high of325 in 1993 to a low of246 in 2003 . Based on this trend of steady 
decline, I will conclude that Orlando shows undesirable results for this component of 
smart growth. 
Now that I have evaluated trends in overall air quality for Baltimore, Atlanta, and 
Orlando, I will examine trends in a couple of particularly damaging airborne pollutants 
for the cities. 
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Ozone and Particulate Matter Trends 
As discussed above, Air Quality Index figures take into account the daily 
concentrations of five common pollutants. These are ground level ozone (03), particulate 
pollution/matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen dioxide 
(N02). The BP A then publishes the number of days per year when each of these five 
pollutants was the primary pollutant in the city. Each of these pollutants has unique 
origins in a metropolitan area as well as unique health risks for people (EPA "Air 
Quality" 2004 ). I will now provide basic information regarding each of these airborne 
pollutants before I determine which ones were most prevalent in Baltimore, Atlanta, and 
Orlando from 1993 to 2003. 
Ground level ozone (03) is not to be confused with beneficial ozone that occurs 
naturally in the Earth's upper atmosphere. Between six and thirty miles above the 
planet's surface, ozone forms a protective barrier that shields living things from the sun's 
damaging ultraviolet rays. Ground level ozone, on the other hand, is formed when 
pollutants primarily from cars and power plants undergo chemical reactions in the 
presence of sunlight. Ozone is the major component of smog. It is hazardous to people 
and animals because it diminishes lung capacity, causing shortness of breath (EPA "Air 
Quality" 2004 ). 
Particulate pollution, including dust and soot, is another major threat to air 
quality. Pollution of this type is made up of both solid particles and liquid droplets that 
are suspended in the air. Particulate matter may be thrown into the air by automobile 
traffic, emitted from factories that grind materials, produced on construction sites, and 
formed in chemical reactions. Airborne particles are dangerous because those that are 
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smaller than 10 micrometers in diameter can be inhaled into human lungs, causing 
respiratory distress or infection (EPA "Air Quality" 2004 ). 
Carbon monoxide (CO) is another pollutant monitored by the EPA. CO is a 
colorless, odorless gas that fonns when the carbon in fuels does not completely burn. 
Most of this gas in cities is discharged from cars, but it also fonns from other types of 
combustion, like forest fires. Prior to about the year 2000, CO was a major source of 
pollution for cities, including those in this research. That trend was reversed, however, 
when federal legislation mandated that emission controls be installed on new vehicles. 
Carbon monoxide is dangerous to humans because it enters the bloodstream through the 
lungs where it binds itself to the body's hemoglobin- the substance that delivers oxygen 
to cells. This causes a decrease in the amount of oxygen to eventually reach organs and 
tissues (EPA "Air Quality" 2004). 
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is another harmful gas. It is produced when sulfur fuels, 
such as coal and oil are burned. When a healthy person is at rest, and breathes SO2 
through his or her nose, the nasal passages can remove the gas particles. However, when 
exercise causes an individual to breathe through his or her mouth, sulfur dioxide can 
enter the body. The gas can cause wheezing and shortness of breath, and is especially 
irritating for asthma sufferers. Sulfur dioxide is also one of the main components of acid 
rain, which is dangerous to plant life and damaging to physical structures, such as 
buildings and bridges (EPA "Air Quality" 2004 ). 
The fifth potential threat to air quality that is monitored by the EPA is nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2). This gas is important to measure because when it combines with "volatile 
organic compounds", or VOCs, ground level ozone is formed (EPA "Air Quality" 2004 ). 
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In order to obtain a clearer picture of air pollution trends in the selected cities, I 
examined EPA data and determined the two primary pollutants in each of the cities over 
the 1 0-year period. In each case, ozone (03) and particulate matter were the main toxins 
(EPA "AirData" 2004). All three cities exhibit a similar general trend over time. The 
number of days per year 03 was the main pollutant has decreased while the number of 
days per year particulate matter was the main pollutant has increased. I must remind the 
reader at this point that EPA data is a report of the number of days per year each of the 
pollutants was most significant. Data points are not actual measures of the concentration 
of a gas or particulate. The implication of this is that if 03 levels decrease in a city, so 
that the gas is not the primary pollutant, then the next highest-level pollutant 
automatically becomes number one. In this case, particulate matter becomes the number 
one pollutant over time, but that does not necessarily mean that actual concentrations of 
particulates are skyrocketing. Figures A-48, A-49 and A-50 illustrate a comparison 
between the number of days per year 03 and PM were the primary air pollutants in 
Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, respectively (EPA "AirData" 2004). 
While the graph for each city displays unique characteristics, the same general 
trend is evident in each case (EPA "AirData" 2004). Each of the three cities experienced 
a decrease in 03 days beginning between 1 999 and 2000, accompanied by a simultaneous 
increase in PM days. Figure A-48 shows the pattern in Baltimore. The trend for ozone 
days in the city is particularly interesting because there was a gradual rise in yearly ozone 
days until 2000, when the number of days plummeted from 270 to 141 .  This was 
followed by a continued decrease in ozone days through 2003. Further, Baltimore shows 
a pattern of fewer than 50 particulate days for the first several years, then a tremendous 
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jump to over 200 days per year in 2000 through 2003. Of particular note is the increase 
from 225 PM days in 2002 to 262 days in 2003. I will discuss the implications this has 
for smart growth below. 
Figure A-49 shows a similar trend in Atlanta (EPA "AirData" 2004). The major 
difference in Atlanta, however, is that prior to the jump in particulate matter days in 
1999, ozone days had been slowly decreasing. While Baltimore had a high of 270 PM 
days in 1999, Atlanta's total of PM days had fallen to only 106. Two other major 
differences can be seen between the graphs for the two cities. One is that number of PM 
days in Atlanta jumped in 1999, whereas the jump occurred in 2000 in Baltimore. The 
second is that after that initial increase, particulate matter days in Atlanta basically stayed 
between 250 and about 300 days per year, while total PM days in Baltimore continued to 
be between 200 and 250 per year. Like Baltimore, Atlanta did, however, show a jump in 
PM days from 2002 to 2003. After a review of trends in Orlando, I will consider the 
implications for smart growth in each of the cities. 
The graph for Orlando contrasts with the graphs of Baltimore and Atlanta in two 
significant ways (see Figure A-50) (EPA "AirData" 2004). One is that after 1999, the 
total number of particulate matter days and ozone days per year in Orlando remained 
relatively similar to one another. In other words, there was not a huge difference between 
PM days, the higher of the two, and 03 days. The second major difference was that in 
Orlando, PM days dropped from 194 in 2002 to 130 in 2003. In 2003, number of ozone 
days once again exceeded PM days in Orlando. 
The information gleaned from these thr�e graphs, considered in light of the trends 
in overall air quality reviewed above, suggests several findings. Primarily, it seems 
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evident that both Baltimore and Atlanta have histories of poor air quality that may be 
attributable in part due to those short term sacrifices associated with smart growth 
described above, while Orlando is simply losing its good air quality rating. In short, 
desirable changes (while indirect) are seen in Baltimore and Atlanta, while undesirable 
changes are seen in Orlando. 
My reasoning for these conclusions is based on a number of observations. In 
Baltimore and in Atlanta, the final few years of data indicate a gulf of separation between 
PM days that were high in totals and 03 days that were low in totals. It is likely that the 
decrease in ozone days indicates better control over related pollutants, while the increase 
in PM days indicates construction, renovation, and rebuilding projects. I will remind the 
reader at this point that both of these cities have histories of serious air pollution that led 
to EPA designations as "nonattainment areas". In both cases, significant measures have 
been taken to reduce the creation of ozone so that an acceptable rating by the EPA can be 
reinstated. In addition, the increase in particulate matter days in both of these cities is 
likely indicative of major construction efforts. PM is generated by debris being flung 
into the air, especially by pounding, drilling, sawing, and other actions employed by 
workers involved in construction (EPA "Air Quality" 2004). Smart growth programs 
often require many construction projects in order to, for example, update or restore 
downtown buildings, reclaim and "clean" old industrial sites, build affordable housing, 
improve existing housing, and to demolish dilapidated buildings ( as Baltimore has done) 
(Anderson and Tregoning 1998). All of these projects listed have been employed in 
Baltimore and Atlanta since the inception of smart growth efforts by the respective states, 
and all of the projects create some amount of particulate matter (City of Atlanta 2004, 
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City of Baltimore 2004, City of Orlando 2004). In sum, I do not believe that Figures A-
48 and A-49 were necessarily indicative of the failure of smart growth programs to 
maintain or improve air quality. 
Trends seen in Orlando, however, are clearly undesirable. Air quality has steadily 
declined in the metropolitan area over the I 0-year period, although the EPA has not 
declared the city a "nonattainment" area. In addition, totals for particulate matter days 
and ozone days in the city were similar to one another from 1999 to 2003 ( as opposed to 
findings for Baltimore and Atlanta). This means that I probably cannot attribute the 
city's deteriorating air quality to an increase in construction projects spurred by the desire 
to achieve smart growth. 
As shown in previous sections of Chapter IV, both the city and suburbs of 
Orlando have continued to grow largely unhindered in terms of population and physical 
size (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). Air quality has been at least partially maintained 
by the steady sea breeze from the Gulf of Mexico, and by Orlando's location on a 
peninsula, far from transient pollution produced by the country's "rust belt" (Porter 
1997). The graphs generated by EPA data suggest that Orlando does not have the 
motivation to immediately improve air quality that is associated with cities designated 
EPA nonattainment areas. Rather, Orlando is slowly slipping toward air quality problems 
as it enjoys the economic and social benefits of unchallenged growth. 
Summary Conclusions 
Results for these air quality indicators are not entirely straightforward, as I have 
explained above. Based strictly on the data analysis, Orlando showed the most desirable 
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results for the tests of air quality. The overall number of "good" air quality days was 
highest in Orlando, and trends for ozone and particulate matter pollution were generally 
on the decline. Baltimore and Atlanta, in contrast, both showed significant reduction in 
days of ozone air pollution, yet overall air quality continued to deteriorate in both cities. 
When the data trends are considered within the unique contexts of each city, 
however, results for Orlando appear less desirable while Baltimore and Atlanta are 
partially redeemed. The totality of evidence suggests that Orlando is gradually losing the 
healthy quality of its air, while Baltimore and Atlanta have sacrificed some degree of 
healthy air in the short term to insure it in the long term. I will provide further discussion 
of this point in Chapter V. 
Objective #5: Create Equitable, Desirable Neighborhoods 
The creation of equitable, desirable neighborhoods is a central part of smart 
growth efforts (Godschalk 1992, Innes 1993, Merriam 2003). As with the four previous 
objectives, this one is .necessarily intertwined with other smart growth goals. For 
example, equitable neighborhoods decrease the incidence of segregation. If there is a 
range of quality housing in a neighborhood, households with a variety of incomes can 
live alongside each other (Katz and Bradley 1999). In addition, creation of desirable 
neighborhoods can help to reinvigorate an inner city or neglected suburban neighborhood 
as permanent residents settle there. Further, equitable and desirable neighborhoods are 
less likely to be hosts to dangerous conditions including drug related crime and some 
types of environmental pollution (Beaumont 1999). Clearly, creation of desirable 
neighborhoods possibly helps with attainment of other smart growth goals. 
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In this section I will examine trends in total housing units available, median rents, 
and financial hardship associated with rents for each of the three cities. As I analyze the 
data I will consider how these variables are affected by smart growth programs 
implemented in each city. 
Total Available Housing 
Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando have each seen a steady increase in the total 
number of housing units available (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). For each city, 
growth in the number of units available in the suburbs has greatly outpaced the number of 
units available in the central city. This is not surprising given the findings for "Objective 
# 1 ", where it was shown that each city's overall population had continued to increase, 
particularly in the suburbs. 
Housing availability in Baltimore has increased for the entire MSA, but census 
figures for the inner city show a gradual decline in available units (see Figure A-5 1 )  
(Bureau of Census "State" 2004). While there were 305,088 units available in 1970, by 
the year 2000, only 299,024 were available in the inner city. For members of the urban 
poor who have little prospect of being able to leave the central city, a loss in housing 
availability is a critical issue (Rusk 1993). On the other hand, as I discussed earlier in 
Chapter IV, some of this loss has been due to demolition of unsafe properties (City of 
Baltimore 2004 ). Overall, in terms of achieving smart growth goals, Baltimore scores 
poorly in this respect. While destruction of decrepit housing is a positive step, the central 
city has a net loss in total housing units. The most desirable outcome from a smart 
growth perspective would have been to replace demolished housing with quality 
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affordable housing at a pace such that the number of total units remained steady or even 
increased. Furthermore, if quality affordable housing were offered throughout the central 
city of Baltimore, perhaps the steady flight out of the city by those who can afford to 
leave ( as shown in Figure A-9) would be reduced. 
Results for Atlanta are more in line with achievement of smart growth (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004). Figure A-52 shows that in Atlanta (MSA), housing units in the 
inner city increased by 14,975 from 1970 to 2000. In the suburbs, on the other hand, 
almost 1 million new units became available during the same time frame. In light of 
population trends in Atlanta, these results are generally favorable. When the data points 
are considered in terms of state policy implementation in 1989, findings are desirable. In 
the central city, after 1989, number of available units grew by a small number from 1990 
to 2000. Based on the literature review presented earlier, I know that much of this 
increase was due to preparation for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. At the same time, as in 
Baltimore, many substandard units were destroyed. Atlanta scores well here because 
despite the loss of housing units to demolition, the number of available units in 2000 did 
surpass the total in 1990. 
The availability of housing in the Orlando MSA has also steadily increased since 
1970, but with at least one significant difference from housing growth patterns in 
Baltimore and Atlanta (see Figure A-53) (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). In Orlando, 
the central city has seen a surge in total housing units over the entire 30-year period. In 
fact, there were 50,472 more units in 2000 than in 1970. This trend is in accord with the 
inner city's growth in population ( as was shown in Figure A- 1 1  ). This is a desirable 
output for a smart growth program because it may influence other factors as well, such as 
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inner city revitalization, decreased reliance on cars, and basic social equality. 
Unfortunately, I cannot determine whether the program is responsible for the desirable 
trend shown on the graph after the year 1985 because it may be simply a continuation of 
the trend line during the "pretest" years. 
Median Household Rents 
Smart growth programs seek to not only provide safe housing for individuals, 
but they also are used to insure social equity (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Katz and 
Bradley 1999). In other words, advocates argue that safe homes should be in 
neighborhoods constructed with a mix of housing types to accommodate households of 
different socio-economic status. Further, housing costs in the suburbs should not be 
significantly higher than housing costs in the city, as this forces low-income households 
to remain in the city (Katz and Bradley 1999). The underlying premise is that the cost, 
condition, and location of housing should not be means for discrimination or segregation. 
A successful smart growth program will produce rents in the city and suburbs that are 
comparable, and not separated by a gaping rift. If rents are reasonable and comparable in 
both locations, residents are provided with choice in where they might live (Walljasper 
200 1). 
The median cost of renting a home, including both apartments and houses, has 
varied widely between the three cities (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). Figures A-54, 
A-55, and A-56 show the comparison between median household rents in the central city 
and suburbs of Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, respectively. All figures have been 
converted to 1 999 Dollars to allow for comparison. 
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As shown in Figure A-54, median household rents in the central city and suburbs 
of Baltimore have changed together over time (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). While a 
wide disparity between the two has continued to exist, both decreased from 1970 to 1980, 
increased from 1980 to 1990, and decreased once again from 1 990 to 2000. The first 
evident finding from Figure A-54 is an undesirable one: It has cost significantly more to 
live in the suburbs of Baltimore than in the city over the entire 30-year period. As stated 
above, this tends to keep lower income, usually black families in the city� while middle 
class, usually white families move to the suburbs (Katz and Bradley 1 999). 
I am primarily interested in the trend after 1992/1997 compared with the trend in 
cost of rents before that time. Two "post-test" findings are evident in Figure A-54 and 
neither is desirable in terms of smart growth. One is that from 1990 to 2000, the gulf 
between rents in the city and suburbs grew rather than shrank. The second is that, unlike 
in Atlanta and Orlando (as will be shown below), rents in Baltimore MSA have 
decreased since 1990. In the suburbs of Baltimore, median rents fell by only $10 from 
1990 to 2000. I am interested in what occurred in the inner city, where median rents fell 
from $526 in 1990 to $482 in 2000. Based on my previous investigation of housing 
conditions in Baltimore, I know that this is an alarming trend. It is reflective of both the 
deterioration of the housing stock in the city and the continued flight of residents outward 
from the city. Overall, Baltimore scores poorly for this variable. 
Figure A-55 shows the comparison of median rents in Atlanta (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004). Rental costs for the central city and the suburbs have both generally 
increased at about the same rate, but with a large disparity between city and suburb rent 
costs. After smart growth legislation inception in 1989, the gulf between suburban and 
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inner city rents remained wide. In 1990, median household rent in the city was $538, 
while in the suburbs it was $695. In 2000, median city rent had increased to $586, while 
rent in the suburbs had escalated to $740. This is an undesirable finding in terms of smart 
growth because it means that households with low incomes are less able to afford to 
move to the suburbs, where quality of life is generally better. Segregation according to 
income is reinforced. 
On the other hand, a desirable finding is that median rent in the central city of 
Atlanta increased by about $50 after the smart growth program began in 1989. As I 
discussed earlier in Chapter N, the City of Atlanta spent tremendous resources on 
developing quality affordable housing in the city after 1989. The increased rent in the 
inner city indicates that there is demand for that housing, and that the stock of housing is 
of sufficient quality to warrant the increase. These are important factors in keeping the 
city populated and vibrant. Overall, results for Atlanta are mixed, with one desirable 
finding and one undesirable finding. 
The trend in household median rents in Orlando is wholly different (see Figure A-
56) (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). While both urban and suburban rent costs have 
increased over time, urban rents have more sharply inclined, meeting the price of 
suburban rent near the year 2000. In fact, from 1990 to 2000, median rents in Orlando 
suburbs nearly leveled off, increasing by only $14. At the same time, median city rents 
increased by $32 to reach the same figure. These findings are mixed in terms of progress 
toward smart growth. One positive finding is that the 1985 Florida legislation appears to 
have narrowed the divide between city and suburb rents ( until they became about the 
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same in 2000). It is also positive that suburban rents have not continued to rapidly 
increase, as they did in earlier decades. 
On the other hand, for many who live in the city of Orlando, housing is becoming 
less affordable. For Atlanta, an increase in median city rents was concluded to be a 
primarily positive finding because it lessened the tremendous gulf between city and 
suburb rents and because it demonstrated quality and demand for city housing. 
Circumstances are different in Orlando, however. Affordable housing in the city is a 
concern because average incomes are low (City of Orlando 2004). I explained earlier in 
this chapter that Disney World and other theme parks are top employers in Orlando. 
Many of those employees make low hourly wages in nonprofessional positions. Rents in 
the city of Orlando are increasing over time because of the booming population and 
tremendous demand for housing. Also, many recent housing projects are part of the 
central city's revitalization efforts, which includes upscale "new urban", mixed use 
housing developments (Jelic 2003). In conclusion, I find mixed results for Orlando in 
terms of median rents and smart growth objectives. 
Housing Cost Burden and Households With '�ny Housing Problems" 
In addition to housing availability and affordability, the issues of substandard 
housing and housing "cost burden" are addressed by smart growth programs (Anderson 
and Tregoning 1998). Data collected through a federal program called the 
Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy, or CHAS, allows for an examination of 
the prevalence of substandard housing and cost burden for households ( including rented 
and owned properties) in each of the three cities (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). In this 
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section I will review and analyze data for each test city in regard to the percentage of 
households with "any housing problems" and the percentage of population with a housing 
cost burden greater than 50% of their income. CHAS defines "housing problems" as "a 
cost burden greater than 30% of income, and/or overcrowding, and/or without complete 
kitchen or plumbing facilities". 
While CHAS data is valuable to this study because it allows for analysis of 
information that otherwise would not be available, it does have limitations. The most 
important limitation to note is that data is only available for years 1990 and 2000. For the 
city of Baltimore, I am able to consider these two data points to be pre-test and post-test 
scores (because of Maryland's smart growth legislation implementation in 1992 and 
1997). For Atlanta and Orlando, however, this analysis will be post-test only, and subject 
to the limitations discussed earlier in Chapter IV. One other condition to note is that 
CHAS data does not distinguish between city and suburbs. Rather, I will be examining 
the metropolitan area as a whole. 
In the discussion of findings to follow, I will examine two graphs, or figures, for 
each city before proceeding to discussion of the next city. The first graph will be a · 
comparison in the percentage of total households with ''any housing problems", and the 
second will show the percentage of population in the MSA with a housing cost burden 
greater than 50% of household income. 
As I mentioned above, CHAS data reveals conditions in Baltimore both before 
and after smart growth program implementation by the state of Maryland. Overall, the 
results for these measures are likely not desirable in terms of smart growth achievement 
(Bureau of Census ''State" 2004). They are results I expected to observe based on 
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previous data results for the city. Figure A-57 shows that the incidence of "housing 
problems" actually increased for whites, blacks, and Hispanics from 1990 to 2000 . In 
addition, the percent of total households with any housing problems increased somewhat, 
from 33% in 1990 to 35.6% in 2000. While housing problems did increase for each of 
the three races graphed, conditions continued to be worst for minorities in 2000, with 
39.5% of Baltimore's black population encountering housing problems, and 43 .2% of 
Hispanics encountering housing problems. 
Figure A-58 shows more desirable trends in housing cost burden (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004 ). In 2000, about 4% fewer households having the lowest incomes, 
those less than or equal to 30% of median family income, or MFI, paid a housing cost 
burden greater than 50% of their income. Conditions also improved slightly for those 
with incomes 3 1 -50% of MFI. While this finding appears to be in line with smart 
growth, when considered with all other evidence it is probably indicative of further 
deterioration in housing stock in Baltimore. It was shown above that rents have been 
decreasing in Baltimore, so the discovery of "improvement" for housing cost burden is no 
surprise. However, Figure A-57 showed the increase in housing problems over the 10-
year period. Cost of housing has decreased in part because housing stock is old, 
substandard, or unsafe. The conditions in Baltimore that I have discussed throughout this 
dissertation are very difficult to reverse. It will likely take several decades to improve the 
housing stock and return a healthy residential population to the city. 
Figures for Atlanta reveal a more positive picture of housing conditions in terms 
of the objectives associated with smart growth (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). In 
Atlanta, the overall trend from 1990-2000 was a decrease in the percentage of households 
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with "any housing problems". The total percentage of households enduring at least one 
of the conditions considered to be housing problems in Atlanta MSA fell from 41 % in 
1990 to 38.9% in 2000. While these numbers are desirable, Figure A-59 shows that 
blacks and Hispanics continue to face housing problems at a higher rate than their white 
counterparts. For example, although black households experienced improvement over 
the decade, 44.9% of black households had housing problems in 2000, compared to only 
29.2% of white households. 
Figure A-60 shows that housing cost burden, or the portion of income a household 
must pay for housing, has decreased in Atlanta for those households with the lowest 
incomes (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). This finding is also desirable in terms of 
smart growth. The chart shows that the percentage of households with an income of less 
than or equal to 30% of median family income (MFI) whose housing cost burden was 
more than 50% of their income fell from 47.8% in 1990 to 41.4% in 2000. There was a 
smaller decrease in housing cost burden for those with incomes between 31 % and 50% of 
MFI. Overall, the City of Atlanta has made progress in the improvement of housing 
conditions and costs for residents. 
For Orlando, analysis of CHAS data produces mixed findings (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004 ). The total percentage of households with "any housing problems", as 
defined above, slightly increased from 35% in 1990 to 37.1 % in 2000. In other words, 
more people in 2000 paid a high housing cost burden, lived in crowded conditions, lacked 
a full kitchen or bathroom, or some combination of those three factors, than did in 1990. 
Considering the population boom, an increase of only 2.1 % in number of household with 
housing problems over a 10-year period is probably not a significantly negative finding. 
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However, Figure A-61 shows that, like in Atlanta, minorities in Orlando have a higher 
incidence of housing problems in either of the years shown. 
On the other hand, significant improvement is evident in housing cost burden data 
for the lowest income households in Orlando (see Figure A-62) (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004). The percentage with a household income less than or equal to 30% of 
MFI who paid more than 50% of their own income in housing costs fell by about 10% 
from 1990 to 2000. At the same time, the number of people with the same housing cost 
burden mentioned above, but who earned 3 1 -50% of MFI, increased by about 2%. 
Overall, Orlando receives a mediocre score for these two housing measures. 
Previous figures in Chapter IV have shown the tremendous growth in the city, 
particularly among minority groups. This burst in population accounts for some of the 
disproportionate hardship seen for blacks and minorities. At the same time, it is alarming 
from a social equality standpoint to consider that about half of all black and Hispanic 
households in Orlando have some sort of housing problem. 
Summary Conclusions 
For the second time, Atlanta is the city where effectiveness of smart growth 
programs is most evident. The city had an increasing number of housing units available 
in both the city and suburbs and a record of overall reduction in number of households 
with CHAS defined housing problems. Orlando also did well in these categories, but 
showed somewhat mixed results in terms of the incidence of housing problems, 
particularly among minority groups. The undesirable results discovered for Baltimore 
were not surprising, given the city's long struggle with inner city abandonment. Data 
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analysis showed that Maryland's smart growth initiative was unable to increase housing 
availability in the city or otherwise reduce the incidence of housing problems in the city. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Research 
In this final chapter, I will provide a summary review of my research, followed by 
copcluding thoughts and implications for future research. I will begin with a brief review 
of the phenomenon known as urban sprawl and its varied effects on communities. 
Secondly I will revisit the steps taken by governments to alleviate sprawl. This will 
include a review of the state smart growth legislation classification system I developed. 
Next I will summarize my methods for evaluating the success of smart growth policy in 
the states, followed by the preliminary conclusions of the research. Lastly I will detail 
how this research could be improved and suggest paths for future related research. 
The Problem: Urban Sprawl 
In the second half of the 20th century, many local governments seemingly awoke 
to realize an urgent problem at their doorsteps. The urban cores of cities had been 
abandoned by businesses and citizens alike. Those who fled had left behind only the 
poor and members of minority groups who could not afford to leave the city. They had 
left behind contaminated industrial sites and acres of empty buildings. Indeed, pollution 
of the air, water, and other cherished natural resources had become routine. New growth 
was occurring in an ever-widening ring outside the deserted city. Forests, open areas, 
and farmland had been plowed under to accommodate the transplanted growth. Schools 
were left empty within the city while new ones were constructed in the country. 
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Eventually places began to loose their uniqueness. Instead, many looked the same­
rotting, empty cities surrounded by sprawling suburbs (DeGrove and Stroud 1987, 
Freilich 1999, Godschalk 1992, "Problems" 2000, Stein 1993). 
Reform Reaction 
When the reality of the impacts of poor planning practices and environmental 
abuses took root in the American consciousness, the issue of reform was forced into the 
political arena (Burby and May 1997, Innes 1993). The question eventually became: 
What level of government is best suited to be charged with insuring that land use 
planning is conducted in a responsible way, and that the abuses of the past will be 
prevented in the future? The federal government was eliminated as a possibility. Not 
only is the country physically too large and diverse to be planned from Washington, but 
the federal government had also contributed to the land management crisis. In light of 
these facts, the role of the federal government has generally been restricted to creating 
and enforcing pollution control legislation (Stein 1993, Weitz 1999). 
Local governments were also considered. In many cases, however, local 
governments had already demonstrated either an inability to effectively perform the task 
of land use management or a refusal to do so. Some states continued to allow local 
governments to engineer their own land management plans via state granted enabling 
legislation (Cullingworth 1997, Porter 1997). An increasing number of states, however, 
began to conclude that they were best able to insure effective growth planning at the local 
level. Their argument continues to be that as state governments, they have the best 
interests of every local jurisdiction in mind; they have greater access to planning 
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resources, money, and staff; and they can exercise a greater coercive power than local 
governments if necessary (Liou and Dicker 1994 ). 
Legislative programs instituted at the state level in order to develop responsible 
planning at the local level, are generally referred to as smart growth programs (Leo et al. 
1998). Under the banner of smart growth, these policies are intended to bring resources 
and people back to cities, limit urban sprawl, protect natural resources, reduce traffic 
congestion, and generally improve the quality of life for citizens. Each state that has 
instituted smart growth has done so in a unique way in respons·e to the needs and desires 
of constituents (Staley 2000). While state legislation does vary, generalizations can be 
drawn about the programs. They may be grouped in categories so they can be studied 
and understood. 
An Improved System of Classification 
In Chapter II, I reviewed the major growth management classification systems 
within the policy and planning literature and examined the benefits and limitations of 
each. Based �n that analysis I developed an improved model from the two most useful 
schemes, those developed by DeGrove and Stroud in 1987 and Gale in 1992. I then used 
the new model to categorize state legislation. 
Based on the new classification system there are three major types of state smart 
growth legislation: (1) low coercion/comprehensive-general; (2) medium 
coercion/comprehensive-general; and (3) high coercion/comprehensive-general. As 
discussed in Chapter II, each of these types of legislation is applicable to all land use 
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activities throughout the state. While variation exists within each category, legislation of 
each type contains similar basic elements (DeGrove and Stroud 1987, Gale 1992). 
States employing low coercion/comprehensive-general programs generally allow 
for voluntary participation by local and/or regional governments. These state 
governments may offer incentives for participation or compliance, which may include 
grants for local projects or free technical assistance with developing plans. At the same 
time, sanctions may be used against local governments that do not voluntarily participate 
(DeGrove and Stroud 1987, Gale 1992). 
The middle category is called medium coercion/comprehensive-general. 
Legislation of this type is diverse, and usually includes a mix of incentives and 
disincentives. Policies may be mandatory, but perhaps only for jurisdictions of a certain 
population, or a certain location. In some cases there is a high degree of cooperation, or a 
partnership of sorts, between the state and local governments (DeGrove and Stroud 1987, 
Gale 1992). 
Lastly, states with high coercion/comprehensive-general legislation generally 
have mandatory programs. The level of jurisdiction that is mandated to plan may vary by 
state. For example, regional and local planning may be mandated, or, city and county 
governments may be mandated to plan. Penalties for noncompliance are stringent. These 
may include ineligibility to qualify for state sponsored grants and loan programs, or, in 
some cases the state may intercede and plan for a noncompliant jurisdiction (DeGrove 
and Stroud 1987, Gale 1992). 
After developing the three categories, my next question was: Of the three types, 
which produces the best results in terms of smart growth goals? To answer this question, 
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I developed a list of indicators to examine for one large city in each of three 
representative states. I chose Maryland to represent the low coercion/comprehensive­
general category, Georgia to represent the medium coercion/comprehensive-general 
category, and Florida to represent the high coercion/comprehensive-general category. 
Within those states, Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando, respectively, were selected as test 
cities. I then translated the five objectives of smart growth policy into indicators, 
collected data for these indicators, and compared changes in the cities over time. 
Does Smart Growth Reduce "Dumb" Urban Growth? 
In Chapter IV, I presented time series data for a variety of dependent variables 
under the following smart growth program goals ( or objectives as I also refer to them): 
revitalization of central cities, control of development, creation and improvement of 
transportation options, protection of natural resources, and creation of equitable, desirable 
neighborhoods. Due to the broad nature of the goals, I narrowed my focus to a singular 
aspect of eac� as will be presented below. I analyzed several indicators for each 
objective in order to determine if smart growth legislation was having the desired effects. 
I presented a detailed analysis of the data in Chapter IV, and I will now summarize those 
findings. 
Health of Central Cities v. Suburbs 
In order to compare the health of central cities versus suburbs for Baltimore, 
Atlanta, and Orlando, I chose three dependent variables to examine. These were 
population growth, segregation trends, and poverty trends. These indicators are 
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important to the analysis because they represent central aspects of smart growth 
programs. If the programs enacted at the state and local levels were effective, I expected 
to see: (1) population growth in the central cities, or at least maintenance of the 
population status quo; (2) a decrease in the incidence of segregation in both the central 
city and suburbs; and (3) a decrease in the incidence of poverty in both the central city 
and suburbs (McMahon 1997, "Smart" 2001, "Sprawl Guide" 2000). Analysis revealed 
most desirable changes in Atlanta, followed by Orlando and then Baltimore. 
Of the three cities, Atlanta yielded results most in accord with smart growth when 
quality of life variables were compared between central cities and suburbs for each of the 
metropolitan statistical areas. Analysis of population growth in Atlanta showed 
particularly encouraging results from a policy analysis standpoint. The central city of 
Atlanta lost residents each decade until after smart growth program inception. From 
1990 to 2000 the central city experienced an increase of 22,457 people. Georgia's smart 
growth legislation was enacted in 1989, immediately prior to the increase, so it may have 
been responsible for some degree of that change (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
Analysis of data for Atlanta produced desirable findings for both segregation and 
poverty measures, as well. In terms of trends in segregation, one finding is that 
conditions did not worsen over time in the central city. The ratio of race populations 
remained essentially the same over time. In fact, conditions somewhat improved for 
blacks as they lost 5% of the total central city population in their flight to the suburbs. A 
second finding is that blacks have not been excluded from occupying the suburbs of 
Atlanta. While pockets of segregation in the suburbs certainly continue to exist, overall 
the rate of black population growth surpassed the rate of white population growth. 
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Georgia's smart growth legislation may be responsible for some of these changes. While 
these trends were evident prior to 1 989, they became more evident after that year. For 
example, black population growth in the suburbs grew more quickly after 1989 than it did 
prior to that year (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). 
Finally, smart growth policy in Georgia appears to have produced benefits in 
terms of the incidence of poverty in Atlanta. In the central city, total population living in 
poverty decreased from 27.3% to 24.4% after 1989. Atlanta's suburban population 
experienced an increase in poverty by a fraction of a percentage point from 1989 to 1999. 
While a continuation of the downward trend in the incidence of poverty in the suburbs 
prior to 1989 would have been most desirable, in light of the tremendous population 
boom in the suburbs of Atlanta over this time, a near-stabilization of the trend is probably 
a positive finding (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). 
While Atlanta clearly showed the most desirable results overall for Objective #1, 
Orlando also showed improvement and may be rated as coming in "second place". 
Population trends observed for Orlando were remarkable in that the number of residents 
in both the suburbs and the central city steadily increased from 1970 through 2000. In 
the city, population rose from 98,965 people in 1970 to 185,951 people in 2000. While 
inner city population continued to increase after 1985, the year smart growth legislation 
was implemented in Florida; the increase may have been a continuation of the trend line, 
which clearly showed an increasing population from 1970 onward. In short, the trend in 
population described is desirable, but may or may not be attributable to Florida's smart 
growth legislation (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
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Orlando had mixed, yet encouraging results for the segregation variable analysis. 
After program inception in 1985, the white population was the only segment to lose 
members in the central city. Some degree of increased segregation is evident because as 
whites were moving out of the city, blacks and Hispanics were moving into the city. On 
the other hand, after 1985 both black and Hispanic populations experienced tremendous 
jumps in their suburban totals. This is a positive finding because it shows increased 
accessibility to suburban homes for both minority groups (Bureau of Census ''State" 
2004). 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that Orlando scored poorly on the poverty trend 
analysis. Incidence of poverty in both city and suburbs of Orlando decreased by about 
5% from 1969 to 1989. After smart growth legislation was enacted in 1985, however, the 
rate of poverty in both city and suburbs slightly increased. It rose .1 % in the city and . 7% 
in the suburbs. These figures appear to be negligible when viewed without the data for 
previous years. In light of the pre-test trends, however, it appears that Florida's smart 
growth legislation may have had a slightly undesirable impact on poverty rates. While 
the findings in terms of poverty are not good, this may in fact be a signal of increasing 
diversity and access to housing in Orlando, which is indicative of smart growth (Bureau 
of Census "State" 2004 ). 
Baltimore, in contrast to both Atlanta and Orlando, showed primarily negative 
results for each of the three indicators. Two notes must be reiterated at this point before I 
· review the findings. One is that Baltimore is an aging city that began its deterioration 
decades ago, when the industrial heart of the city was abandoned (City of Baltimore 
2004, Cohen 2002, Rusk 1996). Even with a comprehensive smart growth plan at both 
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the state and city level, I would expect a slow recovery for the city. The second point I 
must remind the reader of is that Baltimore's legislation was enacted in 1992 and 1997, 
making the second half of the program less than ten years old. While it is important to 
begin evaluation, outcomes may only recently be materializing "{Bureau of Census "State" 
2004). 
Overall, Baltimore experienced loss of population in the inner city, mixed results 
in terms of segregation trends, and increased incidence of poverty. In terms of population 
trends, residents steadily vacated the central city from 1970 to 2000, while population in 
the suburbs grew. It appears that Maryland's smart growth legislation was not able to 
stop the population flight from the city as of the year 2000 (Bureau of Census "State" 
2004). 
Segregation trend data showed that both white and black populations have 
abandoned Baltimore's central city. On one hand, it is notable that blacks were less 
likely to leave the urban area than whites, as the segment's loss of population was 
significantly slower, and did not begin until 1990. This is likely indicative of economic 
hardship among central city blacks. On the other hand, it may be a positive finding in 
terms of smart growth that blacks were more able to leave the city if they wished during 
the decade Maryland's smart growth legislation was enacted. Further, it is a positive 
fmding in terms of smart growth that numbers of blacks in Baltimore's suburbs have 
continued to grow (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
Finally, results for Baltimore were undesirable for poverty trends as incidence of 
poverty increased in both the city and suburbs after program implementation. From 1989 
to 1999, poverty grew in Baltimore's central city from 21.9% to 22.9% of total 
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population, and in the suburbs from 4.7% to 5.2% of total population. Furthermore, 
tremendously higher poverty levels were recorded in the central city as compared with 
the suburbs in each decade (Bureau of Census "State" 2004 ). 
Population Density 
In order to evaluate the second objective of smart growth programs, control of 
development, I limited my analysis to population density. If smart growth initiatives 
were successful in the cities, I would expect to see: ( 1 )  an increase in population density, 
or the number of people per unit of land; and (2) a similar rate of growth between 
population and land area of each city (Danielson and Lang 1998, Mitchell 200 1 ). Based 
on these indicators, Orlando fared best, followed by Baltimore, then Atlanta. 
In terms of controlling development by increasing population density, Orlando 
clearly had the best results. Of the three cities, Orlando was the only one to have urban 
population increasing while population density was also increasing overall. Prior to 
adoption of smart growth legislation in 1985, the overall trend was undesirable, with a 
faster rate of growth in Orlando's land area than in its population. From 1980 to 2000, 
the trend reversed, and population growth in urbanized Orlando outpaced land area 
growth (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 and "State" 2004). 
An examination of population density measures in Baltimore showed mixed, but 
promising, results. The positive finding in terms of smart growth is that during the 
decade smart growth legislation was enacted in Maryland, from 1990-2000, the rate of 
decrease in population density slowed in Baltimore. The rate was a loss of 168.6 people 
per square mile from 1980 to 1990, and then slowed to a loss of 148.7 people per square 
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mile the following decade. Conversely, Maryland's legislation probably cannot be 
credited with the positive changes seen in expansion of land area. From 1970 to 1980, 
the physical size of the city grew by 68. 8%, while population only grew by 1 1 . 1  %. In the 
following two decades, the rate of growth in land area significantly slowed, to a 13.4% 
increase from 1980 to 1990 and a 1 5.2% increase thereafter. Maryland did not pass smart 
growth laws until the mid- 1990s, indicating that positive changes after 1990 were 
probably a continuation of the trend line begun the previous decade (Bureau of Census 
"Summary" 2004 and "State" 2004). 
Atlanta showed only vague improvement for this indicator over time, consuming 
a huge land area in relation to population over all. The city experienced a net decrease in 
population density over the 30-year period. There was some improvement, or increase in 
density, from 1980 to 1990, but after smart growth implementation in 1989, population 
density fell once again. In terms of growth in population versus landmass for Atlanta, 
results were unpredictable. From 1970 to 1980 growth in land area surpassed population 
growth, while during the next decade population growth was the greater of the two. 
Unfortunately, immediately after smart growth implementation in 1989, growth in land 
area once again surpassed population growth. While on the surface findings for Atlanta · 
are discouraging for population density, there is reason for optimism. In light of the 
tremendous population growth in both the city and suburbs of Atlanta from 1990 to 2000, 
it may be true that Georgia's smart growth legislation kept the increase in land area from 
outpacing population growth at any higher rate (Bureau of Census "Summary" 2004 and 
"State" 2004 ). 
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Roadway Congestion 
The third smart growth objective I considered was creation and improvement of 
transportation options. I focused my study on analysis of highway traffic congestion. I 
examined several dependent variables- a measure called the Roadway Congestion Index 
(RCI), costs associated with congestion, hours of traffic delay, and wasted fuel estimates. 
If smart growth programs were �uccessful in the cities, I expected to find: ( 1) an RCI of 
less than 1.0, or at least a decrease in the index after legislation implementation; (2) a 
decrease in traffic congestion costs; (3) a decrease in traffic delay hours; and ( 4) a 
decrease in wasted fuel totals (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, Chapman 2000, Giuliano 
and Wachs 1993, Jeffords 2000). Examination of these indicators in the cities revealed 
most desirable trends in Orlando, followed by Baltimore, then Atlanta. 
Florida's smart growth legislation appears to have had a positive impact on 
roadway congestion in Orlando. Orlando generally showed results similar to or better 
than "average" for other large cities. After the law's implementation in 1985, the RCI for 
Orlando nearly leveled off for a IO-year period at below the 1.0 level. In addition, the 
city's RCI was above average until 1993, although after that year it remained below the 
average for same size cities through the end of the study {Texas _2001). 
Findings for the remainder of traffic congestion indicators in Orlando were 
somewhat surprising, and must be understood in light of the city's position as a major 
tourist destination ( City of Orlando 2004 ). First, when residential population is 
accounted for, it appears that individuals in Orlando lost more money due to traffic 
congestion than what one would expect based on the city's RCI in 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
Second, Orlando showed an unsteady upward trend in traffic delay hours as well for each 
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year except 1990. Third and last, after inception of statewide smart growth requirements 
in 1985, the annual amount of wasted fuel in Orlando continued to climb, yet remained 
below average for cities of similar size (Texas 2001 ). 
While these results appear to be largely inconsistent with smart growth at first 
glance, such a conclusion would likely be incorrect. Highway traffic in Orlando is 
congested largely because of the huge tourist population, which is not factored into the 
city's population total. While the burden of crowded roadways is certainly evident in the 
city, the tourist population is clearly a confounding variable that is likely skewing these 
results (City of Orlando 2004, Jelic 2003). 
Baltimore's roadway congestion trends analysis placed that city after Orlando, but 
clearly ahead of Atlanta when I ranked the three cities according to achievement of smart 
growth goals. Overall, results for Baltimore were fairly good. Analysis of Roadway 
Congestion Index for Baltimore revealed tentatively encouraging findings. After 1992, 
the first year of program implementation in Maryland, the RCI leveled off for only one 
year, remaining at . 97 for 1993. If the legislation provided that benefit, it was indeed 
short-lived. On the other hand, after the second phase of the program was instituted in 
1997, Baltimore's congestion index began to gradually fall below the average for 
similarly sized cities. While there was not actually a drop in Baltimore's RCI trend line 
after 1997, considering the city's crowded roadways, staying below the average RCI is a 
positive finding (Texas 2001 ). 
There were two other findings of significant note for Baltimore. One was the dip 
in wasted gas totals from 1997 to 1 999 and the second was the corresponding dip in 
yearly traffic delay hours. Wasted fuel totals had been gradually increasing in the city 
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since about 1992. While the 1992 legislation was not effective, Glendening's program in 
1997 may have been responsible for cutting the amount of wasted gasoline for several 
years. After 1997, total wasted fuel dropped from 69 million gallons to 64 million in 
1998. The previous trend of increase returned in 1999 (Texas 2001). 
The second noteworthy finding was a similar pattern seen in yearly traffic delay 
hours. Delay hours crept upward from 1992 to 1997, and then fell after that year. The 
data trend indicates that Maryland's 1997 legislation may have had a dramatic, if short­
lived impact on both of these variables (Texas 2001 ). 
Examination of the remaining variable for Baltimore produced mediocre results. 
In terms of per capita costs due to traffic congestion, the most desirable outcome, that of 
a decrease in costs, was not observed. Nor were traffic associated costs held constant. 
However, it is positive that cost totals for 1998, 1999, and 2000 were consistently below 
the average for same sized cities each of the three years (Texas 2001). 
Traffic congestion measures in Baltimore did fall short of the ideal, although 
some progress is evident. While the 1992 legislation did not evidently have a significant 
or long-lasting affect on traffic congestion, the 1997 laws may have had a profound 
impact. Unfortunately the available data indicates a return to previous conditions in 
about 2000. Perhaps there will be more progress associated with the legislation in the 
years to come (Texas 2001). 
Of the three cities, Atlanta consistently fared the most poorly for Objective #3 
with skyrocketing traffic congestion, worsening delays, and wasted gasoline. Atlanta was 
the only test city to maintain a higher level of traffic congestion (RCI) than what was 
average for the same size cities in each year from 1982 through 2000. However, as was 
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the case in Baltimore, some improvement was seen in Atlanta's RCI in the two years 
following Georgia's program adoption in 1989. After 1992, RCI resumed a pattern of 
escalation {Texas 2001). 
Analysis of several of the other dependent variables also indicates the possibility 
of short-term improvement in Atlanta's traffic congestion following Georgia's smart 
growth legislation enactment in 1989. For example, congestion delay hours in Atlanta 
were above average before 1989. Not only was there a decrease in hours of delay from 
1990 to 1991, but also delay hours in Atlanta dropped below average in 1990, 1991, and 
1992. While the law may have initially produced the desired effect, unfortunately delay 
hours soared once again beginning just four years afterward (Texas 2001). 
A similar pattern was seen in wasted fuel totals for Atlanta. After 1989, when the 
Georgia law was enacted, wasted fuel totals dropped slightly from 4 2 million gallons in 
1990 to 41 million gallons in 1991. After 1991, however, the steady increase resumed. 
A drop in wasted fuel totals was seen once again 1999, but in the following year 
continued to spike upward (Texas .2001). 
Lastly, data for annual traffic congestion costs in Atlanta were primarily 
discouraging in terms of smart growth. While there was a $45 decrease in annual per 
capita costs from 1998 to 1999, the figure grew by more than $100 per capita in the next 
year. Furthermore, cost in Atlanta have consistently been $150-$200 higher than 
average. This indicator seems to reinforce the severity of Atlanta's traffic conditions 
(Texas 2001 ). 
Overall, little progress is evident as far as Georgia's smart growth legislation 
producing desirable results for traffic congestion in Atlanta. As described above, in 
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several cases, a temporary improvement was seen in the two or three years immediately 
after 1989. Atlanta's reputation as a traffic "nightmare" is upheld (Bullard 2000, Texas 
2001). 
Air Quality 
The fourth smart growth objective I considered was protection of natural 
resources. I _chose air quality as the focus because of the critical impact it has on living 
systems of all types. I decided to examine air quality after the examination of population, 
population density, and traffic conditions, because each of these factors may affect 
quality of the air, as I discussed in Chapter N (EPA "Air Quality" 2004, Switzer and 
Bryner 1998). I could then use results from those evaluations in interpreting the air 
quality data. 
I chose two dependent variables as indicators of air quality in each city. The first 
was a comparison of EPA designated "good" and "unhealthy" air quality days. The 
second was an examination of trends in ozone levels and particulate matter. If state and 
local smart growth programs were successful, I expected to see: ( 1 )  good air quality days 
increasing as unhealthy days decreased; and (2) a decrease in the incidence of both ozone 
days and particulate matter days (EPA "Air Quality" 2004 ). 
Based strictly on the data analysis, Orlando showed the most desirable results 
overall for the tests of air quality. The total number of "good" air quality days was 
highest in Orlando, and trends for ozone and particulate matter were generally on the 
decline. Baltimore and Atlanta, on the other hand, both showed significant reduction in 
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days of ozone air pollution, yet overall air quality continued to deteriorate in both cities 
(EPA "AirData" 2004). 
. Results of the analysis presented in Chapter N showed that on the surface 
Orlando had the best air quality for these measures, while both Baltimore and Atlanta had 
similar undesirable results, sharing the "second place" designation. Although the data 
suggests these conditions, I concluded that, in fact, Orlando is slowly losing the healthy 
quality of its air, while Baltimore and Atlanta have sacrificed some degree of healthy air 
in the short term to insure it in the long term (EPA "AirData" 2004 ). 
My reasoning for these conclusions is based on a number of observations. In 
Baltimore and in Atlanta, the final few years of data indicate a gulf of separation between 
PM days that were high in totals and 03 days that were low in totals (EPA "AirData" 
2004). It is likely that the decrease in ozone days indicates better control over related 
pollutants, while the increase in PM days indicates construction, renovation, and 
rebuilding projects. I will remind the reader at this point that both of these cities have 
histories of hazardous levels of air pollution that led to EPA designations as 
"nonattainment areas". In both cases, significant measures have been taken to reduce the 
creation of ozone so that an acceptable rating by the EPA can be reinstated. In addition, 
the increase in particulate matter days in both of these cities is likely reflective of major 
construction efforts. Particulate matter is generated by debris being flung into the air, 
especially by pounding, drilling, sawing, and other actions employed by workers 
involved in construction (EPA "Air Quality" 2004 ). Smart growth programs often 
require many construction projects in order to, for example, update or restore downtown 
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buildings, reclaim and "clean" old industrial sites, build affordable housing, improve 
existing housing, and demolish dilapidated buildings (Catlin 1997, Weitz 1999). 
Trends seen in Orlando, however, are clearly undesirable in the long-term. 
Although quality of air in Orlando has remained high in comparison to Baltimore and 
Atlanta, and the EPA has not declared the city a "nonattainment" area, air quality has 
steadily declined in metropolitan Orlando over the 10-year period. In addition, totals for 
particulate matter days and ozone days in the city were similar to one another from 1999 
to 2003 (as opposed to findings for Baltimore and Atlanta) (EPA "AirData" 2004, Jelic 
2003). This means that I probably cannot attribute the city's deteriorating air quality to 
an increase in construction projects spurred by the desire to achieve smart growth. The 
results of this study indicate that Orlando does not have the motivation to immediately 
improve air quality that is associated with cities designated EPA nonattainment areas. 
Housing Conditions 
Finally, I examined housing conditions in Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando in 
order to evaluate the fifth smart growth objective of creating equitable, desirable 
neighborhoods. The condition and availability of housing is a critical component of 
smart growth program evaluation. As discussed in Chapter IV, housing is a basic part of 
one's total quality of life, associated with such factors as physical health and safety, 
equality, and financial well-being (Beaumont 1999, Burby and May 1997, Rusk 1993). I 
selected four indicators for evaluation- total available housing, median household rents, 
housing cost burden, and number of households with "any housing problems". If smart 
growth was occurring in the cities as a result of state and local programs, I expected to 
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see: (1) an increase in available housing in both the city and suburbs; (2) stabilization of 
cost or increase in cost of rents; (3) a decrease in housing cost burden; and (4) a decrease 
in the number of households with housing problems (Anderson and Tregoning 1998, 
Katz and Bradley 1999, Walljasper 200 1). Findings from the data analysis revealed most 
desirable results in Atlanta, followed closely by Orlando. Baltimore showed the least 
desirable results. 
In Atlanta, there were positive findings for each housing variable except median 
rent costs, which showed mixed results. In terms of the number of available housing 
units, desirable increases in unit totals were observed for both inner city and suburbs after 
state legislation was implemented (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). However, housing 
improvement in the central city was impacted by preparation for the 1996 Olympics, 
which included construction of apartment homes as well as major demolition projects in 
substandard neighborhoods. Although it is impossible to distinguish between the impact 
of smart growth legislation and the impact of Olympic preparation during the 1990s, 
results are clearly iri line with smart growth goals (Bullard 2000, City of Atlanta 2004). 
In addition, there was progress evident in both the improvement of housing 
conditions and cost burden for residents in Atlanta. Overall trends from 1990-2000 
included a decrease in the percentage of households with "any housing problems" and a 
decrease in housing cost burden for households with the lowest incomes (Bureau of 
Census "State" 2004 ). 
The only mixed results for housing conditions in Atlanta were associated with the 
median cost of rents. An undesirable finding was that after smart growth legislation 
inception in 1989, the gulf between suburban and inner city rents remained wide. This 
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indicates that households with low incomes remained less able to afford to move to the 
suburbs, where quality of life is generally better. On the other hand, a desirable finding is 
that median rent in the central city of Atlanta increased by about $50 after the smart 
growth program began in 1989 (Bureau of Census "State" 2004). This is probably a 
positive finding in light of the investment in developing quality affordable housing in the 
city after 1989 (including Olympic development). The increased rent in the inner city 
indicates that there is demand for that housing, and that the stock of housing is likely of 
sufficient quality to warrant the increase. 
Results were also largely positive for Orlando, but did include some mixed 
findings for median rent costs and incidence of housing problems. In terms of available 
units of housing, it was desirable to see an increase in both urban and suburban units over 
the entire 30-year period. Unfortunately, I cannot state conclusively that Florida's smart 
growth program was ·responsible for this because data points after 1985 may be at least in 
part a continuation of the trend line during the "pretest" years (Bureau of Census "State" 
2004). 
Examination of trends in median costs of rent are mixed in terms of progress 
toward smart growth. One positive finding is that the 1985 Florida legislation appears to 
have narrowed the divide between city and suburb rents ( until they became about the 
same in 2000). It is also positive that suburban rents have not continued to rapidly 
increase, as they did in earlier decades. On the other hand, for many who live in the city 
of Orlando, where average incomes are relatively low, housing is becoming less 
affordable (Bureau of Census "State" 2004, City of Orlando 2004 ). 
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Finally, trends in cost burden and housing "problems" in Orlando were also 
mixed. There was significant improvement in housing cost burden for the lowest income 
households in Orlando, those with less than or equal to 30% of median family income. 
At the same time, minorities in Orlando had a significantly higher incidence of housing 
problems in either of the years shown. The rapid expansion in population accounts for 
some of the disproportionate hardship seen for blacks and minorities. Nevertheless, it is 
alarming from a social equality standpoint to consider that about half of all black and 
Hispanic households in Orlando have some sort of housing problem (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004 ). 
The City of Baltimore, in contrast to Atlanta and Orlando, has shown minimal 
improvement in each of these categories. This is not surprising given the severity of the 
city's decline (City of Baltimore 2004, Knaap et al. 2003, Rusk 1996). The primary 
problem is that the central city of Baltimore lacks safe, affordable housing. Analysis of 
data reveals a gradual decline in available units in the city. While the city's effort with 
destruction of decrepit housing is a positive step, a net loss in total housing units is a 
critical concern for urban poor (Bureau of Census "State" 2004, City of Baltimore 2004). 
In addition, from 1990 to 2000, the difference in price between rents in the city 
and suburbs grew rather than shrank. This is partially because rents in urban Baltimore 
have decreased since 1990. These findings are reflective of both the deterioration in the 
housing stock in the city and the continued flight of residents outward from the city. Cost 
of housing has decreased in part because housing stock is old, substandard, or unsafe 
(Bureau of Census "State" 2004, Knaap et al. 2003, Rusk 1996). 
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Finally, the incidence of"housing problems" increased for whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics while the trend in housing cost burden was improving over the ten-year period. 
As I mentioned above, rents have been decreasing in Baltimore, so the discovery of 
"improvement" for housing cost burden is no surprise. These two findings together are 
further indication of deterioration in housing stock in Baltimore (Bureau of Census 
"State" 2004 ). 
Which Type Works Best? 
Analysis of dependent variables reveals that the City of Orlando experienced the 
most desirable changes in terms of smart growth objectives after statewide legislation 
was adopted. In fact, Orlando showed the best results for three of five dependent 
variables. Those were: Objective #2, control of development; Objective #3, creation and 
improvement of transportation options; and Objective #4, protection of natural resources. 
Atlanta, Georgia had the most desirable results for the two remaining categories: 
Objective #1, central city revitalization; and Objective #5, creation of equitable, desirable 
neighborhoods. Based on these results, I make the preliminary inference that high 
coercion/comprehensive-general smart growth legislation, as it exists in Florida, is the 
most effective of the three types examined. In addition, medium coercion/ 
comprehensive-general smart growth legislation, as it exists in Georgia, is tentatively 
concluded to be the second most effective type. 
Findings of this research imply that the more coercive a state's smart growth 
legislative program is, the more likely it will be effective at the local level. This is 
reinforced by the fact that not only was Florida's program most successful within this 
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study, but Georgia's  was second most successful. Maryland's program, which 
represented the low coercion/ comprehensive-general category, was not most effective 
for any of the five dependent variables examined. This conclusion is not surprising given 
that other authors reviewed within this study (Bollens 1992, Burby and May 1997, 
DeGrove 1990, Durant et al. 1993 , Gale 1992) have found that local governments are 
most likely to develop and implement substantive, effective plans when they are 
mandated to do so by the state. Such is the case in Florida, where local governments are 
required to develop plans and submit those plans for state approval. 
These findings are particularly of interest given that the trend for the last ten to 15  
years has been for states to implement less coercive smart growth programs (Burby and 
May 1997, Durant et al. 1993, Freilich 1999, Gale 1992, Weitz 1999). As described in 
Chapter Il, state growth planning programs have evolved over time. "First wave", or the 
earliest growth management legislation in states, generally included mandatory planning, 
a high degree of regtilation, and a focus on environmental protection. Recent, or "second 
wave" legislation, has tended to be a more cooperative effort between state and local 
governments, with incentive features rather than penalties, and with a focus divided 
between concern for the environment and healthy economic growth (DeGrove and 
Metzger 1993, Freilich 1999, Weitz 1999). Indeed, as in the case of smart growth 
legislation in Maryland, local government compliance is generally voluntary in most 
recent programs (Bollens 1992). 
If it is true that mandatory, highly regulated smart growth programs are most 
effective for achieving the objectives of smart growth, then state policy makers should 
consider these results carefully (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993 ). Of course, smart 
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growth legislation is molded in each state to reflect not only the needs of the people, as 
well as of the land and other resources; but also to reflect what is politically feasible 
(DeGrove 1990, Leo et al. 1998). As discussed in Chapter ID, Governor Glendening was 
successful with implementation of Maryland's legislation because he crafted it in a way 
that he knew would be accepted by the legislature and the constituents. In order to make 
the program as widely accepted as possible, he put minimal hardship on local 
governments in terms of participation and rearranged funds rather than requesting 
additional ones ( Cobb 1999, Cohen 2002 ). In short, it may be that even if highly 
coercive smart growth legislation is shown to be most effective, some states will have to 
choose between a less coercive program or no program, based on what is politically 
feasible. 
Perhaps I am looking too far ahead, however. As I have stated throughout this 
work, these results are preliminary. Many more systematic studies will be needed to 
confirm or deny the finding that highly coercive, or "first wave" programs are most 
effective. In addition, the methodological concerns I outlined in Chapter N still must be 
taken into account when considering these findings. While I was able to overcome or 
minimize the hazards associated with most of the methodological challenges, the decision 
to include only one city from each state does limit the external validity, or 
generalizability, of the results (Campbell and Stanley 1963). Each of the three cities 
utilized has characteristics and circumstances that make it unique. In the next section I 
will discuss not only how this project can be improved, but also some possible future 
directions for research in this area. 
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Avenues for Improvement 
I must state once again that this is a preliminary study. I have been restricted to 
the analysis of data that was, firstly, obtainable, and secondly, collected for all three 
cities, in identical format, at the same points in time. In light of these limitations, there 
are numerous potential avenues for improving this research. One avenue would be to 
conduct this study again, using the same cities, but with more indicators for each of the 
five smart growth objectives. For example, in addition to air quality, water quality and 
soil quality measures could be interpreted to gain a more complete understanding of the 
condition of natural resources in the cities ( assuming such measures were available for 
each city). Based on the incorporation of more variables, it would be interesting to see if 
Orlando, representative of high coercion/comprehensive-general type of legislation, was 
again found to be most successful. 
A second improvement would be to consider more cities, or cases, in each state. 
Conclusions would be more likely to be generalizable if the n was increased to, say, 
twenty cities in each state. The major problem with increasing the number of cities, 
however, is that there may not be twenty cities in the same population category in each 
state. Or, data may simply not be available for them all. I discovered over the course of 
this research project that county and, of course, state level data is much more widely 
available than city level data. That is unfortunate for policy research of smart growth 
programs because such research necessitates the comparison of data for entire MSAs, 
central cities and suburbs, and urbanized areas. 
Another avenue for improvement would be to include a state without smart 
growth legislation in the study. Doing so would provide a useful comparison case. It 
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would be particularly telling if the non-smart growth city/cities performed as well as or 
better than the smart growth cities. The state of Alabama would be a good choice for 
selection because it is notable as one of the few states with no history of smart growth or 
related legislation and none on the horizon. It would also be a good choice from a 
methodological standpoint because it is located in the same area of the country as the 
other three states, thereby allowing for some control over political and social culture, 
climactic and geographic conditions. 
Finally, the incorporation of attitudinal information might be useful. I limited my 
research to physical indicators at the exclusion of perceptual indicators. To clarify, a 
physical indicator of noise pollution would be the decibel level as registered by a meter 
near an airport. A perceptual indicator, on the other hand, would involve asking a 
resident of a neighborhood near an airport: "How loud is the airplane traffic on a 10-point 
scale?" (Green 2001 ). It would be interesting to survey citizens of each MSA in order to 
study the difference in perception of those living inside the city limits and those living in 
the suburbs. The attitudinal information collected could be used either to enhance or to 
compare with the physical indicators. Surveys could register opinions on the severity of 
various consequences of urban sprawl, such as loss of green space, traffic conditions, 
pollution, crime, and segregation. Responses could be broken-down for comparison by 
respondents' l�ngth of residency in the MSA, and place ofresidency as inner city, 
older/first ring suburb, newer/second ring suburb, or rural area. · 
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Implications for Future Research 
The study and evaluation of state smart growth legislation is ripe for academic 
inquiry. For nearly thirty years, the growth management trend in this country has been 
for an increasing number of states to assume some level of responsibility for local land 
use planning (Burby and May 1997, Freilich 1999, Weitz 1999). The time has come for 
systematic analysis of the effects of smart growth programs, as they continue to be 
implemented in a variety of forms. The ultimate goal of evaluation such as what is 
performed here is to determine whether or not smart growth programs produce some 
benefit for local communities. 
Future research regarding smart growth legislation should be directed in at least 
two areas: a "nuts-and-bolts" analysis of the effectiveness of various types of state 
legislative programs, as I have done here; and secondly, scholarly inquiry into the 
legitimacy of those fundamental criticisms of smart growth programs I identified early in 
Chapter II. In the previous section I suggested several paths for future evaluative 
research, so I will now tum my attention to the criticisms mentioned above. 
Two primary types of criticism are levied against smart growth programs. Some 
critics challenge the assumptions underlying the need for smart growth policies, arguing, 
for example, that urban sprawl is not a serious threat to farmland in the US. Other critics 
challenge the methods associated with achieving smart growth (Bishop and Tilley 2002, 
Gordon and Richardson 1998, Green 200 1 ,  Staley 2001 ). It is this second type of 
criticism that clearly requires attention in the form of future research. 
The basic challenge to be addressed is the notion that the market economy itself 
will correct for all or most of the problems associated with unhealthy growth (Bishop and 
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Tilley 2002, Gordon and.Richardson 1998, Staley 200 1). These critics argue, in other 
words, that it is preferable for state governments to pass no smart growth legislation, but 
instead allow the system of capitalism work. Markets, they contend, are much more 
effective than governments at registering the preferences of individuals (Bishop and 
Tilley 2002, Gordon and Richardson 1998, Staley 2001 ). Some argue that government 
interference in areas such as land and transportation management not only disables the 
market economy's ability to respond to problems, but it may create new problems. 
Further, " . . .  order can be produced without government planning. It is not that no one is 
planning; rather, everyone makes their own plans, and those plans are coordinated by 
market forces with the plans of everyone else" (Holcombe and Staley 200 1 ,  quoted p 10). 
This type of theory should be tested in light of the tremendous resources spent 
by governments at the local, regional, and state level to assure healthy growth (Freilich 
1999). It would indeed be a remarkable moment if it were discovered to be true that 
governments could redirect those resources elsewhere because the market alone would 
facilitate a responsible resolution. I do not think that would be the outcome. One only 
has to look to the coastline of the Atlantic to see how dangerous consumer preferences 
can be. When the shoreline is left unregulated, individuals will build at the edge of the 
sea, and rebuild in the same place after their homes are leveled by hurricanes ( Catlin 
1997, Liou and Dicker 1994, Switzer and Bryner 1998). 
While it may be shown that a market-based solution may be inappropriate for 
extremely sensitive areas, such as coastlines and floodplains, would the same be true for 
land uses in less sensitive areas? This research question could be addressed by 
comparing conditions in communities without government regulation of growth to 
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conditions in communities with government regulation. I have already suggested that a 
state such as Alabama presents an interesting test case because of its historic lack of land 
use or protection planning. 
Clearly the research agenda for the subject of smart growth is a full one. The 
most important question is an enduring one and not easily answered: How best to achieve 
smart growth? Many more studies such as this one are required to reach an answer. In 
conclusion, I think the following quote provides a good summation of the driving force 
behind both smart growth initiatives and the need for related research: 
"The prospect of everyone owning their own home evokes a nightmare image of 
endless single-family houses, apartment buildings, and condos sprawling over hill 
and dale, destroying farmland and forests, leading to increased car dependency, 
further fragmentation, excessive energy and resource consumption, and continued 
ecological damage. Neither the market nor the environment can support 
everyone in fulfilling this 'American Dream ' "  (Norwood and Smith 1995, quoted 
p 29). 
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APPENDIX I: TABLES 
23 1 
Table A-1 : Racial Groups as Percent of Total Population in Central City v. 
Suburban Baltimore 
1980 1990 2000 
Race Central Suburbs Central Suburbs Central 
city (%) (%) city (%) (%) city (%) 
White 44 89 39 86 3 1  
Black 54 8 59 10 64 
Hispanic 1 1 1 1 2 
Other 1 2 1 2 3 
Total 100 100 JOO 100 100 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
Date note: Percentages are rounded to nearest whole number. 
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Suburbs 
(%) 
79 
14 
2 
5 
100 
Table A-2: Racial Groups as Percent of Total Population in Central City v. 
Suburban Atlanta 
1980 1990 2000 
Race Central Suburbs Central Suburbs Central 
city (%) (%) city (%) (%) city (%) 
White 32 84 30 77 3 1  
Black 66 14 67 19 61  
Hispanic 1 1 2 2 5 
Other 1 1 1 2 3 
Total JOO JOO JOO JOO JOO 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. htt,p://socds.huduser.org 
Date note: Percentages are rounded to nearest whole number. 
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Suburbs 
(%) 
63 
25 
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JOO 
Table A-3: Racial Groups as Percent of Total Population in Central City v. 
Suburban Orlando 
1980 1990 2000 
Race Central Suburbs Central Suburbs Central 
city (%) (%) city (%) (%) city (%) 
White 66 86 63 8 1  5 1  
Black 30 1 0  27 9 26 
Hispanic 4 . 3 9 8 1 8  
Other I 1 2 2 6 
Total JOO JOO JOO JOO JOO 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
Date note: Percentages are rounded to nearest whole number. 
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Source: Gale, Dennis E. 1992. "Eight State-Sponsored Growth Management Programs: 
A Comparative Analysis. " Journal of the American Planning Association. 58, 
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Figure A-2: The Bollens Model 
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Cooperative/Planning Voluntary local government compliance; Incentive system used; Balanced environment/economic focus 
Source: Bollens, Scott A. 1992. "State Growth Management: Intergovernmental 
Frameworks and Policy Objectives." Journal of the American Planning 
Association. 58, no. 4 (Autumn): 454-466. 
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assistance, and advice to local governments; administers federal and 
state programs 
Type 5 No regional responsibility under state program; Local 
governments may establish and fund regional bodies 
Figure A-3: The Ndubisi and Dyer Model 
Source: Ndubisi, Forster and Mary Dyer. 1992. "The Role of Regional Entities in 
Formulating and Implementing Statewide Growth Policies." State and Local 
Government Review. 24 (Fall): 1 1 7-127. 
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Figure A-4: The Durant, Thomas, and Haynes Model 
Source: Durant, Robert F ., Larry W. Thomas and Don Haynes. 1993. "The Politics of 
Growth Management Reform in the States: A Comparative Analysis. Policy 
Studies Review. 12, no. 3: 30-54. 
239 
Consistency 
Requirements 
Persuasive 
Measures 
Vertical 
,,Jr 
_. Horizontal 
� Loe&
mremw 
Local Concurrencv 
_. Coercion 
_. Incentives 
Figure A-5: The Burby and May Model 
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Source: Burby, Raymond J. and Peter J. May. 1997. Making Governments Plan: 
State Experiments in Managing Land Use. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 
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Figure A-6: The Bollens and Caves Model 
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Source: Bollens, Scott A. and Roger W. Caves. 1994. "Counties and Land-Use 
Regionalism: Models of Growth Governance." International Journal of Public 
Administration. 17, no. 5: 851-880. 
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Figure A-7: The DeGrove and Stroud Model 
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Source: DeGrove, John M. and Nancy E. Stroud. 1987. "State Land Planning and 
Regulation: Innovative Roles in the 1980s and Beyond." Land Use Law and 
Zoning Digest. 39, no. 3: 3-8. 
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Figure A-8: The Proposed Model 
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Figure A-9: Comparison of Population Growth Between City of Baltimore and Suburbs 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-10: Comparison of Population Growth Between City of Atlanta and Suburbs 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-11: Comparison of Population Growth Between City of Orlando and Suburbs 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A- 12 :  White Population Trends in Baltimore 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A- 13: Black Population Trends in Baltimore 
2000 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-14: Comparison of White and Black Populations in Suburban Baltimore 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A- 15: White Population Trends in Atlanta 
2000 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-16: Black Population Trends in Atlanta 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-17: Comparison of White and Black Populations in Suburban Atlanta 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-18: White Population Trends in Orlando 
2000 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-19: Black Population Trends in Orlando 
2000 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-20: Hispanic Population Trends in Orlando 
2000 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-21: Comparison of White, Black, and Hispanic Populations in Suburban 
Orlando 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-22: Percentage of Population Living in Poverty Over Time in Baltimore 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-23 : Percentage of Population Living in Poverty Over Time in Atlanta 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-24: Percentage of Population Living in Poverty Over Time in Orlando 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-25: Comparison of Change in Population Density Over Time 
Source: Bureau of Census. Summary Files. http://factfinder.census. gov. 
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Figure A-26: Comparison of Rate of Change Between Population and Land Area for 
Urbanized Baltimore 
Source: Bureau of Census. Summary Files. http://factfinder.census. gov. 
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Figure A-27: Comparison of Rate of Change Between Population and Land Area for 
Urbanized Atlanta 
Source: Bureau of Census. Summary Files. http://factfinder.census.gov. 
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Figure A-28: Comparison of Rate of Change Between Population and Land Area for 
Urbanized Orlando 
Source: Bureau of Census. Summary Files. http://factfinder.census.gov. 
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Figure A-29: Trends in Roadway Congestion Index for Baltimore, Atlanta, and Orlando 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http :/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-30: Comparison of Trends in Roadway Congestion Index Between Baltimore 
and Average of Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-3 1 :  Comparison of Trends in Roadway Congestion Index Between Atlanta and 
Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-32: Comparison of Trends in Roadway Congestion Index Between Orlando 
and Average of Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-33: Trends in Annual Traffic Congestion Costs ($ Millions) 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-34: Comparison of Trends in Annual Traffic Congestion Costs Per Capita 
Between Baltimore and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility.tamu.edu 
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Figure A-35: Comparison of Trends in Annual Traffic Congestion Costs Per Capita 
Between Atlanta and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility.tamu.edu 
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Figure A-36: Comparison of Trends in Annual Traffic Congestion Costs Per Capita 
Between Orlando and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility. tamu.edu 
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Figure A-37: Trends in Annual Hours of Highway Traffic Delay Per Person 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-38: Comparison of Trends in Annual Hours of Highway Traffic Delay Per 
Person Between Baltimore and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility.tamu.edu 
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Figure A-39: Comparison of Trends in Annual Hours of Highway Traffic Delay Per 
Person Between Atlanta and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ !mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-40 : Comparison of Trends in Annual Hours of Highway Traffic Delay Per 
Person Between Orlando and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility.tamu.edu 
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Figure A-4 1 :  Trends in Annual Wasted Fuel Due to Traffic Congestion 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility.tamu.edu 
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Figure A-42: Comparison of Trends in Wasted Fuel Due to Traffic Congestion Between 
Baltimore and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-43: Comparison of Trends in Wasted Fuel Due to Traffic Congestion Between 
Atlanta and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http://mobility. tamu.edu 
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Figure A-44: Comparison of Trends in Wasted Fuel Due to Traffic Congestion Between 
Orlando and Average for Large Cities 
Source: Texas Transportation Institute. The 2001 Annual Mobility Report. 
http:/ /mobility. tamu. edu 
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Figure A-45 :  Comparison of Good to Unhealthy Air Quality Days in Baltimore 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. AirData. http://oaspub.epa.gov/pls/airsdata/ 
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Figure A-46 : Comparison of Good to Unhealthy Air Quality Days in Atlanta 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. AirData. http://oaspub.epa.gov/pls/airsdata/ 
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Figure A-47: Comparison of Good to Unhealthy Air Quality Days in Orlando 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. AirData. http://oaspub.epa.gov/pls/airsdata/ 
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Figure A-48: Comparison of Trends in Number of Days Ozone and Particulate Matter 
Were Main AQI Pollutants in Baltimore 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. AirData. http://oaspub.epa. gov/pls/airsdata/ 
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Figure A-49: Comparison of Trends in Number of Days Ozone and Particulate Matter 
Were Main AQI Pollutants in Atlanta 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. AirData. http://oaspub.epa.gov/pls/airsdata/ 
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Figure A-50: Comparison of Trends in Number of Days Ozone and Particulate Matter 
Were Main AQI Pollutants in Orlando 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. AirData. http://oaspub.epa.gov/pls/airsdata/ 
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Figure A-5 1 :  Comparison of Total Housing Units in Baltimore 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-52 : Comparison of Total Housing Units in Atlanta 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-53: Comparison of Total Housing Units in Orlando 
. Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-54: Median Household Gross Rent in Baltimore ( 1999 Dollars) 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-55 :  Median Household Gross Rent in Atlanta ( 1999 Dollars) 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-56: Median Household Gross Rent in Orlando (1999 Dollars) 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Set. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-57: Comparison in Percentage of Total Households in Baltimore With "Any 
Housing Problems" (As Defined by CHAS) 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Systems: Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy Data. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-58: Percentage of Population in Baltimore With a Housing Cost Burden 
Greater Than 50% of Their Income 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Systems: Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy Data. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-59: Comparison in Percentage of Total Households in Atlanta With "Any 
Housing Problems" (As Defined By CHAS) 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Systems: Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy Data. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-60: Percentage of Population in Atlanta With a Housing Cost Burden Greater 
Than 50% of Their Income 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Systems: Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy Data. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-6 1 :  Comparison in Percentage of Total Households in Orlando With "Any 
Housing Problems" (As Defined by CHAS) 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Systems: Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy Data. http://socds.huduser.org 
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Figure A-62: Percentage of Population in Orlando With a Housing Cost Burden Greater 
Than 50% of Their Income 
Source: Bureau of Census. State of the Cities Data Systems: Comprehensive 
Housing Affordability Strategy Data. http://socds.huduser.org 
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